India Deal Could Spur New Nuclear States, Former U.S. Official Says

By Jon Fox, Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The pending U.S.-Indian civil nuclear agreement could create a global environment in which Washington’s friends and allies feel emboldened to “go nuclear,” a former leading U.S. nonproliferation official said yesterday (see GSN, July 27).

Robert Einhorn, assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation during the Clinton administration, said he is less troubled by the deal’s potential implications for ongoing efforts to defuse the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises than how nations closely allied with the United States might react.

Nations such as Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt might regard the bilateral agreement as a signal that Washington would ultimately — if reluctantly — accept their entrance into the group of nuclear-armed nations, said Einhorn, now a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“Many countries contemplating the nuclear option will assume that they will be accepted into the nuclear club,” he said at the Center for National Policy.  “It may be months or years that they’re in the dog house,” but eventually relations would normalize.

A potential U.S. reaction “has been a critical factor in persuading a lot of countries around the world in deciding that it just wasn’t worth it for them to go nuclear,” Einhorn said.  “I think the deal will lower the perceived costs of a country going nuclear in the future”

India, which is not a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, first tested a nuclear device in 1974.  A series of tests in 1998 prompted Pakistan, India’s regional foe, to tests its own nuclear weapons. 

The proposed cooperation pact first announced by U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2005 would reverse decades of U.S. policy prohibiting trade in nuclear technology with nations outside the treaty.

The Bush administration, which has pushed aggressively for the pact, has argued the deal represents a net gain for the global nonproliferation regime.  All current and planned Indian civilian nuclear sites would be opened to monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency.  Military sites would remain closed to inspections.

Decades after conjuring its nuclear program into existence, India has demonstrated its commitment to not transferring sensitive technology and deserves some recognition as a nuclear state, according to administration officials.

In exchange for its cooperation, India could receive U.S. nuclear fuel and technology. 

Critics have argued that offering New Delhi nuclear fuel for civilian energy production would allow it to use its domestic supply of uranium solely for military purposes.  The deal might enable India to boost its annual production rate of nuclear warheads from between five and 10 to as many as 50 warheads annually, according to a former Indian intelligence official (see GSN, June 23). 

Einhorn suggested that number could be as high as 70 but said it is by no means clear to what extent fissile material production would be increased under the deal.

While not paramount among his concerns, Einhorn said the pact also offers Iran a rhetorical toehold from which to assail U.S. nonproliferation policy as selective and discriminatory.  Unlike India, Iran is a NPT signatory but Washington has persistently charged that Tehran has nuclear weapon ambitions.  Tehran claims its uranium enrichment research is for reactor fuel and purely peaceful.

“The deal sends a signal to the international community that the U.S. approach to nonproliferation is selective and self-serving,” Einhorn said.  “If the U.S. can bend the rules for its special friends, why can’t countries like Russia and China bend the rules for their special friends?”

Washington has not offered a similar deal to any other non-NPT state, including Pakistan.  Islamabad is reportedly negotiating its own deal to purchase six nuclear reactors from China in parallel with the India deal (see GSN, Aug. 17).

Einhorn cautioned that while the nonproliferation benefits of the U.S.-Indian agreement are thin, “I think the risks are very substantial.”

“The Indian government got essentially all that it wanted,” including no restrictions on its military nuclear program, he said.  “I think the United States fared much less well in that negotiation.”

Many of the benefits of the pact touted by administration officials are “long term and speculative,” Einhorn said, including India’s potential support for the U.S. stand on Iran.

“The idea that this deal is going to buy a strategic partnership that is going to have an impact on issues like Iran is illusory,” he said.  “It should be clear that India will choose its own independent path and often that path is going to be in conflict with the United States.”

The U.S. House of Representatives in July approved enabling legislation for the agreement.  The Senate could vote on its own version of the bill before 2007, but it is unclear if the bill will move to the Senate floor before Congress breaks in October or if it would be considered during a lame-duck session after the November midterm elections.  Lawmakers later would have to approve the actual deal.

In addition to the relaxation of U.S. export laws, the pending agreement requires India to strike an inspections agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group must also reach a consensus to alter its rules to permit sales of technology and fuel to India.  Current NSG guidelines bar the United States and other members from selling nuclear equipment and fuel to nations that do not open all their facilities to international safeguards.

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