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United States I: Bush Plan Would Keep Many Warheads Available By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — With Russian nuclear weapons forces projected to wither over the next decade and a half, the United States under a new Bush administration plan is planning to retain a potentially much larger capability. The Bush plan, resulting from a recently completed Pentagon Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) (see GSN, Jan. 9), would reduce over the next 10 years operational nuclear warhead numbers to somewhere around the level envisioned in the START III negotiations between Russia and the Clinton administration, between 1,700 to 2,200 warheads. An unclassified U.S. intelligence report released yesterday concluded “unless Moscow significantly increases funding for its strategic forces, the Russian arsenal will decline to less than 2,000 warheads by 2015 — with or without arms control.” The Russian reductions will result from resource problems, program failures and weapon system aging, the report says. But an unspecified number of the 3,800-4,100 warheads projected for U.S. reduction will not be destroyed, but rather, reserved as a “responsive capability,” for possible reintroduction in the event of a change in plans, according to J. D. Crouch, the assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, at a press briefing Wednesday. “There have been no final decisions made at this point on what the size of our responsive capability would be,” he said. The warheads would be available to “augment the operationally deployed force,” available for redeployment in a matter of “weeks, months and even years, [so] that we could respond to changes.” Crouch cited potential “changes in the security environment that were more adverse than we thought. Technological surprise. Changes in our assumptions about how well we can introduce or field new elements of the triad.” White House spokesman Ari Fleischer told reporters yesterday, the reserved warheads “will be maintained in a non-deployed status as a hedge against unforeseen technical or international events.” Potentially hundreds of other warheads counted in the U.S. reductions also will not be dismantled, they will be on the sidelines while their submarines undergoing routine overhaul. Simply De-alerting? The plan effectively formalizes a November understanding announced but never signed between President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Crawford, Texas (see GSN, Nov. 14, 2001). It has been criticized by some arms control experts. Ivo Daalder, a senior Brookings Institution fellow and Clinton administration national security official, sees two qualified positives. “One is, they’re moving unilaterally, though their moving toward the level Clinton had at the Helsinki summit in 1997 — if you ignore their stupid counting rules,” he said. Second, “all things being equal, it is better to have 2,500 warheads on day-to-day alert status than 7,200, which is what we have currently,” he said. But Daalder noted many of the permanent reductions were planned seven years ago, while other reductions can be reversed in a matter of days: “The way they achieved the reductions is by taking down the 50 MX missiles, with 500 warheads, but remember that was announced in the NPR in September 1994. They are converting four Tridents [submarines] to cruise missile carriers, but that was decided in September 1994 in the NPR, and for the rest, they are maintaining the force structure, they’re just downloading weapons…” It could take “a matter of days,” said Daalder, to reconfigure the B-52H’s and B-2B bombers with nuclear capabilities. “It’s not that they’re reducing nuclear forces, it’s de-alerting. And they gave the game away yesterday when they said they’re keeping the force structure.” Crouch drew a distinction between the announced plan and de-alerting. De-alerted weapons “could be brought back up to alert in a few minutes to, you know, maybe a few hours. What we’re talking about is a responsive capability that would take, at the very least weeks, but likely months, and even years to be able to regenerate,” he said. It “would not be something that you would respond, let’s say, under a tactical threat. It would be a major change in the security environment, for example.” Like START III Current U.S. nuclear warhead holdings are said to be around 6,000 as required by the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). The never-implemented START II agreement would have brought the number down to 3,500 warheads and the never-concluded START III negotiations were headed toward reducing U.S. warheads down to 2,500. The Bush administration’s new Nuclear Posture Review, explained Wednesday at the briefing, says the Pentagon will reduce the number instead down to between 1,700 and 2,200 “operationally deployed warheads.” But depending upon how the warheads are counted, the maximum number could be considered around the 2,500 warheads envisioned for START III. The term “operationally deployed warheads” has special meaning — it excludes warheads assigned to delivery platforms that are on the sidelines in overhaul. Crouch indicated the warheads on two Trident submarines, always in overhaul, would not be counted as operationally deployed. Experts say that amounts to as many as 384 warheads, or 192 per Trident. “We are planning on maintaining a Trident SSBN fleet of 14 submarines. Two of those submarines will be in overhaul at all times, and those submarines will not have missiles available to fire, and they will not be part of the operationally deployed nuclear weapons.” Not a Formal Agreement The Bush plan, however, differs from the START agreements in a number of important ways. Importantly, it is not based on any formal written agreement with Russia, leaving the United States with much greater liberty to revise the plan. Further, unlike START, the United States is not obligated to reduce its number of nuclear delivery platforms. While resuming nuclear testing is not currently planned (see related GSN story, today), Crouch also indicated the administration is considering the controversial option of developing new nuclear weapons that could be used for special battlefield operations like bunker busting. “Now, we are trying to look at a number of initiatives,” he said. These factors reflect a radically new approach to U.S. nuclear posture and arms control, laid out in the NPR, where the United States will no longer allow a bilateral arms control relationship with Russia to guide its nuclear weapons holdings. Rather it will preserve a range of nuclear capabilities, and reserve capabilities, ostensibly to respond to a range of unpredicted threats. Crouch confirmed the new plan effectively nullifies arms reduction efforts pursued in correspondence with the START II and START III efforts. The constraints outlined in START I, however, a fully signed and ratified treaty, will remain in force, Crouch said. “START I will continue to be in force, and all of its applicable rules, including the verification provisions as well as the counting rules, are still in force,” he said. The government may feel constrained, at least through January 2005, by any personal assurances Bush made to Putin in Crawford. Russia, however, may be seeking firmer guarantees. U.S.-Russian officials are to begin meeting Jan. 15-16 to further discuss offensive nuclear arms reductions, Interfax reports (see GSN, Dec. 18, 2001). Daalder said there can be a hazard in not having a signed agreement with verification measures. “Without full transparency, without predictability about future commitments you generate suspicion inevitably and therefore you are likely to hedge, to take steps that allow you to protect against the uncertain,” he said.
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