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Former Defense Secretary Advises Warning North Korea From Friday, January 19, 2007 issue.

Former Defense Secretary Advises Warning North Korea

By Jon Fox
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry yesterday urged the Bush administration to warn North Korea of “grave consequences” should a North Korean bomb detonate in the United States, South Korea or Japan (see GSN, Jan. 17).

Whether that bomb was delivered by North Korea or a third party would not matter in terms of the U.S. response, he said.  The aim is to deter what Perry called one of the primary dangers of a nuclear North Korea:  that Pyongyang would transfer a working nuclear device or fissile material to a terrorist group.

“The statement should be as unambiguous as the one [President John F.] Kennedy made at the time of the Cuban missile crisis,” Perry, defense secretary under President Bill Clinton, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Without specifying precisely which statement he was referring to, he invited committee members to review Kennedy’s language.  Perry might have been pointing lawmakers to Kennedy’s 1962 statement indicating that any missile launched by Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union and Moscow could expect a full retaliatory response.

On Oct. 9, 2006, shortly after North Korea detonated a nuclear test device, President George W. Bush appeared to set such a red line for a nuclear transfer without making an explicit reference to retaliation (see GSN, Oct. 16, 2006).

“The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or nonstate entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States,” he said then (see GSN, Oct. 20, 2006).  “We would hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences of such action.”

The prospect of a nuclear bomb or plutonium making its way out of North Korea is more pressing than the prospect of a Pyongyang marrying a nuclear warhead to a missile and firing it at the United States or an ally, Perry said.

“They are still far from having that capability, and even if they did get it, deterrence would still be effective,” he said.  “The North Korean regime is not seeking to commit suicide.”

In June 2006, Perry along with former Assistant Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, published an opinion piece in the Washington Post calling for the United States to destroy any long-range ballistic missiles on their launch pads before North Korea could conduct a flight test (see GSN, June 22, 2006).  The following month, Pyongyang conducted a failed test of the long-range Taepodong 2 missile and six shorter-range missiles.

At the hearing, Perry drew attention to the potential for North Korea to sell a grapefruit-sized ball of plutonium that could fuel a nuclear device.  He suggested the Proliferation Security Initiative, the U.S.-led effort to prevent smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and WMD materials, is unlikely to stop such a transfer.

“We should never believe that [the Proliferation Security Initiative] has a high probability of preventing an experienced smugger like North Korea from transferring enough plutonium to make a bomb,” he said.

North Korea has a record as a proliferator of missile technology as well as a trafficker of counterfeit U.S. currency and illicit drugs.

The second major concern regarding North Korea, Perry said, is that it would complete work on an additional nuclear reactor, giving it the capability to produce enough plutonium for an additional 10 nuclear bombs a year.

In his prepared testimony for the committee, Perry wrote that he believes “we are in a very deep hole today with North Korea.”  Persuading Pyongyang to give up a capability it already has will be “very hard.”

“Because of past inactions on the part of the United States and the international community,” he wrote, there remain “no attractive options” to stop North Korea from developing its nuclear capacity.

He called for the United States to return to the six-party talks with a negotiating strategy that involves a “credible coercive element,” including cooperation from China and South Korea.  Those countries, Perry said, could threaten to cut off the supply of fuel oil and grain to North Korea.  “I would return to China and South Korea and lay this on them rather heavily,” he said.

Coercive diplomacy backed by the credible threat of force is critical, although if the United States is compelled to use military action there could be “dangerous unintended consequences,” he told the committee.

A possible inducement for China and South Korea to back the United States in its push could be the concern “that if they did not provide the coercion, the United States might take the only meaningful coercive action available to it — destroying” a nuclear reactor now under construction, Perry said.

Republican and Democratic committee members agreed on the dire nature of the North Korea nuclear situation and said they planned to devote more attention to the problem in the coming months.  Committee Chairman Tom Lantos (D-Calif.) said he plans a trip to North Korea this spring.

Members sent verbal barbs across party lines, with Democrats accusing the Bush administration of a “dithering” and failed North Korea policy.  Republicans pointed fingers at President Bill Clinton’s negotiated Agreed Framework with Pyongyang and said today’s situation with North Korea is a legacy of inherited problems.

“The initiation of the six-party talks was smart policy, but the deep divisions within the administration have hobbled the negotiations from day one,” Lantos said.

The Democratic chairman said he was concerned that Pyongyang has already stopped seriously considering negotiations, preferring instead to wait out the final years of the Bush administration.

“It is my hope that this is not the case, but North Korea’s decision to test a nuclear device just three months ago would seem to indicate that a deal may not be in the offing,” he said.

Lantos said he was heartened by a statement from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill that bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang could be normalized after the nuclear issue has been resolved (see GSN, Jan. 18).  “We must work assiduously to keep the door open for diplomacy,” Lantos said.  “The stakes are enormous.”

Democratic lawmakers on the committee called for the Bush administration to further engage China in the negotiations process and to talk directly with North Korea.

“In the interest of defusing a dangerous situation we should not fear dialogue,” said Eni Faleomavaega, a Democratic nonvoting delegate from the U.S. territory of American Samoa.

“We need more carrots.  We also need more sticks,” said Representative Brad Sherman (D-Calif.).  Inducements could include increased trade with North Korea and a nonaggression pact, he said.

Senior committee Republican Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (Fla.) expressed concerns that any additional nuclear tests in North Korea could spark an arms race in the region, spurring Japan, South Korea and maybe Taiwan to rethink their security needs.

She also highlighted the risk of Pyongyang spreading nuclear technology. 

“Kim Jong Il’s past eagerness to engage in illicit activities, including drug trafficking in Japan and counterfeiting of U.S. currency, indicates that the Dear Leader would have no hesitation in striking a proliferation deal for profit,” Ros-Lehtinen said.

While Ros-Lehtinen called the Agreed Framework a “disaster,” Perry said the negotiated freeze at the Yongbyon nuclear reactor from 1994 to 2002 prevented the production of enough plutonium for 50 to 100 nuclear weapons.

That negotiated freeze broke down when the Bush administration took control of North Korea policy.  The White House said officials in Pyongyang admitted to a having a suspected uranium enrichment program.  North Korean officials later denied having such a program or making such an admission.


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