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Experts Offer Limited Support for New U.S. Warhead By Jon Fox WASHINGTON — A panel of nuclear weapons experts has called the Bush administration’s push to develop a new warhead a “prudent hedge” against future stockpile-related uncertainties, but the group also concluded that the initiative is difficult to fully assess in the absence of a clear White House-defined nuclear weapons policy (see GSN, April 23). In attempting to determine the benefits of the administration’s twin plans for a new, invigorated nuclear weapons complex and the first new warhead in nearly two decades, the authors of the report from the American Association for the Advancement of Science struggled with a lack of details. The experts note that there have been no presidential or Cabinet-level statements describing the role of nuclear weapons in the “post-Cold War, post 9/11 world that make the case for and define future stockpile needs.” Most of the benefits of the complex overhaul and the new warhead, dubbed the Reliable Replacement Warhead, would occur in the long term. “In the absence of detailed plans on scope, schedule and costs, however, it is not possible to make judgments” about the positive effects of replacing some or all of the stockpile with new weapon designs. The Bush administration has offered no description of the size or composition of a future nuclear stockpile. Nor is there a cost schedule or description of the scope of transformation of the nuclear complex 20 to 25 years in the future. “These things don’t exist,” said Bruce Tarter a former director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and chairman of the committee that produced the report. “There are risks in either long-term outcome — a stockpile that would be composed of all or mostly RRWs, or one that would be composed of mostly legacy warheads — and it is difficult today to weigh the pros and cons,” the report states. It would be difficult to individually transform the network of production facilities and laboratories that maintain the nation’s nuclear stockpile, produce new warheads or update the current stockpile of aging weapons, Tarter said. The current plans call for doing all three at once. “If you’re going to do a really big job, then you ought to have a national policy debate,” Tarter said yesterday during a discussion of the report. The current plans include replacing a number of the W-76 warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the backbone of the Administration officials say the replacement warhead would include new safety features, be easier to maintain and less likely to fail than Cold War-era weapons that were designed to get the most bang for the buck. Existing weapons are changed slightly every time they undergo maintenance, and their reliability could be compromised over time, officials say. Accumulation of such minute changes could eventually necessitate a return to underground testing to confirm the viability of the stockpile, administration officials have said. The Reliable Replacement Warhead would alleviate this concern and could most likely enter the stockpile without testing, they say (see GSN, March 30). Energy Department officials say the new design, which could be followed by new warheads for silo-based missiles or gravity bombs, should also provide the catalyst for the transformation of the production infrastructure, a plan tagged Complex 2030. Both the RRW and Complex 2030 projects have stirred concerns in Congress, but Tarter noted there have been no statements from the White House illustrating the need for either. Clear support has come from both Gen. James Cartwright, head of U.S. Strategic Command, and Energy Department officials, “but there is no current Cabinet-level or higher articulation of a policy framework to fit this program into,” he said. Debating such policy is not something one wants “to do every year or every five years but with this kind of change we believe you want to do it,” Tarter said. If the Complex 2030 plan is going to survive its more than 20 year scope, the White House must drum up strong bipartisan support, the authors wrote. “Based on experience, there cannot be a major transformation of the sort envisioned by the Complex 2030 and RRW programs without greater White House leadership,” the report concludes. As much as White House support is necessary, it is also an awkward time for such a move, Tarter said, noting that the Bush administration’s final days are quickly approaching. Senator Pete Domenici (R-N.M.), a strong supporter of the plans, recently sent a letter to the White House requesting a statement on the RRW and Complex 2030 proposals, according to Tarter Despite certain concerns, the report still concludes that taking the initial steps down the path toward the Reliable Replacement Warhead “could be a prudent hedge against the uncertainties of an all-legacy future and an opportunity that might result in the creation of a better long-term posture.” It would also present “considerable challenges” for the production complex particularly in producing an accelerated rate of plutonium pit manufacturing. Due to the substantial time it would take to fully carry out the plans, the report concludes that a successful approach would balance weapons program goals and international nonproliferation and arms control concerns. “It could be an arms control benefit. It could be an arms control provocation. In the absence of a policy it’s hard to tell which would be the case,” Tarter said of the program. The report suggests the The National Nuclear Security Administration, a semiautonomous division within the Energy Department that is shepherding the RRW program, praised the AAAS report yesterday. “The AAS study provides a valuable contribution to the discussion on RRW,” acting NNSA head Thomas D’Agostino said in a statement. “Several … recommendations reaffirm our ongoing plans to study the RRW concept and move forward with our modernization and transformation efforts.” The report validates NNSA plans to pursue a detailed cost and schedule plan for the RRW program, D’Agostino said. The NNSA response also notes that the Bush administration plans to look closely at the reports recommendations. Representative Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), chairwoman of the House Armed Forces subcommittee that oversees military funding for nuclear weapons, said in a statement the report is consistent with her concerns regarding the program (see GSN, March 21). “If the Reliable Replacement Warhead is going to move forward and we are to realize the program’s full potential, its risks must be identified and clear policy objectives outlined,” she said. “The Bush administration has to make it clear that RRW will not come at the expense of stockpile stewardship and that a real commitment to not-testing exists.” The panel concluded that the current design proposal for the RRW program could lead to a final design that could enter the stockpile without testing. Tarter said the laboratories are “quite confident” on this point.
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