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Threat Assessment: CIA Reports No Major Changes to Missile Threat By Steve Hirsch Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON – U.S. intelligence agencies yesterday released an unclassified summary of their latest estimate of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, reporting no major changes in ballistic missile projections from the last such summary, released in 1999. At the same time, the summary said U.S. intelligence agencies believe it is more likely U.S. territory will be hit with weapons of mass destruction using delivery systems other than ballistic missiles. One observer remarked on the report’s cautious tone. The national intelligence estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, describes new missile developments and the U.S. intelligence community’s projections of possible and likely ballistic missile threats to the United States, overseas U.S. interests and military forces or allies. The estimate also updates assessments of theater ballistic missile forces around the world, discusses the changing proliferation environment and summarizes forward-based threats and cruise missiles. The unclassified summary also briefly discusses nonmissile weapons of mass destruction threats to the United States and terrorist interest in chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials, saying intelligence agencies are looking into the matter. Among the report’s key conclusions are that most U.S. intelligence agencies believe the United States is likely to face ICBM threats from North Korea and Iran, and possibly Iraq, before 2015. U.S. interests, forces and allies already face a significant threat from short- and medium-range missiles, the report says. Intelligence agencies also believe that without significant new funding, Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal will drop to below 2,000 warheads by 2015, regardless of arms control measures. “Although Russia still maintains the most comprehensive ballistic missile force capable of reaching the United States, force structure decisions resulting from resource problems, program development failures, weapon system aging, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and arms control treaties have resulted in a steep decline in Russian strategic nuclear forces over the last 10 years,” the report says. Intelligence agencies also say China’s ballistic missile forces, aimed mainly against the United States, will increase significantly by 2015 to between 75 and 100 warheads. The Chinese ICBM force, however, will continue to be smaller and less capable than Russian and U.S. strategic missile forces. According to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi, China will strengthen its defenses “in accordance with its own needs,” Associated Press reported. “I have no details on the specific report,” the spokesman said, “but I think such matters are merely baseless speculation” (John Lumpkin, Associated Press, Jan. 10). The intelligence agencies also say North Korea may be ready to flight test its multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2, which could reach the United States with a nuclear weapon-size payload, although Pyongyang last year extended its moratorium on long-range missile flight testing until 2003, assuming negotiations with the United States proceed. Iran, which has 1,300-kilometer range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missiles, is interested in short- and long-range missile capabilities, according to the report, and an ICBM/space launch vehicle system. “All agencies agree that Iran could attempt a launch in mid-decade, but Tehran is likely to take until the last half of the decade to flight test an ICBM/SLV; one agency further believes that Iran is unlikely to conduct a successful test until after 2015,” the report says. Despite international sanctions and prohibitions, Iraq wants to have a long-range missile and probably has a “small, covert force” of Scud variants, the report says, and if U.N. sanctions were cut, Iraq would probably spend several years reestablishing short-range ballistic missile capabilities, developing and putting into place solid-propellant systems, and pursuing medium-range ballistic missiles. Although all U.S. intelligence agencies agree Iraq could test different ICBM variations before 2015 if U.N. prohibitions were withdrawn in coming years, most agencies think that is unlikely, according to the report. Some, however, think that if the prohibitions were killed, Iraq would likely test an ICBM disguised as a space launch vehicle by 2015, maybe by 2010, if foreign technology were provided. In addition, the report says several countries could develop a way to launch short- or medium-range ballistic missiles or land-attack cruise missiles from ships or other platforms, a few are likely to do so by 2015. It also says terrorist and other groups that have threatened or have the capability to attack the United States or U.S. interests have expressed interest in chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials. The September terrorist attacks have increased intelligence agencies’ focus on the terrorist threat, the report said, “and we are obtaining more information on potential terrorist actions.” The report says that although nonmissile means of attacking the United States with weapons of mass destruction do not have many of the advantages of ICBMs, these means remain a concern and intelligence agencies think the country is more likely to be attacked with weapons of mass destruction using such means, including ships, trucks and airplanes. Among the advantages, the report says, are cost, that they can be hidden, are likely to be more reliable than ICBMs that have not been fully tested, would probably be more accurate than new ICBMs during the next 15 years, would probably be better suited for biological warfare agents, and would not be affected by missile defenses. Joseph Cirincione, director of the Carnegie Endowment’s Nonproliferation Project, noted caveats the intelligence agencies included in the report and pointed to its cautious approach. The report describes its assessments of future missile developments as “inexact and subjective because they are based on often fragmentary information.” “Many countries,” the report says, “surround their ballistic missile programs with extensive secrecy and compartmentalization, and some employ deception,” adding that although some milestones, such as flight testing, are hard to hide, “we may miss others.” “To address these uncertainties, we assess both the earliest date that countries could test various missiles, based largely on engineering judgments made by experts inside and outside the intelligence community, on the technical capabilities and resources of the countries in question, and, in many cases, on continuing foreign assistance; and when countries would be likely to test such missiles, factoring into the above assessments potential delays caused by technical, political or economic hurdles. “We judge that countries are much less likely to test as early as the hypothetical ‘could’ dates than they are by our projected ‘likely’ dates,” the report said. Cirincione pointed to the report’s prominent expression of caveats in terming the report cautious and its prominent discussion of the probability of nonmissile threats. He suggested that that caution could explain why the Bush administration has been relatively low-key about the report’s release.
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