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Anthrax: U.S. Army Reconstructs Spores Used in Attacks The spores used in the U.S. anthrax incidents match those recently produced by the U.S. military for investigative purposes, the Baltimore Sun reported today. As the “Amerithrax” investigation continues, however, critics are questioning theories that point to a U.S. military connection, according to reports. Scientists at the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah have produced small amounts of weapon-grade anthrax that is nearly identical to the spores used in the incidents, U.S. sources said. The production of weaponized anthrax is apparently the first since former U.S. President Richard Nixon ended the U.S. offensive biological weapons program in 1969, the Sun reported. Dugway researchers sent the newly produced anthrax—via Federal Express—to the U.S. Army Military Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMIID) for sterilization. USAMIID shipped the spores back to Dugway as a coarse paste, according to the Sun. Dugway researchers then used the killed spores to minimize risks to workers while conducting experiments. Some experiments, such as those on decontamination methods and detection systems, needed to use live and weaponized anthrax, according to government sources. Army officials said the anthrax stored at Dugway and USAMIID were protected by several security measures. At Dugway, security measures included video cameras, intrusion alarms and a “buddy system,” which does not allow researchers to handle anthrax and other microbes alone, according to one scientist. Dugway produced the live anthrax because vaccines and other preventive measures need to be tested against aerosolized anthrax, according to David Huxsoll, a former head of the USAMIID’s biodefense program. “When you’re building a program to defend against biological weapons on the battlefield, you have to be prepared for an aerosol exposure,” Huxsoll said. The Army’s production of small amounts of weapon-grade anthrax at Dugway would not violate the Biological Weapons Convention, said University of Maryland expert Milton Leitenberg. The convention only bans the production of biological warfare agents for non-protective measures. “There’s no specific limit in grams or micrograms,” Leitenberg said. “But if you got up in the hundreds of grams, people would be very, very skeptical” (Scott Shane, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 12). Rosenberg Theory Questioned A recent report that suggests someone connected to the U.S. military is responsible for the anthrax incidents has several inaccuracies that call its conclusions into question, according to the New Republic (see GSN, Dec. 4). One false conclusion made in the report, prepared by Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, head of the Federation of American Scientists’ Working Group on Biological Weapons Verification, is that the limited circle of research facilities with access to the Ames strain of anthrax—the same strain used in the incidents—suggests a domestic source, the New Republic reported. Terrorists could just as easily obtain Ames strain spores from a recently dead cow, according to David Huxsoll, interim director of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center in New York. The Ames strain, which was first isolated in 1929, is a monomorphic disease—one in which strains mutate slowly, or not at all—Huxsoll said. Spores taken from a cow that died recently would be virtually the same as the Ames strain used by researchers, he said. “One should not be at all surprised that you could find something very much the same—it would be a surprise to find something very different,” said Huxsoll. “If I were a terrorist, I’d just go where the disease occurs naturally and dig it up.” The Rosenberg report also said the United States first researched a strain of anthrax called Vollum 1B as a weapon (see GSN, Dec. 10), but then “the search undoubtedly continued for better strains. The U.S. bioweapons program apparently switched to the Ames reference strain because of its high virulence.” There is no evidence of such a switch in research having taken place, according to the New Republic. The U.S. biological weapons program never gave up working with Vollum 1B, according to a law-enforcement official. Instead, when researchers saw how slowly anthrax killed its victims, they abandoned work on it altogether, the New Republic reported. “Who the hell wanted a weapon that would take 60 days to kill?” asked the official. If any former employees of the U.S. biological warfare program kept supplies of old anthrax, they would be Vollum 1B spores, not Ames, according to the New Republic. There is no evidence the United States has produced weaponized Ames strain anthrax, the New Republic reported. Rosenberg also wrote in her report that “The extraordinary concentration (one trillion spores per gram) and purity of the letter anthrax is believed to be characteristic of material made by the U.S. process.” This does not mean, however, that other countries could not produce anthrax of similar quality, according to the New Republic. The former Soviet biological weapons program deliberately used anthrax powder that consisted of only 25 percent anthrax by weight, according to Ken Alibek, former deputy director of the Soviet biological weapons program. This was done not because the Soviets could not produce better quality anthrax, but because more concentrated anthrax was unnecessary for use in a missile weapon, the New Republic reported. “I still don't see any geography here ... we are not going to find a smoking gun,” said former USAMIID commander David Franz. “The anthrax could have been made in any place at any time. We have to get away from the idea that you can just analyze these samples and tell who made them” (Wendy Orent, New Republic, Dec. 11). University Inspections Begin Research facility inspections began yesterday at the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston (see GSN, Dec. 10), a university official said. Investigators from the U.S. Health and Human Services Department’s Office of the Inspector General are examining the security of biological samples and computer data, said university spokesman Tom Curtis. The investigation could last up to four weeks, Curtis said. “It amounts to an audit.” The university is fully cooperating with the investigation, Curtis said. “I don’t question the need for someone to look into dangerous materials and make sure they are being handled appropriately” (CNN.com, Dec. 12). Information Needs to be Shared New York Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik yesterday asked the U.S. Senate to pass proposed legislation that would make it easier for local law enforcement to obtain information from the FBI. The walls between the two agencies were “the worst kind of dysfunctional thinking in government,” Kerik said. In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight in the Courts, Kerik discussed the anthrax incident involving a suspicious letter sent to NBC’s studios on Oct. 12. New York police did not learn about that letter until almost a week after the FBI had been notified, Kerik said. That example showed the need for better communication between local and federal law enforcement, according to Kerik. “We could have been on the issue instantly,” Kerik said. “And that sort of brought all of this to light. The FBI had not let us know.” The proposed legislation, sponsored by Senators Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.), would allow federal authorities to share information gathered from sources such as wiretaps, grand juries and foreign intelligence operations with local law enforcement officials. The new bill, however, would not require federal law enforcement to do so. Witnesses at the hearing said that while the legislation would not eliminate the withholding of information between federal and local law enforcement, it would remove an oft-cited reason federal law enforcement uses to do so. “It’s possible that countless New Yorkers were unnecessarily put at risk simply because the law and culture makes information-sharing taboo,” said Subcommittee Chairman Schumer. “That’s a risk that none of us should ever be forced to take” (Raymond Hernandez, New York Times, Dec. 12). Canadians Knew of Anthrax Letter Dangers Canadian military officials knew several months before the U.S. anthrax incidents that letters filled with anthrax spores posed a risk to mail handlers and that opening a tainted letter could send spores into the air, according to the Wall Street Journal. A Canadian study was discussed yesterday at a meeting called by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention regarding the anthrax incidents. Canadian officials said they had e-mailed the study to the CDC soon after reports of the discovery of anthrax at the American Media Inc. headquarters in Florida. The e-mail, however, was never opened, said Bradley Perkins, a CDC anthrax investigator. Perkins said he regretted that the report was not read. “It is certainly relevant data, but I don’t think it would have altered the decisions that we made,” Perkins said (Chad Terhune, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 12). Organizers of the CDC meeting also asked participants to come up with the answers to several research questions concerning anthrax, according to the New York Times. The questions included the following: * What is the minimum number of spores needed to infect a human (see GSN, Nov.16)? * How long do exposed people need to take antibiotics? * When is a decontaminated office or building safe? “We wish we had the answers today,” said James Hughes, the CDC official overseeing the anthrax investigation (Lawrence Altman, New York Times, Dec. 12). Hart Building Cleanup Continues Small items, such as files, computers and books, which may have been tainted with anthrax inside the Hart Senate Office Building, will be shipped to Richmond, Va., for further decontamination, officials said yesterday. The items have been fumigated once during the decontamination of the entire building, but this move is an extra dose of caution, officials said (see GSN, Dec. 4). The process, which uses ethylene oxide, could take a week, a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency spokeswoman said. EPA officials said they hope to reopen the Hart building by the end of the year (Goldstein/Nakashima, Washington Post, Dec. 12).
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