Nuclear Attack Now Only Option in Some Cases, U.S. General Says

By Jon Fox
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United States has made little progress in developing a conventional “prompt global strike” capability, leaving the military few options short of a nuclear attack in certain scenarios, the head of U.S. Strategic Command said yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 2).

U.S. troops might not be able to respond quickly to a sudden military threat that has the potential for great harm to the United States, said Gen. James Cartwright. 

Such troop movements could take three to five days, he said, and other conventional strike capabilities exist that could eliminate threats within a day or two.  However, in cases in which a major threat must be addressed at intercontinental ranges immediately there is no option except for a nuclear-armed ballistic missile, Cartwright said in testimony before the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee.

“In the diverse threats that we deal with, that is not necessarily appropriate across the spectrum,” he said.  “We really need to be able to provide a capability for the nation below the nuclear threshold that can address these fleeting, high-value, high-regret factor type threats.”

Military officials have said a prompt global strike should deliver conventional weapons to a target as quickly as technology would allow and could include either a land- or sea-based ballistic missile system.

Such threats could range from a WMD-tipped ballistic missile or a weapon of mass destruction delivered by irregular means.

To respond to what Cartwright termed this “seam” in U.S. capabilities, the Defense Department has proposed modifying 24 nuclear-capable, submarine-launched Trident ballistic missiles to carry conventional warheads.

Lawmakers questioned the proposal last year and asked for an independent review by the National Academy of Sciences.  The report is due March 15.  Senators Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii) and Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), leaders of the opposition to the plan, spelled out their concerns more explicitly in a letter to the academy earlier this month.

“The fact that one would not be able to differentiate between a conventional missile launch and nuclear missile launch from a Trident submarine was viewed with particular concern by those of us who opposed the program,” they wrote.

Subcommittee Chairwoman Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.) echoed those concerns during her opening statement at the hearing yesterday, citing the Trident issue as one of a number of “important questions” regarding “prompt global strike.”

Cartwright did not directly address those concerns during his testimony but said a global strike missile is needed within two years.

Tauscher called for a public dialogue on the role of nuclear weapons and nonproliferation.  She also pointedly pushed Cartwright on the issue of the Reliable Replacement Warhead program, a plan to replace some or all of the nation’s nuclear stockpile with next-generation warheads that administration officials say would be easier to maintain and safer.

Officials from the Defense and Energy departments last week selected a design for the first new warhead.  The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California is due to spend the next year further developing that design (see GSN, March 2).

“I strongly believe we need a public debate on the nature of strategic deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons,” Tauscher said.  “General, as you know, I believe that finding ways to prevent the spread and possible use of nuclear technology, material and weapons is at least important as the future of the nuclear arsenal.”

Tauscher stressed that a number of outstanding questions remain on the RRW program, and said Congress in this budget year would make no decision on funding actual construction of the new warhead (see GSN, March 5).

President George W. Bush’s fiscal 2008 budget request contained nearly $89 million for the program, a more than threefold increase over the last congressionally approved budget.

A new, more reliable warhead would allow military planners to reduce the current stockpile without jeopardizing deterrence, Cartwright said.  “We need to have an infrastructure that is responsive to operational and technical surprises.”

Officials have said the new weapon would also incorporate more measures to prevent detonation if terrorist group ever obtained a U.S. bomb.  “Nirvana for me is if the wrong person gets a hold of it, it’s a paperweight,” Cartwright said.  “That’s where we need to be.”

The warhead is slated to first replace the payloads on submarine-launched W76 ballistic missiles and the nuclear yield is not expected to change by any significant amount.  The massive explosive power of the weapons would only fluctuate by perhaps 1 or 2 percent, Cartwright said.

“We are allowing the designers, where appropriate, to reduce the size and yield … in order to optimize for larger margins and ensure we don’t have to test,” he said.

Lawmakers have said they would strongly oppose the program if it meant a return to nuclear testing, something the United States has not done in more than a decade (see GSN, March 7).  The United States has signed but not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

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