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South Asia: ABM Treaty Demise to Affect China, India and Pakistan By Bryan Bender In a collection of essays published by this week by the Henry L. Stimson Center, several experts based in South Asia speculated how the three states would probably react to any U.S. deployment of national and theater missile defense systems and what effect their actions would have on regional security. While the viewpoints differ — corresponding in large part to each author’s home country and its stated policy toward the U.S. move — a common theme emerges throughout. China, India and Pakistan have no formal constraints on their nuclear and missile programs and, unlike the United States and Russia, they lack parity in nuclear and missile capabilities, the experts agreed. In addition, the three have declined any significant transparency over their respective programs. At best, informal arrangements might help forestall a destabilizing nuclear and missile arms buildup in the region, but U.S. missile defense plans are likely to accelerate nuclear and missile competition in the region and breed further distrust in coming years, most of the experts agreed. “China, India and Pakistan are enmeshed in a three-cornered interaction that will not be easy to stabilize,” wrote Michael Krepon, an arms control expert at the Stimson Center, in the collection, The Impact of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia, published Wednesday. “They make a triangle of three unequal sides — an inherently unstable geometric form.” Threat to Deterrence? The United States formally backed out of the 1972 ABM Treaty last month to enable it to deploy comprehensive missile defenses (see GSN, June 14). Russia’s nuclear deterrent — which may consist of thousands of strategic warheads even after the recently signed arms treaty is in effect — is expected to remain intact in the face of U.S. plans to field only limited defenses (see GSN, July 9). The same cannot be said, the experts said, about China, India and Pakistan, which have “minimalist” nuclear weapons and ballistic missile inventories. Their deterrent value might be eroded — if not militarily, then politically — in the face of proliferating missile defense systems or a weapons buildup to overwhelm those defenses. For example, a nuclear or missile buildup undertaken by China to strengthen its deterrent against the United States might set off a chain reaction in the region. In addition, the distinction made in the United States between national and theater missile defenses — one designed to protect U.S. territory from long-range missiles and the other intended to prevent short-range missiles from striking U.S. forces overseas — does not apply to the region, the experts said. Indeed, theater missile defenses are national missile defenses in South Asia because China, India and Pakistan do not require intercontinental ballistic missiles to attack each other. Recently, tensions between the three have been high (see GSN, July 10). India has continued to clash with Pakistan over Kashmir. It has jockeyed with China over disputed border areas including Tibet. China and India both have been developing advanced navies (see GSN, Feb. 1 and June 11) and preparing for a regional competition for command of the high seas. Meanwhile, China has been the prime supplier of missile and nuclear technology to Pakistan, and any Chinese developments in the nuclear and missile arena are likely to make their way to its allies in Islamabad, the experts said. “Nuclear weapons and missile programs now overlay these neuralgic issues, making it even harder for national leaders in China, India and Pakistan to create and sustain a stable strategic environment,” according to Krepon. “Chinese, Indian and Pakistani nuclear requirements will be derived from an interactive set of conditions that are subject to change based on domestic and external factors. Prospective missile defense deployments add one more external factor to this mix.” The “Cascading” Effect U.S. deployment of missile defenses would affect all three countries, according to the report, destabilizing actions on the part of one would probably ignite a chain reaction. For example, Krepon said, “Beijing’s calculations of nuclear sufficiency will reverberate in New Delhi, and India’s recalibrated nuclear requirements will reverberate in Islamabad.” “U.S. missile defense deployments and transfers could prompt cascading military requirements in China and around the periphery of Asia,” he said. These include “accelerated growth in nuclear stockpiles, missile inventories and conventional capabilities. A trickle-down effect on South Asia is already underway, but it has yet to become a cascade.” China’s close cooperation on nuclear and missile technology with Pakistan could be another complicating factor. Even if India chose not to react to a Chinese buildup, any new technical assistance to Islamabad could force India to accelerate or expand its efforts. China as Pivot The authors of the essay collection agreed that the outcome would depend largely on China, which is currently the strongest military power in the area with the largest nuclear and ballistic missile forces. China has been the most vocal opponent of U.S. missile defense plans and has been particularly concerned by the prospect of the United States transferring missile defense technology to Taiwan. Distrustful of U.S. assurances that its defenses would not erode Beijing’s nuclear deterrent, China may be compelled to accelerate its nuclear enhancement efforts to avoid any such erosion, the experts said. Krepon argued that while China’s actions to counter U.S. defenses would have only a limited effect on the U.S.-China equation, they “could be compelling on the subcontinent.” Another of the experts, Arvbind Kumar of the National Institute of Advanced Studies in Bangalore, India, argued that China’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs could be accelerated as a result of the U.S. national missile defense system, including introducing multiple-warhead missiles. The transfer of missile defenses to Taiwan, meanwhile, could serve the same purpose, prompting China to expand its arsenal of short-range missiles, which could theoretically also hit targets in India. These scenarios would in turn prompt India to improve its nuclear command and control structure and mate its nuclear weapons with delivery systems to ensure a more credible nuclear deterrent, according to Kumar. To have such a credible deterrent against China, India would need a nuclear force in the “low hundreds” of warheads, Kumar said. “India is not reassured by China’s no-first-use guarantee, or its claims that its nuclear arsenal is purely defensive and not on hair-trigger alert, because of a lack of transparency in China and the absence of reliable warning systems in India,” Kumar wrote. “India needs a better sense of Chinese behavior and intentions, which would in turn help India in shaping its strategies and planning for its force structure.” Krepon said he believes that the trickle-down effect from U.S. missile defense plans is already underway. “The extent of acceleration will depend, in the first instance, on decisions taken in Washington and Beijing,” he said. India Supports Missile Defenses India sits apart from its neighbors as one of the only vocal supporters of the Bush administration’s decision to scrap the ABM Treaty, construct wide-ranging missile defense systems and share some of this technology with allies. According to Rajesh Masrur of the Center for Global Studies in Mumbai, India, New Delhi’s support for U.S. missile defenses is based on a deep-rooted cultural aversion to nuclear weapons and longtime opposition to the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. He argued that it therefore makes sense for India to support U.S. missile defenses and to aspire to have a limited missile defense of its own (see GSN, May 16). He said he does not envision a major Indian buildup of weapons, regardless of what China or Pakistan might do. “India has long accepted the nuclear gap between itself and China,” according to Masrur. “The widening of the gap will not make much difference. China will still be vulnerable to an Indian strike as and when Indian capacity develops. The number or relative sophistication of Chinese forces does not matter.” On the other hand, other experts point out that India has yet to codify its nuclear force structure goals and strategy. “While India has embraced the concept of minimal, credible deterrence, the size and scope of the of the Indian nuclear deterrent are not fixed,” wrote Lawrence Prabhakar, of Madras Christian College in Chennai, India. “India’s commitment to nuclear minimalism could be challenged by developments in China and Pakistan, as well as by prospective U.S. missile defense deployments.” Pakistan Watching India Unlike India, Pakistan has opposed U.S. missile defense plans and seen India’s aspirations for a missile defense as an effort to increase its military and political dominance. An Indian missile defense system would probably cause a buildup by Islamabad, according to Mutahir Ahmed of the University of Karachi. “In response to Indian acquisition of missile defenses, China and Pakistan are likely to engage in nuclear buildups and to continue established patterns of strategic cooperation,” Ahmed said. Pakistan might “be compelled to respond to Indian ambitions by increasing military cooperation with China and keeping its nuclear option open as the last resort in a war against India.” The world’s hottest nuclear flashpoint — and the cause of three previous wars — is the disputed territory of Kashmir, which nuclear-armed India and Pakistan both claim as their own, Ahmed said. “New Delhi’s deployment of missile defenses could jeopardize improved relations between India and China … and make the resolution of the Kashmir dispute more remote,” he wrote. Prospects for Treaties Remote The prospects for reaching any formal agreement to reduce the spread of nuclear and missile forces in South Asia are considered low, according to the report. China, India and Pakistan have been opposed to the degree of transparency necessary for such agreements, the experts said. “Cold War models of nuclear risk reduction are only partly relevant to Asia,” Krepon wrote. “The Hot Line agreement and other accords to prevent dangerous military practices could certainly be adapted to meet Asian circumstances. But the stabilizing aspects of strategic arms limitation and reduction accords, especially their codification of equality and intrusive monitoring provisions, are unlikely to be applicable to this region.” The best hope for stabilizing the region, Krepon argued, is for the United States to avoid weakening China’s nuclear deterrent. “If future U.S. administrations do not seek the negation of China’s strategic deterrent, cascade effects on the subcontinent could be greatly reduced.”
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