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U.S. Response: Tougher Export Control Regimes Needed By David McGlinchey Multilateral export control regimes have successfully limited the export of weapons — particularly to “countries of concern” — but a number of shortfalls leave them unable to address some proliferation issues, the report says. The Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group have had an impact on weapons proliferation, including by increasing the cost of attaining chemical weapons worldwide and by stunting missile programs in Argentina, Brazil and Egypt. Member nations, however, are not sharing information about export denials and approvals, preventing a complete picture of the regimes’ effectiveness. Countries are also taking harmfully long periods of time to adopt export control changes into their own laws, and once this does occur the regulations are being applied differently worldwide, according to the GAO. “This lapse of time might allow proliferators seeking sensitive items to exploit disparities in regime members’ control lists,” the report says. Export controls are also suffering because countries join the regimes without effective export control systems in place — the United States has identified Argentina, Belarus and Russia as offenders, according to the report. Any effort to reform the regimes, however, would face imposing hurdles, the GAO says. One member can stop a change in a regime, resulting in a “difficult process of making consensus-based decisions,” the report says. The regimes are voluntary, meaning the groups cannot act against blatant violations such as Russia’s sale of nuclear fuel to India (see GSN, April 30). Earlier this year, the Australia Group adopted stricter controls over chemical and biological weapons but there is no penalty for not adhering to them (see GSN, June 21). The report also noted that changing technology makes it difficult to maintain current control lists. “Secondary proliferation,” poses another significant risk to the regimes, as nonmember countries develop the technology to produce weapons of mass destruction. The GAO singled out North Korea for its export of ballistic missile technology. The report recommends the U.S. secretary of state develop a strategy to improve the regimes, report all U.S. denials of export licenses and establish criteria for reviewing the regimes. The secretary should also work with other member nations to toughen the regimes, and as part of that effort the United States should “increase information sharing, improve the consistent adoption and implementation of export controls, and assess ways to overcome organizational obstacles to reaching decision and enforcing members’ compliance with their regime commitments,” the report says. For further information, see: U.S. State Department MTCR Summary Wassenaar Arrangement Web site Wassenaar Participating States Pentagon Executive Summary on Wassenaar
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