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Anthrax I:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes">  </span>Powder Produced Recently, Watchdog SaysFrom Tuesday, December 04, 2001 issue.

Anthrax I:  Powder Produced Recently, Watchdog Says

By David Ruppe

Global Security Newswire

Genetic testing suggests the sophisticated anthrax mailed to two U.S. senators and two news organizations was produced in a small batch, and fairly recently, according to a well-connected molecular biologist.

That would further suggest the perpetrator was someone connected with a government program or who works in a laboratory connected with a government program, Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, who runs the Federation of American Scientists’ chemical and biological arms control program, told Global Security Newswire yesterday.

“I’m certain it’s someone connected with a government program, or who works in a laboratory connected with a government program,” she said.

U.S. officials have yet to announce any results of the testing performed by a nongovernmental laboratory.

The anthrax probably was produced already in weapon form for U.S. biological weapons defense research, or was stolen from such a program and weaponized elsewhere, but did not likely come from an old offensive biological weapons program, she said.

“The grapevine has it that the results of an experiment on genetic variation at certain locations suggest that this material was made in a very small batch, and that suggests that the material was not made in some old weapons program on a large scale,” she said, citing sources inside and outside the government.

Mark Wheelis, a University of California-Davis microbiologist, similarly says that if the material were stolen from a government lab, it must have been done after 1980, probably from a small batch used for biological defense research, and not taken from U.S. offensive weapons stocks.

“Assuming for the moment that Barbara’s hypothesis is true, then this spore preparation could not have been stolen from the U.S. weapons program at the time we had an offensive program because the Ames strain wasn’t isolated until 10 years after the programs were ordered closed,” Wheelis said.

Wheelis is doubtful, however, that genetic analysis can pinpoint a specific time when it was made since 1980.

“That’s asking an awful lot for a technique like this, to even pin it down to a decade,” he said.

Strong Track Record

Rosenberg has a good recent track record on theorizing about the anthrax.

For several weeks, she has circulated her theory that a renegade person associated with a U.S. biological weapon defense laboratory was responsible for mailing the letters in September and October.

When she presented the theory in a speech last month at the Biological Weapons Convention review conference in Geneva (see related GSN story, today), a U.S. representative at the conference was said to have walked out of the room.

If her theory proves true, it could be embarrassing for the United States, which effectively killed conference efforts to create a legally binding verification mechanism for the treaty.

Rosenberg’s arguments seem to be gaining increasing credence. A New York Times story yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 3) reported federal scientists and a contractor found the mailed anthrax powder to be “virtually indistinguishable” from anthrax produced by the U.S. military in its offensive biological weapons program, which ended in the early 1970s.

The Times story said the powder had a similarly extremely high concentration of the deadly spores, much higher than other countries and terrorist groups are capable of producing.

An unidentified senior federal science adviser, cited in the story, said the finding lends credence to the idea the terrorist had links to a government lab or its contractors.

The Times also reported Sunday the FBI had expanded the focus of its investigation of the mailings to include government and contractors’ laboratories.

“Barbara’s analysis certainly fit all of the facts as we knew them at the time, and I don’t believe anything has surfaced yet that disagrees with it,” said Wheelis. “Certainly the articles in the Times provide further confirming evidence.”

Citing Publicly Available Evidence

Rosenberg said she developed her theories by analyzing publicly available evidence and with input from other scientists, and from “inside” sources.

She said the strain contained in the letters was the same as one that was used by the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases for biological weapons defense research, the Ames strain.

Further, she said a sample of the anthrax reportedly was mixed with a drying agent believed used by the United States to keep the spores from caking so it will float in the air.

“All the available information is consistent with a U.S. government lab as the source, either of the anthrax itself or of the recipe for the U.S. weaponization process,” wrote Rosenberg.

The U.S. weaponization process is secret, however, she noted, so further analysis would be needed to determine whether the letter samples were made using the special U.S. process.

Investigators have yet to say officially whether the size of the spores and the type of drying agent match that of anthrax made through the secret U.S. process.

“I do think we have to be cautious in recognizing that this is still a hypothesis,” Said Wheelis of U.C.-Davis. “It is still at this point just a theory.”

Informed Speculation

Rosenberg is not alone in her suspicions.

“There is explicit speculation floating around the informed bioweapons community in the United States that this might have been diverted from a U.S. biodefense program,” said Wheelis.

Some scientists have contended, however, that the perpetrator did not necessarily have to be associated with a U.S. biological defense program to produce that particularly virulent strain of anthrax.

Marjorie Pollack, an epidemiologist based in Brooklyn, is not yet convinced there is evidence a person associated with a government program was responsible, although she doesn’t rule it out either.

“Nothing I’ve seen points it to being a government worker,” said Pollack. The perpetrator could be a former scientist, but might also be a disgruntled lab worker or doctoral student in the biological sciences, she said.

Pollack argues equipment that could be used to produce dry anthrax powder, like that used in the attacks, is commonly employed in commercial industries and the drying process is well described in a journal that can be found on the Internet.

“It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to translate this particle size research and get the equipment to do it,” she said “It’s a whole industry out there and if I can find this online so can somebody else.”

A Disgruntled Person With Lab Experience

Rosenberg, Pollack and other scientists seem to agree on the perpetrator’s motivations and basic abilities.

He is probably a disgruntled employee who probably had access to the bacteria at a laboratory somewhere in the United States and some skill at working with hazardous materials, they say.

It could be “somebody who is concerned there is not enough funding for biological terrorism research, and got tipped over the edge by the Sept. 11 attacks and wanted to point out how vulnerable we were,” said Pollack.

The particularly virulent Ames strain has been used in U.S. biological defense work, but it also has been distributed for study to a handful of laboratories within and outside the United States, experts say.

The perpetrator did not appear to intend to inflict mass casualties, suggests Pollack, because the letters, sent nearly a month after Sept. 11, warned the recipients that anthrax was present, and in at least two letters, to take antibiotics.

The FBI Nov. 9 issued a very general profile of the suspected perpetrator based upon an assessment of his handwriting on three of the envelopes and letters. It suggested the letters all were written by one person: an adult male with a scientific background, potentially a loner, and possibly comfortable working with hazardous materials.

The person may also have been vaccinated or used antibiotics, had access to anthrax and possessed knowledge of how to refine it, had access to relevant lab equipment, and could hold grudges for a long time, vowing that he will get even with “them” one day, according to the FBI.

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