|
|||||
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
 |
 |
    |
|
|
|||
 |
|
||
|
|||
|
|
|
|
||||||||
|
Threat Assessment II: CIA Analyzes International WMD Capability In a report released yesterday, the CIA analyzed acquisitions of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology by several nations of concern and terrorist groups for the first half of 2001 (see related GSN story, today). Terrorist Groups “The threat of terrorists using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials appears to be rising — particularly since the Sept. 11 attacks,” the CIA report said. It added that several of the 30 designated foreign terrorist groups have expressed interest in weapons of mass destruction — “although terrorists probably will continue to favor proven conventional tactics.” Terrorist organizations are most interested in chemicals such as cyanide salts to poison food and water supplies or to assassinate individuals, according to the report. They have also expressed interest in other toxic chemicals — many of which are relatively easy to obtain and use — as well as traditional chemical agents, such as chlorine and phosgene. Some terrorist groups have shown interest in nerve agents. The report found lesser terrorist interest in biological weapons agents. It also had no credible reporting of terrorists successfully developing a nuclear weapons or obtaining the sufficient materials to do so (see GSN, Jan. 25). “Gaps in our reporting, however, make this an issue of ongoing concern,” the report said. Iran “Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD … technology from abroad,” the CIA report said. By doing so, Iran is also attempting to build a domestic capability to produce weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, the agency said. Iran’s efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction-related equipment and technology primarily have focused on entities in Russia, China, North Korea and Western Europe, according to the report. The CIA found that Iran had made chemical weapons and delivery systems for agents including blister, blood and choking agents. During the first half of 2001, Iran continued to seek production technology, training, equipment and chemicals from Russian and Chinese entities to develop domestic capability for producing nerve agent (see GSN, Jan. 24). Iran has continued its efforts to seek dual-use materials and equipment mainly from Russian and Western European entities. “We judge that this equipment and know-how could be applied to Iran’s biological warfare program,” the report said. Iran has also sought nuclear-related equipment and technical expertise from a variety of sources, especially Russia, according to the report (see GSN, Jan. 16). Russia is continuing work on a nuclear power reactor at Bushehr and Russian entities have continued to work with Iranian research centers on other nuclear fuel cycle activities. The expertise, technology and contacts obtained, particularly through the Bushehr power plant construction project, could be used to advance Iran’s nuclear weapons development program, the CIA report said. Iraq Because of the lack of on-the-ground inspectors and monitoring systems in Iraq, it is difficult for the United States or the United Nations to accurately assess the state of Iraq’s programs of weapons of mass destruction, according to the report (see related GSN story, today). Given Iraq’s past actions, however, Iraq has probably used the intervening period to rebuild prohibited programs, the report said. Since the suspension of U.N. weapons inspections in 1998, Iraq has had the capability to reinstate its chemical weapons programs within a few weeks to months, the report said. The lack of an inspections-monitoring program, however, makes it difficult to assess the current state of any Iraqi chemical weapons program. Since the end of the Gulf War, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production capability for industrial use, and it has rebuilt missile production facilities. Iraq has attempted to purchase dual-use items, the report said. These dual-use items could also be diverted for weapons of mass destruction purposes. Iraq admitted to having a biological weapons program in 1995 and submitted the first in a series of “full, final, and complete disclosure” documents to reveal the scope of that program. The documents, however, were incomplete and filled with inaccuracies, according to the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq. Since investigators were unable to verify the full scope of Iraq’s biological weapons program, UNSCOM assessed that Iraq maintains a knowledge base and infrastructure that could be used to produce a large amount of biological weapons at any time. Iraq has also worked on its L-29 unmanned aerial vehicle program, according to report. These refitted trainer aircraft are believed to have been modified to deliver chemical, or more likely, biological weapons, the CIA reported. In its nuclear program, Iraq has probably continued at least low-level theoretical research and development, according to the report. Iraq’s main obstacle to producing a nuclear weapon is the lack of a sufficient source of fissile material, the CIA said. It added that the agency’s concerns over Iraq’s nuclear program increased in September 2000 when Iraqi President Saddam Hussein publicly called on “nuclear mujahideen” to “defeat the enemy.” Iraq has continued to pursue development of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), which are not prohibited under the post-war U.N. resolutions, and may be expanding to longer-range systems, the report said. Iraq’s pursuit of U.N.-permitted missiles allows the country to develop technical improvements and infrastructure that could be used to develop long-range missiles, according to the report. The CIA said it believes that the Iraqi development of the liquid-propellant al-Samoud SRBM is maturing and developers could achieve a low-level operating capability in the near term. Iraq’s solid-propellant development program may now be a higher priority and longer-range systems may possibly be moving ahead rapidly, according to the report. Iraq also likely has retained a small, covert force of Scud-type ballistic missiles. North Korea North Korea has continued to procure raw materials and components for its ballistic missile program, primarily through North Korean firms based in China, according to the report. North Korea is capable of producing and delivering, via missile warheads, chemical and some biological weapons agents, the report said. The CIA also found that North Korea has produced enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons (see GSN, Jan. 16). North Korean spent fuel rods, canned in accordance with the 1994 Agreed Framework, contain enough plutonium for several more nuclear weapons, the report said. Libya Libya has continued to seek ballistic missile-related equipment and technology from foreign sources, the CIA reported. Outside aid, particularly from Serbia, India, North Korea and China, is crucial to Libya’s ballistic missile development programs, the report said. Currently, Libya’s missile capability is limited to its Scud-B missiles. With continued international aid, however, Libya could likely achieve a medium-range ballistic missile capability — “a long desired goal,” the report said. During the time period covered by the report, Libya still appeared to want to produce offensive chemical weapons domestically, the report said (see GSN, Dec. 20, 2001). Libya may also be seeking to acquire the capability to produce and develop biological weapons. The country has continued to try to develop nuclear weapons, but would still require large amounts of foreign aid to succeed, according to the report. Syria During the first half of 2001, Syria sought precursors to chemical weapons and expertise from foreign sources, according to the report. Although Syria already has stockpiles of sarin, it appears that the country is attempting to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents, according to the report (see GSN, Jan. 11). Syria is dependent on foreign sources for key components of its chemical weapons program and is probably developing an offensive biological weapons capability. In January 2000, Russia approved a draft cooperative program with Syria that included civil nuclear power, the report said. Increased access to Russian expertise could aid Syria in expanding its indigenous capabilities if it decides to pursue nuclear weapons, the CIA said. Syria has continued work on creating solid-propellant rocket motors with aid from foreign sources, the report said. The country also continues efforts on assembling liquid-propellant Scud-C missiles, probably with considerable North Korean aid, according to the report. Sudan Sudan has continued to develop its capability to produce chemical weapons. In the past, the country has relied on foreign sources, primarily Iraq, to do so, according to the report. Sudan may also be interested in developing a biological weapons program, the report said (see GSN, Dec. 12, 2001). “We remain concerned that Sudan may seek a ballistic missile capability in the future,” the CIA said. India India has continued its nuclear weapons development program, according to the report (see GSN, Jan. 28). It has continued to obtain foreign aid, primarily from Russia, for its civilian nuclear power program. India’s acquisition of foreign equipment will help in the development of more sophisticated nuclear weapons, the report said. India is still dependant on foreign aid for key ballistic missile technologies, since it lacks the needed domestic and production expertise, the report said (see GSN, Jan. 30). Pakistan The CIA found that China continued to provide significant assistance to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program (see GSN, Jan. 22). With China’s aid, Pakistan is moving toward the serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs, the report said. Successful development of the Shaheen-II medium-range missile will require continued Chinese or other foreign assistance, the report said. Pakistan has continued to acquire nuclear-related and dual-use equipment from foreign sources, primarily in Western Europe. The country’s acquisition of foreign nuclear-related goods will be important if Pakistan chooses to develop more advanced nuclear weapons, according to the report. In 1996, China said it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in any country. The report said, however, that unspecified contacts between Chinese entities and those involved in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development program could not be ruled out. Egypt In the first half of last year, Egypt continued its long relationship with North Korea on ballistic missiles, the CIA said. Egypt has also maintained a deployed force of Scud-B and Scud-C missiles, according to the report (CIA release, Jan. 31).
| ||||||||||
Back to top
