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Radiological Weapons: “Dirty Bomb” Attack Is 40 Percent Probability, Expert Says By Mike Nartker Albright outlined the likelihood of a variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios during a panel discussion at a nonproliferation conference held by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The chances of terrorists conducting a successful attack on a nuclear power plant, detonating a more sophisticated radiological weapon or a crude nuclear weapon within the next 10 years range from 1 to 10 percent, he said (see GSN, Oct. 30). While these percentages are low, they indicate that there is still a possibility of nuclear terrorism, which officials need to take seriously, Albright added. There are also fears terrorists could construct a plutonium-based nuclear weapon, Albright said. While the chance of a successful attack using such a weapon is low — no more than 5 percent — it still poses a potential risk, he said. Even though a crude plutonium-based weapon might achieve an explosive yield of only a few hundred tons or a few kilotons — which would be a failure by U.S. standards — that could be sufficient for terrorist aims, Albright said. The chance of what many would consider the worst-case scenario — terrorists obtaining and detonating an intact nuclear warhead — is less than 1 percent, Albright said. Even though the chances of a successful sophisticated nuclear or radiological terrorism attack are relatively low, the high consequences of such an attack should lead to the United States making its prevention the highest priority, he said. Terrorist Motivation and Attempts Fears of nuclear terrorism are justified because terrorist groups have demonstrated a motivation to conduct such attacks, Albright said. For example, there is evidence that al-Qaeda was “very determined” to obtain a nuclear capability, he said (see GSN, Sept. 3). Al-Qaeda has tried to develop a self-sufficient weapons production capability, Albright said, noting the organization’s efforts to develop high explosives. Several documents have shown that al-Qaeda was successful on theoretical and experimental levels in developing such weapons and that the organization was teaching its operatives how to enter a country and develop high explosives from scratch, he said. This self-sufficient philosophy, however, could do more harm than good regarding nuclear terrorism, because such devices are too sophisticated to be produced through decentralized efforts, Albright said. There is also evidence that al-Qaeda attempted to establish a “quasi-state [nuclear] program” in Afghanistan with the aid of the Taliban, Albright said. The organization was aware that it needed outside help in developing a nuclear capability and looked primarily to Pakistan for assistance, he said. By the summer of 2001, several Pakistani scientists involved in projects inside Afghanistan were being approached by al-Qaeda, often done with the knowledge of the Taliban, Albright said. Al-Qaeda also used the Taliban regime to help aid in the foreign procurement of necessary components, since a government entity was a more legitimate recipient of dual-use items, he added. If al-Qaeda had been able to stay in Afghanistan undisturbed, they probably would have successfully produced at least a crude nuclear weapon, Albright said. Even after being disrupted by the U.S.-led war on terrorism in Afghanistan, however, the organization might still be attempting to develop a nuclear capability. The identities and locations of many who were involved in al-Qaeda’s nuclear and radiological efforts within Afghanistan are still unknown, Albright said, noting increasing concerns that the organization might be regrouping and relaunching a recruitment effort. Reducing the Risk During the panel discussion, two other experts presented a number of recommendations to reduce the threat of radiological and nuclear terrorism. Charles Ferguson, a scientist-in-residence at the Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said a strategic plan is needed to organize the plethora of recommendations made over the last several years. Such a system would help officials determine how to best allocate finite resources and help identify appropriate preventive, enforcement and response measures for both the short and long term, Ferguson said, noting the need of a “defense-in-depth” approach. While there is a large amount of data on the various aspects of nuclear terrorism, in-depth information is still lacking on the motivations of terrorist groups to conduct such attacks, Ferguson said. Since the United States can probably do little to convince terrorist organizations to not conduct such attacks, however, more should be done where there can be a demonstrable effect — improving the security of radioactive materials, he said. Richard Garwin, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, outlined a series of recommendations that were included in a 2001 paper on nuclear terrorism presented to a session of The International Seminars On Planetary Emergencies. The United States and other members of the international community should work to reduce the number of potential terrorists and to improve the security of potential targets, such as radioactive material storage sites, to discourage attacks upon them, Garwin said. Trusted-person databases and biometric-based identification systems should also be introduced to prevent unauthorized persons from gaining access to sensitive areas at nuclear sites and aircraft standards should be modified to prevent hijackings and Sept. 11-type attacks on such sites, he said (see GSN, Nov. 12). Garwin also recommended that public education systems and contingency plans be in place in order to prevent panic in the event of a radiological attack. Such plans should prevent people from leaving the area in a panic when there is no significant hazard in remaining in place for a week or more, he said. In order to reduce the consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism, absolute radiation protection limits, such as U.S. Environmental Protection Agency standards, should be replaced by a more market-based approach, Garwin said. For example, a full disclosure and inspection would detail the possible increased cancer risk of a home in a radiation-contaminated area, which could then be sold at a market price to people who would be older and be less likely to have children, and thereby suffer less effect. “Recall that 20 percent of us will die from cancer,” Garwin said in his presentation. “Life is too short for the individual to worry about an additional 1 percent probability in the remote case of terrorist attack, although it is an important topic in public health” In order to implement the recommendations made by experts, the United States needs to create a technical organization to evaluate the possible terrorist threat, identify potential solutions and evaluate capabilities at any time, Garwin said. Such a technical organization should be modeled after the Manhattan Project — the World War II-era U.S. project to develop the first nuclear weapon, he said.
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