U.S. Unprepared for Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism, Report Says

By Jon Fox, Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Adequate planning for the aftermath of an act of nuclear terrorism could save hundreds of thousands of lives, but nearly five years after the attacks of Sept. 11 those contingency plans still do not exist, according to a report released last week by the Physicians for Social Responsibility (see GSN, May 25).

Examining three scenarios — a nuclear blast in an urban area, an attack on a nuclear power plant and the detonation of a radiological “dirty bomb” in the heart of a city — the report says a quick decision to either evacuate or shelter downwind populations would be the most important factor in limiting deaths.

Despite the importance of taking swift action, however, the United States still has no plan for determining whether to mount an evacuation or shelter residents, according to the report. The report warns the lack of such a plan could lead to hundreds of thousands of conceivably preventable deaths.

The federal response last year to Hurricane Katrina “suggests there is no clearly designated individual or group to make the decision to evacuate or shelter and no clearly defined criteria for making that decision.”

“The consequences of nuclear terrorism are unbelievable and unimaginable,” said Irwin Redlener, director of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University, who appeared with other representatives of Physicians for Social Responsibility to release the report in Washington.

“It would make Katrina look like a rainstorm,” he said.

Considering the case of a modest 12.5-kiloton explosion in lower Manhattan –—about the size of the weapon the United States dropped on Hiroshima during the final days of World War II — the group estimates about 52,000 people would be killed instantly by the heat and blast of the bomb.

The authors estimate that an additional 238,000 people would be exposed to direct radiation from the explosion, basing their numbers on a 2002 study published in the British Medical Journal.  There would likely be 44,000 cases of acute radiation sickness, with 10,000 of those ending in death.

The deaths within the blast radius would be unavoidable, as would the immediate radiation exposure, but the authors argue that hundreds of thousands of deaths resulting from a massive radiation plume drifting across the New York metro area could be prevented.

As many as 1.5 million residents could be exposed to radioactive debris drifting miles from the blast’s epicenter.  Assuming a prevailing wind from the west, within two days a cloud of potentially lethal dust could drift well into Long Island, according to the report.

The fallout could kill an additional 200,000 people and cause hundreds of thousands of cases of acute radiation sickness.  By evacuating residents or advising them to find shelter during the most lethal period of exposure, authorities could prevent many deaths, according to the report’s authors.

They caution that such widespread exposure to radiation, as well as related traumatic injuries, would almost certainly overwhelm the medical response capacity.  In addition, many of the treatment facilities would likely be in areas affected by radiation.

“Five years after Sept. 11 the United States remains dangerously unprepared to deal with the aftermath of nuclear terrorism attack,” said Ira Helfand, one of the report’s authors.

“The Department of Homeland Security needs to simply do its job,” he said.  “It needs to create an effective overall coordinated strategic response plan to guide us in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack.”

Homeland Security maintains contact with between 50 and 60 medical organizations prepared to provide assistance in wake of a disaster.  That is unlikely to be sufficient, Helfand said.

The report’s recommendations include establishing a national disaster medical system that increases the number of medical assistance teams, allows for the rapid mobilization of existing military medical teams, and integrates volunteer medical professionals into the government response.

The report also recommends positioning radiation protection and monitoring equipment in areas at a high risk for attack and establishing mobile field hospitals near such urban areas.

The authors also stressed the importance of a central coordinating authority and a clear chain of command in the case of such a “megadisaster.”  Redlener called the current response framework “just disorganized.”

In Washington, D.C., where the report criticizes the lack of clearly marked road signs indicating evacuation routes, emergency plans have been in constant development since Sept. 11, 2001, said Sharon Gang, a spokeswoman for Mayor Anthony Williams.

“Sept. 11 changed everything for everybody,” she said.  Hurricane Katrina also made the city take another hard look at its plans.  “We learn as we go,” she said.

Following a terrorist nuclear strike, a decision to either evacuate or shelter would come from the mayor’s office, Gang said.  The general advice, however, is for residents to shelter in place, she said.

The city has an evacuation plan, which it tested on July 4 after downtown fireworks drew hundreds of thousands of spectators.  Officials gave themselves a grade of “A-minus” for the exercise that included cooperation with agencies in Maryland and Virginia.

Roads around the National Mall remained closed for half an hour after the fireworks to allow pedestrians to walk to their cars, and nearby traffic lights were retimed to stay green for longer periods.  Police were also posted at critical intersections to keep traffic flowing.

In Maryland and Virginia, officials also retimed lights to keep traffic moving smoothly into the suburbs.

“We’ve made a lot of progress and we’ve institutionalized our relationships with our other counterparts in the region,” Gang said.

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