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U.S. Response II: NRC’s Meserve Opposes Changes to Nuclear Plant Security By Mike Nartker “The destruction of a skyscraper does not suggest it was a mistake to build skyscrapers,” Meserve told reporters in a speech at the National Press Club. “If we allow the threat of terrorists to determine what we build and what we operate, we would be headed into the past — back to an era without suspension bridges, harbor tunnels, stadiums or hydroelectric dams, let alone … nuclear power plants,” he said. Nuclear power plants are not “soft targets,” Meserve said. “[They] are among the most formidable structures in existence.” To make them even safer, the NRC is conducting a “top-to-bottom” review of security procedures, Meserve said. He added that the review is ongoing and that there would be “no magic end date.” Keep Security Guards Private Congressional legislation to federalize nuclear power plant security guards is also a bad idea, Meserve said (see GSN, Dec. 7, 2001). He said there is no problem with the current system, which uses private guards controlled by plant licensees. The private forces are not “rent-a-cops,” Meserve said, adding that plant guards are well paid and have a high retention rate and that two-thirds come from police or security backgrounds. The proposed federalization of security could instead cause more problems than any inherent in the current system, Meserve said. Federalizing plant security guards could put the NRC in the position of regulating what it also would be managing. Placing the guards under NRC control would change the agency’s focus from a regulatory body to a security agency, he said. Meserve said he did support congressional legislation that would federalize laws regarding the use of deadly force by power plant security guards. Currently, the laws of the state where each plant is located sets the rules of deadly force for plant guards.
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