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United States: Report Warns Against New U.S. Nuclear Weapons By Bryan Bender Developing a nuclear warhead to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets would adversely affect both the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the British American Security Information Council concluded in the July report, Bunker Busters: Washington’s Drive for New Nuclear Weapons. The move would raise doubts about Washington’s pledge to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and might require new nuclear testing to prove the utility of new weapons, the authors warned. Meanwhile, European allies are likely to look warily upon any U.S. effort to give nuclear weapons a greater role in defense planning, while Russia and China might take any new nuclear developments as a sign of continued U.S. hostility, according to the report. The Bush administration is seeking congressional approval to modify current nuclear weapons and to study new warhead designs to strike at deeply buried targets such as underground bunkers suspected of hiding chemical, biological or nuclear weapons (see GSN, Dec. 19, 2001). The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives remain split over the issue in divergent versions of the fiscal 2003 defense budget, which they will have to resolve it by the end of next month (see GSN, June 28). The search for a nuclear bunker-buster has picked up steam in the wake of a re-evaluation of U.S. nuclear policy that led earlier this year to the classified Nuclear Posture Review, which called for developing a nuclear bunker-buster to fulfill a “key unmet capability” (see GSN, March 14). Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is studying a modified B83 nuclear warhead and Los Alamos National Laboratory is studying the feasibility of modifying the B61, which can already penetrate earth (see GSN, March 26). To enhance the credibility of its nuclear deterrent, the posture review abandoned the deliberate ambiguity surrounding the question of whether the United States is prepared to counter a chemical or biological attack with nuclear weapons, the report says. For the first time, the review raised the prospect of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, according to the report. “Hawkish policy officials believe that the United States should now adopt a more explicit stance in this regard and thereby raise the profile of its nuclear arsenal in its military planning,” the report says. “The Bush administration has already started down this road by announcing that a pre-emptive strike policy would be incorporated into the National Security Strategy in autumn 2002.” NPT and CTBT at Risk Introducing a bunker-busting nuclear warhead, according to BASIC, would have a “far-reaching impact” on the interlocking matrix of global arms control agreements. In particular, “of all the international treaties that may be adversely affected, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty may suffer the greatest blow,” according to the report. For one, the Bush administration’s plans contradict some of the 13 steps to advance the treaty that were agreed to by signatories in May 2000, according to the report. “Ongoing attempts to develop new, more usable nuclear weapons, and a refusal to rule out their use against non-nuclear states, raise serious doubts about Washington’s commitment to ensure a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies,” the report says. The threat to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states in particular “runs contrary to the ‘negative security assurances’ issued by the nuclear powers in the context of the NPT regime,” the report says. Meanwhile, U.S. plans for missile defenses, submarines and bombers signal an “ambition to continue, and possibly increase, the reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. military planning well into the 21st century.” Another jeopardized arms control regime would be the CTBT, according to the report, which says that renewed testing may be necessary to prove any new weapons. That would especially be the case if a modified nuclear weapon is unsatisfactory and an entirely new design is required. “Development of new warheads could necessitate renewed testing,” the report said, “with the administration claiming that the safety and reliability of the new designs cannot be derived from the results of previous testing” (see GSN, March 29). An entirely new nuclear design may be necessary, according to recent study results. Tests of the B61 as a bunker-buster have already raised questions about whether a modification would be enough to fulfill the mission, according to the report. The B61 could only penetrate about 20 feet into dry earth when dropped from 40,000 feet, making it ineffective against deeply buried targets and raising the risk of radioactive fallout in the surrounding area. European, Russian and Chinese Responses U.S. pursuit of bunker-busting nuclear weapons will also affect Washington’s relationship with allies and potential adversaries, according to BASIC. “Allies and adversaries alike have reacted to the new U.S. nuclear posture with trepidation, wariness, and even anger,” the report says. Europeans, and particularly NATO allies, have had nuclear policies in line with the United States, which therefore has an effective veto over the development of nuclear policy. “Washington may seek to include similar language [as the Nuclear Posture Review] in future alliance policy documents to extend the range of missions for its nuclear arsenal, despite concern expressed by NATO allies,” the report says. “Already strained by questions over its role in a post-Sept. 11 world, NATO will have difficulty withstanding fresh splits over this issue.” The reaction of European allies, however, may pale in comparison to new regional tensions sparked by U.S. nuclear moves. In addition, development of new nuclear weapons by the United States might increase Russian military interest in its own arsenal, according to the report. “With renewed emphasis on nuclear arsenals and technologies in both Russia and the United States, the possibility of meaningful reductions in tactical nuclear weapons will disappear rapidly,” the report says. At the same time, “the development of low-yield nuclear weapons would appear to Chinese analysts and policymakers as further proof of U.S. hostility,” the report adds. A possible military confrontation with China over Taiwan is cited in the posture review as a potential nuclear flashpoint and as a result China would be able to justify expanding its own nuclear arsenal without eliciting strong international reaction, the report predicts. China’s reaction, moreover, “may have serious impact on stability in South Asia as India and Pakistan seek to maintain the regional military balance,” the report says.
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