By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can be verified effectively and would not harm the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, says a study released today by the National Academy of Sciences.  Although the United States signed the pact in 1996, the Bush administration has said it will not seek to ratify the agreement, largely due to concerns over the issues addressed in the study.

The report, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, indicates that the “main technical concerns raised about the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty when the Senate refused to ratify it in 1999 are all manageable,” an academy press release said today.

Prepared by an 11-member panel of top scientists, arms control experts, and former national laboratory and industry executives, the report addresses purely technical questions and refutes concerns that undermined the treaty when the Senate voted it down in 1999.

The analysis also serves to address Bush administration opposition to the pact.  President George W. Bush said he opposed the treaty during his presidential election campaign, saying it was unverifiable and could undermine U.S. nuclear deterrence.

Today, the Bush administration has no intention of ratifying the treaty and has withdrawn some financial support for the treaty’s verification mechanism.  There have also been reports some Bush administration officials may push for the United States to withdraw its signature.

The study also challenges an assertion in the Bush administration’s Nuclear Posture Review released in January that the United States might need to resume testing at some point in the future to maintain the nuclear stockpile.

“Increasingly, objective judgments about capability in a nontesting environment will become far more difficult,” the Nuclear Posture Review said.  It also called for spending money to shorten the preparation time for resuming testing (see GSN, Jan. 8).

“Remanufacture to original specifications is the preferred remedy for the age-related defects that materialize in the stockpile,” the report said.  It called for enhancing manufacturing and remanufacturing capabilities and improving surveillance for defects.

The administration also has requested funding for the Energy Department to study options for developing a new low-yield nuclear warhead for striking deeply buried and hardened targets (see GSN, Feb. 20).  The United States has adhered to a self-imposed moratorium on testing since 1992, but has conducted at least 17 subcritical tests since then (see GSN, June 10).

The report “concludes that verification capabilities for the treaty are better than generally supposed, U.S. adversaries could not significantly advance their nuclear weapons capabilities through tests below the threshold of detection, and the United States has the technical capabilities to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of its existing weapons stockpile without periodic tests,” according to the release.

Possible Withdrawal

Recent reports have suggested that some officials are seeking U.S. withdrawal of its signature.  Such a move would amount to a major reversal of U.S. policy regarding the treaty.

During the 1990s, the United States spearheaded efforts to ban nuclear weapons testing through the treaty and President Bill Clinton signed the treaty on the day it was opened for signature in 1996.

The treaty’s signature created the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization in Vienna, which, among other things, has been building an International Monitoring System, a network of several hundred facilities spanning the globe using various technologies to detect possible nuclear explosions. 

The organization provides funds to countries to create seismological, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide stations, which when completed transmit data back to Vienna for processing, archiving and distribution to member states. 

The Bush administration has continued to provide funding for these activities, making the overall largest contribution to the organization in 2002, $16.5 million (see GSN, March 19).  The administration has, however, withheld funds for some CTBTO activities, specifically on-site inspections.

Arms control advocates have said they believe that U.S. support for the treaty remains in jeopardy.

“In light of other administration positions with respect to the ABM Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention protocol and so many other issues, we still have a major fight on our hands, not so much that this treaty will be ratified, but whether it will withdraw the U.S. signature from the treaty,” said John Isaacs, president of the Council for a Livable World, an arms control lobbying organization.

“The one positive note is that the Secretary of State [Colin Powell, then the retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,] was one of those who endorsed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty when it was before the Senate,” Isaacs said.  In his confirmation hearing in early 2001, Powell referred to “flaws” in the treaty, but did not specify them.

In 1999, top U.S. military leaders said they supported ratification of the treaty, viewing the network of capabilities it offered a valuable addition to the U.S. global nuclear test detection system.

“This treaty provides one means of dealing with a very serious security challenge, and that is, as Secretary [of Defense William] Cohen has outlined, nuclear proliferation,” said Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Henry Shelton in congressional testimony in February 1999.  “The CTBT will help limit the development of more advanced and destructive weapons and inhibit the ability of more countries to acquire nuclear weapons.”

His predecessor, Gen. John Shalikashvili, then in retirement, published a report of findings and recommendations on the treaty in January 2001, in which he concluded, “It is very much in our national interest to secure (certain) benefits through entry into force of the Test Ban Treaty.  If this opportunity is lost, the United States’ ability to lead an effective global campaign against nuclear proliferation will be severely damaged.”

Supplement to U.S. Capabilities Seen

The National Academy of Sciences report suggests the system could be an important improvement over current U.S. capabilities for monitoring any clandestine Russian testing.

On October 3, 1999, the Washington Post reported, “The Central Intelligence Agency has concluded it cannot monitor low-level tests by Russia precisely enough to ensure compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” writing the agency could not distinguish very low-level nuclear explosions from conventional tests or seismic activity.  The story cited a series of Russian tests at the site U.S. officials suspected were conducted to develop new low-yield nuclear warheads.

The CTBT system, combined with some intelligence collection, should allow for detection of nuclear weapons explosions with yields as small as 1 kiloton “with high confidence in all environments,” the NAS report said.  In some locations of interest, such as Russia’s Novaya Zemlya test site, the capability would extend down to very low levels of .01 kilotons or 10 tons, the report said.

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