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Anthrax: U.S. Military Facility Lost Samples, Reports Say The U.S. Army lost samples of anthrax and other pathogens in the early 1990s, the Baltimore Sun reported yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 18, 2001). Meanwhile, scientists have detected genetic fingerprints in the anthrax strain used in the attacks, which might help determine its source, according to reports. A 1992 U.S. Army inquiry found 27 sets of pathogen specimens missing from the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in Fort Detrick, Md., according to the Sun. The samples included specimens of anthrax, Ebola, simian AIDS, hantavirus and two labeled “unknown.” The samples were likely rendered harmless because of the chemicals used to prepare them for microscopic study, said an army spokeswoman. The inquiry also found that someone at the facility appeared to be entering a laboratory late at night to conduct unauthorized research on anthrax, the Sun reported. A numerical counter on laboratory equipment appeared to be set back and the misspelled word “antrax” was left in the counter’s memory, according to army documents obtained by the Hartford Courant. In 1992, Lt. Col. Michael Langford, then head of USAMRIID, called for an inventory after he found there was “little or no organization” and “little or no accountability” at the facility. “It turned out that there was quite a bit of stuff that was unaccounted for, which only verifies that there needs to be some kind of accountability down there,” Langford said in a 1992 interview with investigators. It is yet unknown whether the anthrax strain used in the mail attacks is among those reported missing from USAMRIID, the Sun reported. Some of the lost anthrax was not from the Ames strain, said army spokeswoman Caree Vander-Linden. She added that one complete specimen set and samples from several others sets were located. Incomplete records on the sample sets, however, made it difficult to provide more information, Vander-Linden said. “In January of 2002, it’s hard to say how many of those were missing in February of 1991,” Vander-Linden said (Dolan/Altimari, Baltimore Sun, Jan. 21). Previous genetic testing found matches between the anthrax strain used in the attacks and those kept by USAMRIID and other military research facilities, the Washington Post reported today. Investigators hope further analysis of the spores found in a letter to Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) will help determine the source of the anthrax. C.J. Peters, former deputy commander at USAMRIID, said the missing samples are not infectious. “It was a very bad situation,” he said. “But the important question is how many of these missing samples were infectious, and the answer is none.” Experts also said it has been difficult to control the whereabouts of anthrax samples. “If someone wanted to steal something, could they have done it? The answer is yes,” Peters said. “There’s no 100 percent guarantee short of putting the scientists under guard 24 hours a day” (Joby Warrick, Washington Post, Jan. 22). Mark Wheelis, a microbiologist at the University of California said that “no matter what you do, there is not any way you can prevent a determined, skillful microbiologist from stealing traces of microbial culture that he is working with, because it takes so few microbes to start a culture.” Until a few years ago, bioterrorism was not a major issue, Wheelis said. “Nobody was thinking that one of these respected, trusted scientists might actually steal one of the cultures with malevolent intent” (Medical Letter on the CDC & FDA, Jan. 20). A former USAMRIID scientist said the facility did produce small amounts of powdered anthrax, which contrasts with previous army statements, the Washington Post reported yesterday. The process of creating wet anthrax to study caused small amounts of dry powder to form on the sides of laboratory equipment, said Ayaad Assaad. “It dried to a powder as fine as any you could make,” Assaad said. “You could collect some of it using a Kleenex or your finger.” The recent details of the security and accountability at USAMRIID are detailed in court documents that are part of a 1998 discrimination suit filed by Assaad, according to the Post (Weiss/Warrick, Washington Post, Jan. 21). Research Developments Scientists at the Institute for Genomic Research in Rockville, Md., said they have discovered genetic fingerprints in the strain used in the attacks that might help pinpoint its source. Institute scientists said they have found a small number of differences in the genetic makeup of the strain used in the attacks and an Ames strain standard. The differences include single unit changes in the anthrax DNA, called Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms. They also include variable repeats, which are sites where the same small DNA sequence is repeated several times, according to the New York Times. The variable regions are the types of differences used in human DNA fingerprinting, the Times reported. The new points of difference between the two strains, which are expected to be confirmed in the next two weeks, could help determine the source of the anthrax used in the attack by matching it to strains collected from about a dozen U.S. and foreign facilities, according to the Times. The new findings “might give us the edge” in finding who is responsible, said a senior law enforcement official. He added, however, that publicity over the findings could alert the person responsible for the attacks. What detectives cannot do is give the responsible person a “road map” to the case, said the senior law enforcement official. “The person who made this stuff understands science,” he said. “We don’t want to give him any little edge, to help him do a better job of covering his tracks” (Broad/Wade, New York Times, Jan. 22). The Anthrax Research Project, which includes members such as Intel and Microsoft, yesterday asked people to use their home computers to help create a treatment for anthrax. Computer users can download a screen saver for their computer that donates the computer’s spare processing resources to build a virtual supercomputer to analyze billions of molecules in less time than a laboratory, the group said in a press release. The screen saver runs whenever computer resources are available, according to Reuters. Once processing is finished, the information is sent back to the group online. A new data set is delivered when the person connects to the Internet (Reuters/New York Times, Jan. 22). Hart Building Reopens Today The Hart Senate Office Building will reopen today, the U.S. Capitol Police said Friday (see GSN, Jan. 18). The discovery last week of a bag containing protective gear in the ceiling above Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle’s (D-S.D.) office delayed the Hart building’s reopening. Tests on the suit and the area where it was found came back negative for anthrax, according to the Washington Post. “Initial information indicates it is likely that the bag was inadvertently used to seal air leaks in preparation for the fumigation of [Daschle’s] suite,” said Capitol Police spokesman Lt. Dan Nichols. “The bag is similar to other bags which were used for that purpose.” The Senate yesterday reopened offices in the basement of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Post reported. The offices had previously been closed because they shared the ventilation system with the area where the bag was found. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimated the Hart building decontamination effort cost about $20 million, said a Senate Appropriations Committee spokesman. Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) yesterday said he was concerned over the cost and called for an inquiry into the hiring and payment of contractors. “I grant you that this is a massive undertaking on your part,” wrote Grassley in a letter to EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman. “And while I’m also confident that you take our safety very seriously, I am concerned about the fiscal integrity of this operation.” Strong (and Scaly) Survivors Two goldfish and a suckerfish belonging to Senator John Breaux (D-La.) survived the Hart building decontamination, said Breaux spokesman Brian Weiss. The fish were left in the building after it was evacuated and closed when the Daschle letter was discovered. “No one thought they would survive chlorine dioxide gas, only a few time-released food capsules and no change of water or filters, but they’re swimming,” Weiss said. “They’re tough southern Louisiana fish” (Spencer Hsu, Washington Post, Jan. 19).
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