Medvedev Stands Firm on Russian Strategic Policy

By Chris Schneidmiller
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — If new Russian President Dmitry Medvedev plans significant updates to his nation’s strategic policy, he is in no hurry to alert the world (see GSN, May 15).

Since taking office in May, Medvedev has not strayed far from the postures taken by his predecessor and current prime minister, Vladimir Putin, regarding Russia’s nuclear and missile arsenal and relations with the West.

Moscow hosted a throw-back to Soviet times just two days after Medvedev’s inauguration, rolling nuclear Topol-M missiles and other heavy weaponry down Red Square in the first such display since the Cold War (see GSN, May 9).  In the weeks afterward, Medvedev promised to provide necessary funding for Russian missile forces, warned against further expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and took several jabs at U.S. missile defense plans for Europe (see GSN, May 15).

The London Times reported this week that Moscow was considering aiming nuclear missiles at Western Europe should the continent become home to missile shield elements seen as a threat to Russian strategic security — a threat previously made by Putin (see GSN, July 14).

“I think in both national security issues and foreign policy issues what we’re seeing right now is a great deal of continuity between now-Prime Minister Putin and the new president, Medvedev,” said U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Merkel, whose portfolio includes Russia.

That should be no surprise, experts said, given how well those policies have played with the Russian populace.

“Any new leader wants to demonstrate that he’s a defender of Russia and an advocate for a strong military,” said nonproliferation expert Joseph Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund.  “You can expect speeches in the Putin model by Medvedev before military audiences, promising increased expenditures, perhaps demonstrating what they claim is a new and unique weapons capability, and probably accompanied by some sort of test or demonstration of that capability.”

The Putin government established an assertive strategy policy largely from its inception at the end of 1999.  Military doctrine adopted the next year allowed for use of a limited nuclear strike to deter a conventional attack on Russia, said Nikolai Sokov, a senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.  Leaders in Moscow wanted to ensure that the United States and NATO would not turn their conventional military might against Russia, he said:  “The answer was the limited use of nuclear weapons.”

Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal now stands at an estimated 5,200 warheads.  Under Putin, the nation’s military sought to ensure it possessed a modern strategic force — dismantling outdated weapons even as it finished a decade-long project to complete its latest ballistic missile submarine and increased efforts to maintain and extend the lifespan of nuclear-capable missiles.  It also deployed ICBMs reputed to be capable of defeating any missile defense system, as the Bush administration pursued just such a program.

Putin supported arms control alongside modernization of his nation’s atomic capabilities.  The Russian leader and U.S. President George W. Bush in 2002 signed the Moscow Treaty, which limited their nations to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed warheads each.  Moscow also pressed for a pact to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which prohibits the nations from deploying more than 6,000 warheads on 1,600 nuclear delivery vehicles, when it expires in December 2009.

Both branches of nuclear policy reflected Russia’s desire to “sustain or recapture its sense of importance in the world,” particularly in relation to its former Cold War enemy, said Jon Wolfsthal, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“President Putin was anxious to make sure that the United States and Russia remained in a situation of nuclear parity, both for strategic stability reasons but also in terms of political parity,” he said.

Updating Russia’s nuclear capabilities was fueled by the nation’s oil- and gas-funded prosperity and helped mask the weakness of the nation’s deteriorating conventional forces.  Moscow was spending money on both military sectors, but rebuilding the conventional side was significantly more expensive, Wolfsthal said.

It is hard to know how much it actually spent, or how central Putin was in directing this strategy, given the Kremlin’s penchant for secrecy, experts said.  As president, though, he was in charge of the Defense Ministry and appointed the top officials who would direct the policy.

If intent on some areas of arms control, the Putin government appeared “cavalier” in others, Sokov said.  Moscow last year suspended participation in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, which limits deployment of troops and heavy military equipment on the continent (see GSN, Dec. 12, 2007).  Putin also suggested Russia would exit from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which forced the Cold War superpowers to remove medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe, unless other nations joined the pact (see GSN, Oct. 12, 2007).

“By withdrawing from the [Antiballistic Missile] Treaty in 2002 and pursuing [missile defense] deployment in Europe today, the U.S. has shown the way — practically licensed withdrawal from treaties by others,” according to Sokov.  “The military argument in Moscow is, ‘If the U.S. can dump treaties because they are no longer convenient or date back to the Cold War, why can’t we?’”

It is too early in Medvedev’s presidency to determine how he will address these matters, or to anticipate significant diversions from Russian policy under Putin, Merkel and analysts told Global Security Newswire.

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said last month he expected Russia to focus on boosting its nuclear power.  However, Sokov argued that Medvedev might be preoccupied with more pressing social and economic matters.  The defense industry complained several months ago that not enough money was being directed toward production for a new ICBM.  First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov “said we don’t want to switch money from social problems.  Production will remain at the same level,” Sokov said.

“Neither Putin nor Medvedev will wake up in the middle of the night thinking, ‘Oh my God, what am I going to do with nuclear weapons?’  That’s a small, routine thing compared to the economic agenda, social agenda,” he said.

Medvedev’s authority to make significant changes is, from the outside at least, somewhat in doubt.  The president is a protege of Putin’s, with a working relationship that dates back to the prime minister’s days in St. Petersburg politics, and questions remain about who holds the figurative reins of government.  Putin selected the sitting Russian ambassador to the United States as his foreign affairs chief, suggesting his intention to remain in charge of foreign policy matters as prime minister, analysts told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.  Washington continues to see Putin as the “go-to guy” for communication, one expert said.

“I think it leans to ‘good cop, bad cop,’” Russia expert Nikolas Gvosdev told RFE/RL.  “But I think they’re attempting to divide … different aspects of foreign policy.  That is, Medvedev is your go-to business guy, who will sign contracts, and talk up the positives of cooperation and how we can all make money.  And Putin is the heavy who comes in and says let’s talk nuclear security.”

The Russian constitution establishes the president as the ultimate authority on foreign policy and the manager of the defense and foreign ministers.  Washington would address questions on foreign policy to that side of the government rather than to Putin’s office, Merkel said.

While Putin himself has declared his successor as Russia’s leader, he is likely to be a significantly more involved in the decision-making process than previous prime ministers, Sokov said.  The analyst said that he expects the former president ultimately to worry more about running the economy than nuclear policy.  “I don’t think that’s a big interest of his.”

Wolfsthal said colleagues in Russia have characterized Medvedev as “his own man” and believe he will be looking to set himself apart from Putin.  “One of the few areas where he has freedom of action as Russian commander in chief is in the area of military affairs and particularly nuclear military affairs.  So he may in fact seek to develop his own Medvedev policy on strategic nuclear weapons,” the analyst said.

The current and former leaders have a strong relationship and appear to be operating on the same wavelength, reducing the potential for conflict, said one State Department official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.  Should there be a difference of opinion on an issue, Medvedev is likely to defer to Putin until he has gained experience as his administration progresses, the official said.  The president’s authority would also increase as he puts his own people into supporting positions, Sokov said.  It took Putin two to three years to complete that process.

Russia is preparing an updated military doctrine, Sokov said.  While the Kremlin is, unsurprisingly, saying little about its intentions, he said it is unlikely that the new doctrine would amend nuclear policy or that Medvedev would become deeply involved in its preparation.

Washington would like to see decisions that help promote stability and reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, Merkel said.  The Bush administration is continuing talks with Medvedev’s government on a replacement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and to allay its concerns regarding deployment of missile defenses in Europe, he said.  A senior Russian foreign policy adviser, though, has called U.S. proposals for verification of a new treaty “empty” (see GSN, July 7).

Engagement on nuclear reductions could help restore U.S.-Russian ties that became strained under Putin and President George W. Bush, Cirincione said.

He said observers might expect for several moves on Moscow’s part.  Talk of complete exits from the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaties should be taken seriously, he said:  “In the wrong political environment even empty slogans have a way of becoming real weapons programs.”  Russia has the resources to restart a medium-range missile program and could see it as another way to extend diplomatic influence through military means.

The Kremlin could also become the latest power to destroy a satellite, making clear its ability to destroy other nations’ space-based assets if deemed necessary, Cirincione said (see GSN,  Jan. 19, 2007 and Feb. 21, 2008).

“China did it, the U.S. did it.  You’re almost daring Russia to do it,” he said.  “That could be a real problem.  Because once Russia tests people will forget what might have provoked that test or set the model for that test.  They’ll just see it as something they have to respond to, both in Beijing and in Washington.”

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