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International Response: Australia Group Adopts New Guidelines By Mike Nartker The Australia Group, an informal network of 33 countries that coordinate export controls, completed its annual meeting in Paris on June 6 after agreeing to adopt a new set of formal guidelines on licensing exports of sensitive items, the group said in a press release. The new guidelines represent an attempt to describe the regulations “more concretely,” said Seth Brugger, a biological and chemical weapons analyst at the Arms Control Association. While other export control regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime have similar guidelines, the Australia Group previously did not, he said, adding that it might have been the result of the informal nature of the group. Two of the most important provisions in the new set of guidelines are the “no undercut” and “catch-all” provisions, Brugger said. Under the no-undercut provision, group members agree not to provide an export license for an item that is “essentially identical” to an item for which another member has denied a license, according to the guidelines. The catch-all provision directs Australia Group members to license exports of materials that could be used to develop biological or chemical weapons, even if the specific item is not identified on the group’s control lists. Exporters must also alert authorities if they are aware that unlisted items are meant for a biological or chemical weapons program. “This is the first time that an export control regime has agreed to include a ‘catch-all’ clause in its public guidelines, reflecting the resolve of participating national governments to use all means at their disposal to fight the spread of CBW,” the group said. The United States already has a catch-all provision in its export licensing regulations, Brugger said. The new provision is meant to set a standard for the group as a whole and for any new members if the group chooses to expand, he said. Other Controls The group also agreed to lower volume limits for fermenters from 100 liters to 20 liters and to add eight new toxins to its biological control list, bringing the total to 19. These measures were taken to reduce risks of terrorists acquiring such items, Brugger said. While a 100-liter fermenter is useful for a militarized biological weapons development program, terrorists could develop biological weapons, albeit in a limited program, with smaller fermenters, he said. The eight toxins added to the biological control list have little military application but could still be useful to terrorists, Brugger said. The group agreed to regulate exports of dual-use technology that could be used to produce machines needed to develop biological weapons. The group had already agreed to control technology for production equipment for chemical weapons, Brugger said. Member states also agreed to control the “intangible transfer” of information that could be used to develop chemical and biological weapons. Such transfers might include oral discussions and electronic communications such as e-mails or faxes, Brugger said. “It’s pretty sweeping,” he added. Authorities would probably implement the control on intangible transfers of knowledge and information by requiring exporters to obtain authorization to share such information, Brugger said. Member states probably would not have to resort to monitoring such communications because the fear of legal prosecution would be enough of an incentive to abide by the regulation, he said. Effectiveness The Australia Group’s members agreed on the newly adopted export controls by consensus, Brugger said. The language is broad enough that countries can implement the controls to the degree to which they feel comfortable, he said, and there are no penalties if one member state fails to abide, Brugger said. Even without potential penalties, however, he expected that members would adhere to the new controls. “It just doesn’t look good” if they do not, Brugger said. For further information, see:
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