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U.S.-Russia: Former U.S. Officials Urge Treaty Ratification By Kerry Boyd and Mike Nartker The treaty’s existence affirms that resolve in the face of harsh criticism toward U.S. foreign policy can pay off “handsomely,” said Kenneth Adelman, former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in his prepared testimony. “This treaty may be the last strategic arms accord, the culmination of 30 years of this arms control process,” Adelman said. “It will dramatically reduce strategic nuclear weapons and increase stability.” The Senate should vote to approve the treaty without significant amendments, former Senator Sam Nunn said in prepared testimony, adding that it “points us in the right direction.” He expressed full support for the treaty but emphasized that the United States and Russia must follow up with concrete actions. “If it is not followed with other substantive actions,” Nunn said regarding the treaty, “it will become irrelevant at best — counterproductive at worse.” Nunn outlined several steps that U.S. and Russian officials should take to ensure that the treaty becomes a foundation for a new and improved relationship rather than a treaty that was “signed because it was quick and easy” and that failed to reflect any “deep commitment to thinking anew.” Reducing Weapons Both countries should begin taking steps to reduce operationally deployed weapons, Nunn said. “The U.S. Department of Defense should develop and make public at the earliest possible date its own plans for reducing our ‘operationally deployed’ forces under this treaty, and I urge Russia to do the same,” Nunn said. Retired Air Force Gen. Eugene Habiger, former head of the U.S. Strategic Command, echoed the suggestion in his prepared testimony. U.S. officials should begin moving more strategic weapons off alert status, he said, beginning with four Ohio-class Trident submarines, all 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs and other strategic forces the United States plans to reduce under the treaty (see GSN, April 8 and June 3). “If the premise of the treaty is correct — that we have embarked with the Russians on a new strategic relationship — then we should be prepared to demonstrate ‘good faith’ by standing these forces down immediately, and not making that contingent on Russian action in advance,” Habiger said. “At the same time, the Russians should understand that the warm climate in our relations could quickly turn cold if a standdown on the U.S. side is not matched by a standdown on the Russian side.” Reviewing Nuclear Postures In addition, the two countries should change their nuclear postures, which have not altered since the Cold War despite significant changes in the U.S.-Russian relationship, Nunn said. Thousands of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons remain on high alert and are ready to launch within minutes, creating the potential for misunderstandings and mistakes that could be disastrous. “The next step our two nations must take is to ease our fingers away from the nuclear trigger. It’s too easy for a trigger finger to slip, too easy to think you see the other person’s trigger finger begin to squeeze,” Nunn said. Russia and the United States should remove as many weapons as possible from hair-trigger alert, possibly beginning by ordering an immediate stand-down of the weapons that are slated to be reduced, Nunn suggested. The two countries should also cooperate to improve Russia’s early warning capabilities, he said. Both the United States and Russia should agree to destroy, rather than merely store in reserve, the nuclear warheads slated to be reduced under the treaty, Habiger said (see GSN, July 10). The offered rationale for their storage — a potential worsening of U.S.-Russian relations — is “anachronistic,” he said. “We have more than enough warheads in our active reserve to guard against all contingencies,” Habiger said. Verifiability Nunn and Habiger both suggested that the United States propose comprehensive transparency measures and work to make the treaty’s provisions verifiable. “I believe that even the best-written treaties and agreements cannot accomplish their purpose unless they’re matched with transparency,” Habiger said. “Trust is not a static thing. It has to be built by many actions and can be destroyed by one. It must be extended gradually, but can be withdrawn instantly. In the end, trust must be fulfilled by transparency, which shows the trust is well placed.” U.S. and Russian officials should allow each other to see where nuclear weapons are actually destroyed, according to Habiger. He recommended that Russian officials should be allowed to visit the U.S. Pantex dismantlement site in exchange for reciprocal U.S. inspections, adding that the sensitivity of such sites has been “vastly overstated” (see GSN, May 2). “The fear has always been that the inspectors would be able to pick up on the design engineering of the warheads. My official response to that is: ‘So what?’” Habiger said. “The Russians don’t need our warhead information.” Adelman, however, said the Moscow Treaty’s lack of formal verification procedures should cause little concern (see GSN, July 9). One reason is that START I Treaty verification measures are scheduled to remain in effect until 2009, he said. Additionally, the lack of verification measures in the Moscow Treaty will allow U.S. intelligence agencies to focus on more important missions such as tracking terrorists, he added. The United States also is able to make judgments on Russian compliance with the treaty even with a lack of verification measures, Adelman said. During the Cold War-era, the United States knew that the former Soviet Union had violated the Biological Weapons Convention, he added. “We reached this conclusion when the U.S.S.R. was a closed society,” Adelman said. “It is far easier to monitor treaty compliance in a fairly open society, as Russia has become.” Tactical Weapons Nunn and Habiger urged the United States and Russia to find ways to ensure accurate accounting and safeguards for tactical nuclear weapons, which, Nunn said, arms control treaties have never covered (see GSN, May 29). Citing Russia’s estimated arsenal of 12,000-18,000 tactical warheads, Habiger said he supports formation of a treaty to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons (see GSN, May 29). Such weapons pose an attractive target to terrorists attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction, he said. Safeguards The United States should continue to provide assistance to safeguard and destroy Russian weapons of mass destruction through the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction programs, Nunn said. He expressed concern that the Bush administration put some of that work on hold when it decided not to certify Russian compliance with certain arms control treaties — a requirement for Nunn-Lugar assistance. Nunn urged Congress to grant the president the authority to wave the requirement (see GSN, May 9). In an attempt to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the United States and Russia must launch a “Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism,” Nunn said. “Terrorists and certain states are racing to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and we ought to be racing together to stop them,” Nunn said. “There is only thing in the world that can destroy the United States of America today — and that is Russian nuclear warheads,” Habiger told the committee. “That is why this treaty and all these follow-on steps ... are so essential to our security. I want the children of tomorrow to know about nuclear missiles on alert, huge stockpiles of warheads, poorly guarded weapons materials and unknown numbers of tactical nuclear weapons. But I want them to read about it in the history books, not the newspapers.” [EDITOR'S NOTE: Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.] For further information, see: U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department) U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Moscow Treaty U.S. Defense Department CTR Site START I Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)
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