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BWC I:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes">  </span>U.S. Rejects Mandatory InspectionsFrom Tuesday, November 20, 2001 issue.

BWC I:  U.S. Rejects Mandatory Inspections

By David Ruppe

Global Security Newswire

The Bush administration further distanced itself from a major international arms control initiative yesterday, indicating it opposes mandatory inspections for suspected biological weapons programs worldwide.

Arms control advocates said the move would harm international efforts to catch and deter banned biological weapons programs.

At a treaty review conference in Geneva to consider, among other items, an enforcement protocol for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton said the protocol, which would require the mandatory inspections approach, is “flawed” and would create a “false sense of security.”

He said the United States favors setting up a “voluntary cooperative mechanism for clarifying and resolving compliance concerns by mutual consent, to include exchanges of information, voluntary visits, or other procedures to clarify and resolve doubts about compliance.”

The treaty bans the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons but currently lacks any mechanisms for verification and enforcement.

Called a Weak Substitute

Arms control experts say the U.S. proposal is a weak substitute for mandatory inspections.

“There is already language in the biological weapons treaty itself which allows for these sort of voluntary conversations with respect to compliance concerns,” said Elisa Harris, a research fellow at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies and a former Clinton administration National Security Council official.

“If the administration doesn’t have confidence in Iran or others abiding by the protocol, why would they for a moment believe such countries would participate in voluntary arrangements by mutual consent?” Harris said.

Bolton’s statement reflected a significant change in U.S. government policy regarding international efforts to curtail biological weapons proliferation (see GSN, Nov. 2). The Clinton administration had worked for six years to negotiate the protocol with parties to the convention.

Representatives from China, Russia and Japan on Monday indicated their continued support for the protocol.

“The recent tragic events in the United States and the continuing danger of terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass destruction have only reinforced our belief in the need to strengthen the operation of the convention by ratifying a multilateral and legally binding document,” said Leonid Skotnikov, head of the Russian delegation to the conference.

Jonathan Tucker, a chemical and biological weapons analyst at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, however, said the U.S. position effectively kills the protocol effort, though perhaps not the review process.

“I think countries debated back in July whether to proceed without the U.S. and it was recognized that even if a protocol were to enter into force without the U.S. it would be meaningless, since the U.S. has by far the largest biotechnology industry in the world.”

An Alternative Approach

The Bush administration first signaled it would oppose the protocol in July, arguing would be too weak to catch cheaters, but would put at risk sensitive U.S. commercial secrets and biological defense activities.

Michael Moodie, president of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, said the new policy reflects a recognition that a mandatory verification mechanism would probably not work on countries like Iraq or Iran, and so some alternative approach is needed.

“It’s based on the premise that we don’t see a way to verify compliance,” he said.

Moodie said the administration has begun developing an alternative approach toward curtailing banned biological activities, which involves creating “an environment in which the misuse of the life sciences is not acceptable within the scientific community first of all and within the broader community of governments and with the public more generally.” A core component of that would be an agreement to enact national legislation criminalizing activities banned by the convention.

“It’s certainly not traditional arms control,” he said.

Bolton’s speech also seemed to indicate an increased focus on rogue countries suspected of pursuing biological weapons program. In a novel move for a diplomatic conference, it named five countries the United States believes has biological weapons programs: Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria (see related GSN story, today).

The University of Maryland’s Harris said there were other countries Bolton should have named, noting that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told a congressional hearing last summer that at least 13 countries were believed to have biological weapons programs.

“The courageous thing for the United States to do today would be to name friends and allies as well as rogues,” she said.

Monterey’s Tucker, however, said naming names probably increased bitterness over the U.S. rejection of the protocol. “From a diplomatic standpoint, I don’t think it was constructive.”

Strong Words

Bolton prefaced the U.S. proposals with strong words calling for action in curtailing the development and use of biological weapons.

The time has come for “straight talk about BWC compliance,” he said, and called on signatories to the convention to be “courageous, unflinching, and timely” in fighting the proliferation of biological weapons.

Bolton listed some other proposals for strengthening the convention, including:

ú         Adopting strict standards for the security of pathogenic microorganisms;

ú         Establishing a mechanism for international investigations of suspicious disease outbreaks and/or alleged BW incidents and

ú         Adopting and implementing strict biosafety procedures based on World Health Organization or equivalent national guidelines.

The U.S. proposal should not be considered “a complete package, or a package that totally gets the job done,” said Moodie.

He added, “when you are trying to create new mindsets and new ways of doing business in a community that is not necessarily known for its flexibility, you’ve got to take some small beginning steps and I think this represents a potential basis on which to move forward.”

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