Russian and North Korean aid to Iranian ballistic missile development might not be as extensive or effective as previously believed, the Washington Post reported Sunday.

Iran has been slow to perfect its Shahab-3 intermediate-range missile and has shown little interest in an intercontinental ballistic missile program, according to experts.

“The Iranian program is not developing as quickly as the Iranians have claimed and Israeli and American assessments expected,” said Gerald Steinberg of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.  The Shahab-3, when perfected, could hit targets within Israel but poses little threat to the United States itself, Steinberg said.

“A missile remains the least likely delivery vehicle for a weapon of mass destruction,” said Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“The September 11^th events have shown that people can inflict mass casualties on the U.S. with cutting knives and imagination,” Cirincione said.  “There are many cheaper, more reliable, but still very destructive means of attacking America that don’t require the expense, technical sophistication and exposure that come with a ballistic missile.”

The Role of Russian Know-How

The Shahab-3 is based on the North Korean No Dong missile, a variation on the Soviet Scud missile, according to U.S. officials.  By modifying the Scud, the most widely proliferated missile in history, states have improved its range, the Post reported.

Iranian officials sought Russian aid to build their own version of the No Dong, according to CIA analysts.  Any Russian assistance to Iran would be a violation of the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime, the Post reported.

Russian aid to Iran, however, has been limited by Iranian paranoia, said Vadim Vorobei, head of the faculty of engine production at the Moscow Aviation Institute.

“They wanted to receive information from us, but at the same time they were not willing to tell us everything they were doing,” he said.  “That made it difficult to help them.”

Many of the Russian scientists who traveled to Iran were professors, instead of missile design experts, the Post reported.

“It’s meat-and-potatoes stuff,” said Steven Zaloga, a U.S. expert on the Russian missile program.  “These guys are useful at the level of basic research, not advanced development.”

Vorobei and other Russian scientists said they only helped Iran develop its general scientific base, and did not give Iran information banned by international agreements.

“It is one thing to learn rocketry in theory, and quite another to move to actual production,” said Yevgeny Mishelov, dean of the Moscow Aviation Institute metallurgy department. 

Although the United States has said that Iran could develop an ICBM in five to 10 years, Vorobei said he doubts that estimate.

“Their progress is very slow,” he said.  “In order to build missiles, you need a strong resource base.  You need steel, aluminum, not to mention composite materials, a machine tool industry.  Iran has very little of this.”

How Much Russian Technology Made It to Iran?

Even though some Russian missile technology has made its way to Iran, it has not been at the level previously believed, the Post reported.  Analysis of missile component transfers indicates they have been sporadic and mainly limited to dual-use materials meant for missile construction, rather than missile systems.

“Our American partners have not presented us with concrete facts [of proliferation],” said Sergei Yekimov, chief enforcer of Russian export controls.  “Their allegations are usually based on emotions and suspicions rather than corroborated evidence.”

U.S. officials said they have provided Russia some information on alleged transfers of missile components, but refused to give greater detail for fear of compromising intelligence sources.  Russia has appeared more interested in finding the source of information rather than investigating transfers, they said.

“It seems to me there has been a drop-off in the more egregious types of assistance,” said Robert Gallucci, former U.S. special envoy on nonproliferation issues.  “This could mean that we did a good job … or it could mean that the character of assistance has moved to different areas that are harder to detect, and harder to control.”

In the past, U.S. intelligence has been mistaken, according to the Post.  Austria, acting on U.S. and Israeli information, intercepted two tons of basalt fiber, which the U.S. said was a heat-resistant material that could be used to coat a missile warhead.  After analyzing and impounding the fiber, Austria said the U.S. claim “ was not plausible” and returned the fiber to its Russian shipper.  U.S. officials continued to say that the fiber could be used in a missile, according to the Post.

“Intelligence information can sometimes be very good, but sometimes I truly wonder how they come up with such information,” said Helmut Krehlik, head of the export control department of the Austrian Ministry of Trade.

North Korean Involvement

Since 1985, North Korea has provided missile development assistance to Iran, including entire missile systems, single components and transporter launchers for short-range missiles, the Post reported.  Iran, however, has often complained about the poor quality and high prices of North Korean components and has tried to produce better ones independently.

“The Persians were indignant with the North Koreans,” Vorobei said.  “They complained that the Koreans were selling their technology very expensively.  The Iranians would take it to pieces, and then reassemble it.”

Can — or Will — Iran Do It?

Despite the slow development of the Iranian missile program, most experts have said Iran will perfect and deploy the Shahab-3.  What remains unknown is whether Iran will attempt to develop longer-range missiles, according to the Post.  Some evidence of an attempt to do so has come from statements by Iranian officials concerning a Shahab-4 and Shahab-5, which would be follow-ups to Shahab-3.

Some recent statements by Iranian officials, as well as missile tests, have shown that Iran may be working instead to develop short-range solid fuel missiles.  This would fit in with analysis of the threat to Iran, which deals more with countries such as Iraq and Israel rather than a long-range U.S. or European threat, according to the Post.

“There is a big difference between Iranians trying to cover the region, and developing a system that will allow them to attack the U.S.,” said Gary Samore of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.  “I don’t think the Iranians have yet made a fundamental decision about an ICBM capability” (Michael Dobbs, Washington Post, Jan. 13).

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