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International Response: Central Asian Nuclear Zone Delayed Despite Russian Support By Mike Nartker The five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — have convinced Russia that the proposed zone will not interfere with non-nuclear aspects of other regional security agreements, U.N. Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala told Global Security Newswire. The Central Asian countries have asked all five declared nuclear weapon states — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States — to sign a protocol to the proposed treaty agreeing to respect the zone and to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against zone members. Until recently, China had been the only country to publicly support the protocol, but last month, the declared nuclear weapon states and the proposed weapon-free states met in New York for discussions (see GSN, Oct. 2). Russia had been concerned about a provision regarding the treaty’s relation to other regional security arrangements, particularly the Treaty of Tashkent, Dhanapala said. According to the Russian interpretation, that treaty allows Russia to seek permission to deploy nuclear weapons within treaty countries. The proposed zone countries and Russia have now agreed to a compromise that preserves the non-nuclear aspects of such security agreements while still prohibiting nuclear weapons in the zone, Dhanapala said. Remaining Concerns The United States, the United Kingdom and France still have concerns about the treaty, Dhanapala said. To help find a resolution, the Central Asian states agreed to delay the treaty’s signing and to schedule another round of discussion for Dec. 17, he said. The Central Asian states have indicated that they are disappointed over the delay, in part, because drafts of the treaty have been made available for examination, Dhanapala added. One remaining Western concern is how the treaty affects transit of nuclear weapons through the zone. Dhanapala said he regards this as “surprising” because the provisions on this issue are similar to those in other treaties that have established nuclear weapon-free zones elsewhere. The Western countries are also uncomfortable with treaty provisions regarding possible expansion of the zone, Dhanapala said. The Central Asian states, however, have indicated they do not believe that this concern warrants a delay because any zone expansion would require a new protocol, which would require another negotiation. The nuclear powers would be able to voice their concerns in that discussion, he said. Dhanapala appeared to be surprised that the issue of the possible expansion of the zone would be one for concern. “I would imagine that the expansion of [nuclear weapon-free] zones is something we would all welcome,” he said. Martha Brill Olcott, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, has said she believes the United States will ultimately support the treaty. The United States has supported similar agreements in the region, including a nuclear weapon-free Kazakhstan, she said. The United States has little to gain by signing the protocol, however, because none of the Central Asian states pose a proliferation risk, Olcott said. Instead, the treaty is more of an attempt by the five countries to determine whether they have a new regional clout, Olcott said, calling the treaty “another one of those Central Asian pronouncements.” Going Alone The Central Asian states hope the December meeting will provide some finality to the treaty process, Dhanapala said. While the five declared states are invited to sign the protocol, they have no veto ability over the zone’s creation, he said, adding that the discussions on the protocol cannot be open-ended and must be conducted in good faith and concluded in a reasonable time. Even without declared support from the five nuclear weapon states, the Central Asian countries are ready to move ahead on the basis of what they have already achieved, Dhanapala said. The Central Asian states will probably sign the treaty even if the United States, the United Kingdom and France have not decided to sign the protocol after the December meeting, he added. Such a move is less likely, however, because of the new importance of Central Asia following the war in Afghanistan, said Scott Parrish, senior research associate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. There have been precedents, however, of nuclear weapon-free zones being created without support from the declared states, he said. For example, the Treaty of Rarotonga, which established a nuclear weapon-free zone in the South Pacific, was signed without French support, Parrish added. There are symbolic and political benefits for the Central Asian states to proceed with signing the treaty, Parrish said. For example, the treaty contains language acknowledging the environmental damage done to the region by Soviet nuclear testing, he said, adding that each of the Central Asian states has indicated that language as a reason for their support of the zone. By establishing the zone, the Central Asian states hope to advance their objective of obtaining increased international environmental aid, Parrish said. Olcott, however, has played down the treaty’s environmental aspects. There have been several previous resolutions that acknowledged the environmental damage caused by Soviet testing, but they have prompted little funding, she said. For further information, see: Bangkok Treaty Text (Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-free Zone) Pelindaba Treaty Text (Africa Nuclear Weapon-free Zone) Rarotonga Treaty Text (South Pacific Nuclear Weapon-free Zone) Treaty of Tlatelolco Text (Latin America and Caribbean Nuclear Weapon-free Zone)
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