U.N. officials charged with searching for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq are paring down their list of unresolved issues in order to meet U.N. Security Council requirements, according to the Wall Street Journal (see GSN, Feb. 15).

The U.N. Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission’s 42 full-time employees in New York have developed a 300-page binder on 100 unresolved questions left over in 1998 from seven years of inspections by the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq.  The information used to compile the questions — including old inspection reports, defectors’ testimonies, satellite photos and previous Iraqi declarations — fills dozens of filing cabinets and is being entered into a searchable database.

UNMOVIC must begin cutting the 100 unresolved questions down to between five and 20 questions that inspectors would focus on if they return to Iraq, said UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix.

Prioritizing Weapons of Mass Destruction

After Iraq refused in 1998 to allow UNSCOM to return, the Security Council conducted lengthy negotiations that resulted in the creation of UNMOVIC.  Russia and France demanded that the new inspection team cut down the list of crucial issues and create specific tasks that Iraq must accomplish to prove it is not pursuing weapons of mass destruction, according to the Journal.  UNMOVIC’s mandate gives inspectors 60 days after returning to Iraq to establish a list of targets.

That means Blix and his colleagues must prioritize disarmament issues.  For example, the lethal nerve agent Tabun probably could be eliminated from the list of problems, Blix said, because it dissipates quickly and is less toxic than other chemical weapons, such as VX nerve.

Deciding not to focus on some possible Iraqi weapons such as Tabun is difficult, but “there are degrees even in hell,” Blix said.  Another UNMOVIC official agreed.  “If you’re going to round up the weapons in New York City, you’d go after all the submachine guns, not the hammers,” the official said.

After UNMOVIC decides which weapons and issues to focus on, commissioners will create a list of tasks that Iraq must finish to prove it has ended WMD programs, such as providing purchase orders and inventory records.

Based on such information and inspections, Blix must decide if Iraq has cooperated and report his findings to the Security Council.  If he reports that Iraq has successfully completed its duties, the council could vote to suspend sanctions against Iraq for 120-day periods (see GSN, Feb. 14).  Eventually, if Iraq cooperates and UNMOVIC determines the country has sufficiently met U.N. requirements, the council could end sanctions permanently.

If Iraq refuses to allow UNMOVIC inspectors into the country or fails to comply with the inspectors, the United States has strongly indicated it would take serious — and possibly military — action, the Journal reported (see GSN, Feb. 14).

A Difficult Job

UNMOVIC faces many challenges.  One problem is that the commission still lacks much essential information, despite its huge amounts of data, the Journal reported.  There is little sound evidence of Iraq’s WMD programs since UNSCOM inspectors left in 1998, although UNMOVIC has collected some information from satellite photos.

“We can see new roofs.  But we won’t know what’s going on under those roofs until we get inside,” Blix said.

Inspectors believe Iraq has maintained its capabilities to produce chemical and biological weapons (see GSN, Jan. 31).  UNMOVIC will probably need 80 to 100 inspectors at all times to visit 700 sites, including 50 to 100 new sites, Blix said.

Other recent information indicates that Iraq continues to pursue WMD programs.  An Iraqi defector last year said Iraq has rebuilt WMD facilities since 1998 and has disguised them under homes, wells and a hospital (see GSN, Dec. 21, 2001).  U.S. satellites have also discovered construction at suspected weapons facilities.

Another challenge is that Iraq has a history of thwarting international inspectors.  Iraqi officials gave UNSCOM false declarations, hid weapons and refused to allow inspectors access to facilities once they were discovered.  They are very skilled at showing enough cooperation to split the Security Council while never surrendering their main stockpiles, said Charles Duelfer, former UNSCOM deputy chief.

In 1998 UNSCOM inspectors thought they had located most of Iraq’s long-range missiles and chemical weapons, but they were only beginning to investigate the country’s biological weapons program, the Journal reported.

Despite the many challenges facing UNMOVIC, the commission’s officials have said inspections would be viable because historically, Iraqi officials tend to keep all records.

“There’s always somebody who has a log book or a diary.  There’s information spread all around,” said Demetrius Perricos, UNMOVIC’s planning and operations chief.

UNSCOM-lite?

Several Security Council members, particularly France and Russia, have insisted that UNMOVIC be less aggressive than UNSCOM.  They want a smaller list of issues, specific guidelines for Iraq to meet and a clear indication of when inspections and sanctions would end, according to the Journal.

UNMOVIC has the right to search anywhere if it goes to Iraq, and inspectors could continue to investigate until they are satisfied that Iraq has ended its WMD programs.  The council, however, is pressuring the commission to be more sensitive to Iraqi feelings and to finish quickly.  UNMOVIC inspectors have even completed cultural sensitivity training.

Due to such pressure and compromises over developing UNMOVIC, some critics have called it “UNSCOM-lite,” according to the Journal.  Some critics have charged that the 1999 council resolution which created UNMOVIC places responsibility on inspectors to prove Iraq has disarmed, rather than expecting Iraq to prove it has ended its programs.  Blix, however, said he intends to conduct serious inspections.

“Cosmetic inspections are worse than none,” he said.  Iraq must allow inspectors “immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access,” he said.

Blix said he would honestly report any doubts he has about Iraqi cooperation.

“I am very firmly of the view that no inspection organ should report more than they actually can verify,” he said (Carla Anne Robbins, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 21).

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