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United States I: Pentagon Plans to Merge Space and Strategic Commands The U.S. Defense Department plans to combine the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command into a single entity, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, May 9). The proposed command, which does not yet have a name, would combine the U.S. early-warning network and the U.S. missile defense system with the ability to plan and execute attacks using either conventional or nuclear weapons, according to the Times. The command would fit well into U.S. President George W. Bush’s doctrine of pre-emptive action against those who are trying to develop weapons of mass destruction, officials said (see GSN, June 3). Bush aides have said it is likely that the merger will be approved. “There’s a logic in taking these two commands with important global reach, and pulling together people who can think globally,” a senior administration official said. Adm. James Ellis, current head of Strategic Command, is expected to be chosen to head the new command, according to the Times. The command would be able to either plan its own operations, such as deploying B-2 bombers equipped with satellite-guided munitions, or aid U.S. regional military commanders in their missions, supporters of the merger said. The command would also be responsible for developing the military’s information warfare capabilities — both offensive and defensive, the Times reported. Some critics of the merger have said the different cultures of the two commands would make it too difficult to combine them. Most Pentagon, congressional and other experts, however, have said the merger is a good idea. “Both are commands that don’t have a whole CINC’s [commander in chief’s]-worth of work to do,” said Ashton Carter, professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and a former assistant defense secretary in the Clinton administration. “Combining them creates a CINC-dom that has a respectable amount of mass” (Eric Schmitt, New York Times, June 25).
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