|
|||||
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
 |
 |
    |
|
|
|||
 |
|
||
|
|||
|
|
|
|
||||||||
|
U.S. Response: Pre-Emption Enters U.S. Counterproliferation Strategy By David Ruppe “We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends,” according to The National Security Strategy of the United States, sent to Congress Friday. “As a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed,” the document says. It was sent from the White House to Capitol Hill along with a proposed resolution to grant the president the authority to act against Iraq using “all means” (see GSN, Sept. 20). The strategy document specifies three U.S. approaches to battling the spread of WMD technologies, including: * “proactive counterproliferation efforts,” such as “detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities”; * “strengthened nonproliferation efforts,” involving diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls, threat reduction assistance, and technology interdiction; and * “effective consequence management” to respond to WMD attacks. Both counterproliferation and nonproliferation have been elements of U.S. national security strategy for decades. The term nonproliferation generally refers to approaches such as arms control, export restrictions on dual-use technology and diplomatic efforts to discourage proliferation. Counterproliferation has been traditionally understood as Defense Department activities to combat proliferation through diplomacy, arms control, export controls, a strong deterrent as well as the preparation of intelligence for possible U.S. strikes. It has also included capabilities for interdicting weapons of mass destruction during an attack and dealing with the consequences of an attack. The Clinton administration’s approach has been characterized as “passive,” focusing strongly on traditional arms control and the promotion of international law and norms. That administration pursued such measures as the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, pursuit of an inspections protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and expansion of the Missile Control Technology Regime. Jack Mendelsohn, a former State Department arms control official, said the Bush administration’s very public consideration of attacking Iraq signals a renewed emphasis on the use of force for counterproliferation. “People are fairly confused about why we’re going after Iraq — it’s not terrorism, its counterproliferation,” he said. In additional to citing proliferation to terrorists as a concern, the White House document cited the possibility of Iraq using its weapons of mass destruction as a form of deterrence or blackmail as a reason for action against Baghdad. “For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states,” the U.S. strategy document said. “Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States,” it said. Mendelsohn said the emphasis on pre-emption as a means of counterproliferation has corresponded with a de-emphasis by the administration on some traditional arms control and nonproliferation approaches that, while constraining potential enemy capabilities, might also constrain U.S. capabilities and action. He cited the administration’s opposition to international negotiations on an inspection mechanism to enforce the Biological Weapons Convention (see GSN, Sept. 6) and its rejection of a nuclear arms control treaty with Russia to eliminate, rather than download, nuclear warheads (see GSN, Aug. 5). “Their counterproliferation policy as far as I can tell looks like ‘bomb Iraq and we’re not sure what to do about North Korea,’” said Mendelsohn. He acknowledged though, the administration has continued nonproliferation efforts in the former Soviet Union, to secure and eliminate WMD stockpiles, and has helped secure an international commitment to provide $20 billion for such programs, a point also noted in the White House document (see GSN, June 28). Military action as tool for combating proliferation is not new. Former President George H.W. Bush cited Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs as a major reason for making war on Iraq in 1991. The United States attacked suspected Scud sites and the Iraq was deterred from using its weapons of mass destruction by U.S. threats of possible nuclear retaliation, but counterproliferation was not the principal U.S. aim for conducting the war, said John Kohout, vice president and senior analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy. “We were looking more at Kuwait than we were looking at WMD at that point,” he said. In December 1993, then-Defense Secretary Les Aspin announced a new defense counterproliferation initiative making pre-emption a prominent Clinton administration counterproliferation goal. The United States has not seriously pursued pre-emption, however, until the current administration following the Sept. 11 attacks, said Kohout. “Pre-emption is a larger factor now, because we’ve never been so close to having weapons of mass destruction in the hands of an adversary where they could use them,” he said. “All of a sudden you haven’t got the maneuvering room to sit back and think, ‘well, maybe it’s not so bad, maybe we can take another year to deal with it,’” he said.
| ||||||||||
Back to top
