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Friday, December 13, 2002
By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The newly unveiled Bush administration strategy for combating weapons of mass destruction marks a significant departure from long-standing U.S. policy by publicly advocating a nuclear response in the face of a chemical or biological attack, according to government officials and private analysts (see GSN, Dec. 11).
The document is considered a step forward by those who believe a revised policy, coupled with a strong declaration about the potential consequences of attacking the United States with weapons of mass destruction, is urgently needed to deter potential adversaries in an era in which traditional deterrence might not be sufficient. The new policy was quickly criticized from several quarters, however, as unnecessarily eroding international arms control.
These critics also contend that the Bush administration is being far too public about its intentions at the expense of U.S. credibility in future debates about stemming the spread of nuclear weapons.
The six-page strategy, sent to the U.S. Congress on Wednesday, threatens overwhelming retaliation — implying the use of nuclear weapons — in response to a WMD attack, in an effort to persuade potential adversaries to refrain from unleashing chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies.
“The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force — including through resort to all of our options — to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies,” the document says.
It also calls for the development of new military and civilian capabilities to defeat WMD-armed adversaries, the strengthening of nonproliferation treaties and arms control regimes, and preparations to reduce the potentially catastrophic consequences of a successful WMD attack against the United States or its allies.
Breaking with the Past
Some expert observers contend, however, that although the United States has always reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear threat, it has never said so explicitly and has refrained from applying the policy to chemical or biological weapons.
A 1978 executive order said the United States would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. Following a renouncement of that policy by U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton in February (see GSN, Feb. 22), the Bush administration quickly reaffirmed it (see GSN, Feb. 27).
The new strategy may also contradict international agreements, according to one interpretation.
“Until now we have not been explicit about” responding to a WMD attack with nuclear weapons, said Robert Einhorn, former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation. “This statement takes one additional layer of ambiguity away by saying we would use any option. They are clearly saying nuclear weapons without saying so.”
“It essentially nullifies the last 50 years,” said Senate Foreign Relations Committee member Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) in a Wednesday speech.
Experts said the policy comes in response to the growing threat from chemical and biological weapons, which, in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, are considered an imminent threat to U.S. national security — even more so in light of a possible war with Iraq to disarm its suspected WMD stockpile.
Yet the new policy also raises international legal questions. According to Corey Hinderstein, an arms control expert at the Institute for Science and International Security, the new policy may conflict with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in particular.
“It is some sensitive ground for international law,” she said. “It doesn’t jibe with some of the interpretations of our legal right to [use nuclear weapons]” under the NPT, she said.
“The first thing that strikes me is what appears to be completely unrealistic references to the NPT, the essential mechanism for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons,” Morten Maerli, nuclear security expert at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, told GSN today. “The U.S. is neglecting the 13 steps to implement article VI from the 2000 Review Conference that can only hurt the future of the treaty,” Maerli said, referring to the treaty commitment undertaken by nuclear powers to move “in good faith” toward nuclear disarmament.
Too Assertive?
Any policy departures or legal questions aside, critics charge that if such a new deterrent strategy is required to address the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the White House would be better to remain silent, continuing its long-standing policy of nuclear ambiguity, rather than advertise its possible responses.
“It is very dangerous to be talking too much about these kinds of responses that the United States would take or actions in anticipation of another nation’s actions,” Hagel said. Overasserting the U.S. right to use nuclear weapons, he said, brings a “mucky schizophrenia” to the long-standing U.S. policy of nuclear restraint.
“What the administration chose to do was to put forward a very muscular version of this, unnecessarily muscular in my view because it alarmed the hell out of a lot of the people we need most to forge the kind of coalition we have to put together against Saddam Hussein,” former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke said Wednesday in a television interview.
The strategy “reflects the changing reality,” prospective Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) told Global Security Newswire earlier today. The administration “could have maybe been more artful in saying it,” he said.
Holbrooke, while critical of the Bush language, said he believes the policy itself is not very different from the past. In the past, however, it was not part of the political rhetoric.
“This is just the more muscular form of a long-standing policy. At least four times in the last half-century, [former U.S. Presidents Dwight] Eisenhower in Korea, [Richard] Nixon in Vietnam, [George H.W.] Bush against [Iraqi President] Saddam [Hussein] in ’91, and [John] Kennedy in the missile crisis in ’62, we have said the same sort of thing,” he said. “We reserve the right to use any means we have, including nuclear weapons,” Holbrooke said.
Possible International Consequences
Yet, experts worry that it may be too late to offset the potential harmful consequences of such an assertive policy.
“I think its effect will be profound in some states,” Hinderstein said. “Pakistan is very fearful that the U.S. is intent on destroying its nuclear capability. If the U.S. establishes a pattern of taking excessive military action, they feel like they might be on that list.”
Added Hagel, “It sets in motion a series of uncontrollable actions that could be taken by China, by Russia, by Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea.”
According to John Isaacs of the Council for a Livable World, the new strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction only adds to a series of Bush administration actions in the nuclear arena that he believes will prove destabilizing in coming years.
“Dr. Strangelove is alive and well in the Bush administration,” Isaacs said in a statement Thursday. “The administration’s new strategy, its quest to explore building new nuclear weapons such as a ‘nuclear bunker buster,’ and its refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signal to the world that the U.S. has extensive plans to build and use nuclear weapons in the future,” he said.
Supporters Applaud Comprehensive Strategy
Despite concerns about some of the language in the new strategy and its possible consequences, the Bush policy was applauded by experts who believe a new deterrent policy was long overdue and describe the plan as the kind of comprehensive strategy required to combat the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction.
“It really is a step forward,” said Jack Spencer, a Heritage Foundation defense analyst. “If we are going to have a chance, albeit a slim one, to address the proliferation problem, we are going to have to take a comprehensive approach to this widespread danger. We can’t rely solely on arms control. Arms control is important, but so is deterrence and persuasion.”
The document is “a nonproliferation tool box,” he added. “It gives us the tools to address this very complex problem.” As for whether it may contradict previous arms control regimes, he said the new threats might require the international community to revisit past treaties to ensure they remain relevant.
The White House will need to continue to explain the new strategy to ensure international support for nonproliferation efforts, experts say.
“They are walking a fine line between an assertive policy they need to commit to but at the same time recognizing that we can’t be a nuclear cowboy in the world,” Hinderstein said.
The United States and Russia yesterday submitted recommendations on what information should be from Iraq’s WMD declaration before it is circulated to the nonpermanent members of the U.N. Security Council (see GSN, Dec. 12). French and British diplomats said they hoped to submit recommendations today, according to the Associated Press.
Security Council President Alfonso Valdivieso of Colombia said he plans to give an sanitized version of the declaration to the 10 nonpermanent members of the council by Tuesday. Sections of the edited declaration are expected to be made publicly available, AP reported (Edith Lederer, Associated Press/TBO.com, Dec. 12).
Meanwhile, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei released more details today about the section of the declaration that covers Iraq’s nuclear weapons, according to a CNN television broadcast (see GSN, Dec. 10). The section is 2,400 pages long, 2100 of which are copies of previously submitted reports, ElBaradei said. Some of the remaining 300 pages, now being translated from Arabic, however, contain “some new additional information,” he added (CNN, Dec. 13).
Inspections
In Iraq today, U.N. experts continued inspecting suspected weapons-related sites, visiting a ballistic missile production facility and a disease control center.
A team from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission visited the bin al-Haitham missile center in the northern Baghdad suburb of Kadhimiya, according to Reuters. The facility was built in 1982 to help develop the short-range al-Sumoud ballistic missile, according to a report by the International Institute of Strategic Studies.
A second UNMOVIC team visited the Center for the Control of Communicable Diseases in Baghdad. The Iraqi Health Ministry operates the center, Reuters reported (Hassan Hafidh, Reuters, Dec. 13).
While at the center, inspectors needed to summon top Iraqi and U.N. monitoring officials to gain access to several rooms at the site, according to CNN. None of the center’s employees were on site because Friday is a Muslim holy day. After being summoned, Hossam Mohammed Amin, head of the Iraqi National Monitoring directorate, arrived at the center with his U.N. counterpart and the situation was resolved, CNN reported. Inspectors tagged the rooms they could not enter for later inspections and left the facility several hours later (CNN.com, Dec. 13).
Yesterday, an UNMOVIC team attended the test launch of an Iraqi short-range ballistic missile variant at the Ramadi missile test pad, the International Atomic Energy Agency said in a press release. Missiles with short ranges are allowed under previous U.N. resolutions, the agency said. Iraqi officials allowed the UNMOVIC team to verify the missile’s configuration before the launch.
An IAEA team, meanwhile, visited the al-Zawraa electronics fabrication facility near Baghdad, according to the agency. The inspectors worked to review the activities of the site since 1998 and to review the use of formerly known dual-use equipment. The team also visited the al-Hatteen firing range to inventory previously monitored equipment, the agency said.
The number of inspectors in Iraq almost reached 100 yesterday with the arrival of 28 additional UNMOVIC experts, the IAEA said. Out of the 98 inspectors currently inside Iraq, 71 are assigned to UNMOVIC, which primarily focuses on biological and chemical weapons, and 27 to the IAEA, which focuses on nuclear weapons (International Atomic Energy Agency release, Dec. 12).
Amin yesterday praised the “professionalism” of the inspectors. If they can resist U.S. and British pressure, it “will be hard to be pessimistic” about the chances of finishing inspections and avoiding war, he said.
“We appreciate the professionalism with which the inspections are undertaken,” Amin said. Inspectors have “shown respect for our traditions and values,” suspending work for two days last week during the Muslim holiday of Id al-Fitr, and have avoided the “silly questions” posed by earlier inspections teams in the 1990s, he added (John Burns, New York Times, Dec. 13).
Declaration Might Include U.S. Companies
The Iraqi WMD declaration contains the names of U.S. companies that provided Iraq with materials for its chemical and biological weapons efforts during the 1980s, according to a senior Iraqi official. The official refused to name the companies or discuss how much information the declaration provides on them.
A White House official refused to comment on the possible listing of U.S. companies in the declaration or the possible consequences of releasing such information.
“The issue is not so much who the suppliers are. The issue is really Iraq’s program and making sure that Iraq declares what it has,” the White House official said (Newsday/Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 13).
For further information, see:
Inspectors from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have now visited dozens of sites in the round of post-Gulf War inspections that resumed Nov. 27 after a four-year lapse. The following chart summarizes some of their reported activities.
| Date | Site | Activity |
| Dec. 13 | Bin al-Haitham missile center in the northern Baghdad suburb of Kadhimiya | UNMOVIC inspectors visited the facility, which was built in 1982 to help develop the short-range al-Sumoud ballistic missile, according to a report by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (see GSN, Dec. 13). |
| Center for the Control of Communicable Diseases in Baghdad | The UNMOVIC team that visited the center — which the Iraqi Health Ministry operates — had to summon top Iraqi and U.N. monitoring officials to gain access to several rooms (see GSN, Dec. 13). | |
| Dec. 12 | Ramadi missile test pad | UNMOVIC team attended test launch of a short-range ballistic missile. Iraqi officials allowed inspectors to verify the missile’s configuration before the launch (see GSN, Dec. 13). |
| Al-Zawraa electronics fabrication facility near Baghdad | IAEA inspectors worked to review activities since 1998 and the use of formerly known dual-use equipment (see GSN, Dec. 13). | |
| Al-Hatteen firing range | An IAEA team inventoried previously monitored equipment (see GSN, Dec. 13). | |
| Al-Nidaa Public Company, in a suburb of Baghdad | Industrial facility formerly involved with ballistic missile development (see GSN, Dec. 12). | |
| Mu’tassim factory, 25 miles south of Baghdad in Jurf Sakhr | | |
| Bin Sina former uranium enrichment facility, 20 miles northwest of Baghdad in Tarmiya | See the Dec. 11 entry below. | |
| Abandoned factory owned by the Arab Company for Antibiotics, 40 miles southeast of Baghdad near Suweirah | | |
| Al-Rasheed factory | ||
| Dec. 11 | Saddam GE site | IAEA inspectors worked to verify activities conducted since 1998 and to review the use of formerly known dual-use equipment believed to be connected to Iraq’s missile program. |
| Amir Factory, owned by Saddam GE | ||
| Al-Razi Research Center, in al-America | UNMOVIC experts fully inspected buildings, several of which had been built in 1999, to verify declarations of materials and activities at the site, which produces diagnostic reagents for some human and animal diseases. | |
| Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, located south of Baghdad | Inspectors completed inventory work (see GSN, Dec. 12). See also the entries below on Dec. 4, 9 and 10. | |
| Al-Qaim phosphate mining facility, 250 miles west of Baghdad in Ashakat | Inspectors completed inventory work (see GSN, Dec. 12). See also the Dec. 10 entry below. | |
| Amariyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, west of Baghdad at Abu Ghraib | See the Dec. 10 entry below. | |
| Al-Fateh chemical site, on the outskirts of Baghdad | | |
| Bin Sina nuclear site, located in Tarmiya, 20 miles northwest of Baghdad | ||
| Dec. 10 | Al-Sumood factory at the al-Karama complex | IAEA inspectors worked to determine current activities and to learn more about the use of various previously known equipment (see GSN, Dec. 11). |
| Al-Fatah Company at the al-Karama complex | ||
| Military Industrialization Committee stores at the al-Karama complex | ||
| Saddam Center for Biotechnology | UNMOVIC inspectors gathered information to set a baseline for future inspections (see GSN, Dec. 11). | |
| National Project for Controlling Brucellosis and Tuberculosis | UNMOVIC inspectors worked to reset a baseline in accordance with information that Iraq submitted in October (see GSN, Dec. 11). | |
| Al-Qaim phosphate mining facility, 250 miles west of Baghdad in Ashakat | IAEA inspectors compared current operations with what inspectors learned about uranium activities in the 1990s (see GSN, Dec. 10). | |
| Veterinary medical site at Abu Ghraib, just west of Baghdad | The site is probably the Amariyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, where Iraq conducted biological weapon-related research in the 1980s. The United States has argued that it has too much storage capacity for legitimate research (see GSN, Dec. 10). See also the Dec. 11 entry above. | |
| Al-Furat Chemical Industries General Company, 40 miles south of Baghdad | | |
| Bin al-Haitham research facility, in the northern Baghdad suburb of Wazireyah | ||
| Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center | Additional nuclear inspections (see GSN, Dec. 10). See also the entries below on Dec. 4 and 9. | |
| Dec. 9 | Ash Shakyli | IAEA inspectors visited buildings and took samples to detect the presence of radiological materials (see GSN, Dec. 10). |
| Al-Qaqaa company, south of Baghdad | IAEA experts began preparing an inventory of known explosive materials from Iraq’s previous nuclear weapons program (see GSN, Dec. 10). See also the Nov. 30 entry below. | |
| Fallujah 2 site of the al-Tariq Company, 100 kilometers west of Baghdad | The site consists of the company’s headquarters and a factory area, but UNMOVIC inspectors only visited the factory, which contains several previously tagged dual-use items that inspectors reconfirmed (see GSN, Dec. 10). | |
| Fallujah 3 site of the al-Tariq company, 100 kilometers west of Baghdad | UNMOVIC inspectors visited the site for the second day in a row (see GSN, Dec. 9). See the Dec. 8 entry below. | |
| Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center | More nuclear inspections (see GSN, Dec. 9) — at the large site which the IAEA has monitored for the past 10 years as Iraq’s main nuclear facility (see GSN, Dec. 4) — to begin a physical inventory of the site’s nuclear materials (see GSN, Dec. 10). | |
| Dec. 8 | Fallujah 3 site of the al-Tariq company | UNMOVIC inspectors accounted for several previously tagged dual-use items at the pesticides and insecticides factory (see GSN, Dec. 9). |
| State Company for Geological Survey and Mining, in Baghdad | An IAEA team spent two hours at the site, at which uranium processing could have produced weapon-grade materials (see GSN, Dec. 4). | |
| Dec. 4 | Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center | See the Dec. 9 entry above. |
| Al-Muthanna State Establishment, 45 miles north of Baghdad | UNMOVIC inspectors checked for resumed chemical and biological weapons activity after materials were destroyed in the 1990s. They confirmed the presence of mustard-filled artillery shells tagged by previous U.N. inspectors (see GSN, Dec. 5). | |
| Dec. 3 | Al-Sajoud palace | UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors were quickly admitted but appeared to have found nothing, according to the Associated Press. |
| Dec. 2 | Three distilleries near Bakuba, north of Baghdad (first previously unvisited site) | IAEA inspectors did not explain why they visited the distilleries, but possibly searched for hidden nuclear equipment (see GSN, Dec. 3). |
| Waziriyah ballistic missile development site at the al-Karama General Company, outside of Baghdad | Several things tagged in 1998 are now missing, according to the IAEA (see GSN, Dec. 3). Iraq said new locations of the equipment are in an October declaration (see GSN, Dec. 4). | |
| Dec. 1 | Khan Beni-Saad cropdusting facility, 35 kilometers north of Baghdad | Satellite information “called for a specific investigation of modified aircraft fuel tanks,” a U.N. spokesman said. UNMOVIC inspectors stayed five hours, taking samples from tanks and downloading computer files (see GSN, Dec. 2). |
| Al-Taji complex with the bin Firnas and al-Quds missile factories | “We gave the inspectors every assistance and answered all their questions,” bin Firnas director Brahim Hussein said (see GSN, Dec. 2). | |
| Nov. 30 | Balad Chemical Defense Battalion, where troops train to defend against WMD attacks | UNMOVIC inspectors spent five hours examining storage sheds, opening ordnance crates and operating handheld sensors (see GSN, Dec. 2). |
| Um al-Maarik factory | Iraqi officials said the facility only produces parts for light machinery and vehicles (see GSN, Dec. 2). | |
| Al-Qaqaa | A small group of IAEA inspectors repaired an air sampling system installed during previous inspections, according to Iraqi officials (Iraqi government report, Nov. 30). See also the Dec. 9 entry above. | |
| Al-Meelad equipment factory, formerly known as al-Furat, where centrifuges have been developed | Recent satellite imagery has indicated that construction has taken place at the site since 1998 (see GSN, Dec. 2). | |
| Nov. 28 | Al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Laboratory | Following four hours of inspection, U.N. experts concluded that the plant is no longer operational (see GSN, Dec. 2). Inspectors noticed a missing fermenter (see below). |
| Veterinary medicine facility | Iraqi officials led inspectors to a veterinary facility north of Baghdad, where a fermenter — missing from al-Dawrah — was being kept (see above; John Burns, New York Times, Nov. 29). | |
| Thu al-Fiqar factory | Inspectors searched the potential dual-use site — which once might have been used to produce ballistic missiles — to search for signs that Iraq has been producing equipment for uranium enrichment, IAEA team leader Jacques Baute said (Kim Ghattas, Financial Times, Nov. 29) | |
| Al-Nasr industrial complex, where centrifuge rotors and missile engine parts were once made | A new building that the United States said is suspicious appeared to be inactive, said IAEA team leader Jacques Baute (see GSN, Dec. 2). | |
| Nov. 27 | Al-Tahidi Scientific Research Center | IAEA inspectors spent three hours examining papers and removing an air sampler installed in 1998 (see GSN, Dec. 2). |
| Al-Rafah graphite production facility | Graphite can be used in missile components (see GSN, Dec. 2). | |
| Al-Rafah missile test pad | UNMOVIC inspectors looked for information indicating the range of missiles tested (see GSN, Dec. 2). |