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China: New Report Details Chinese Missile Defense Countermeasures By Mike Nartker Building on years of research, China has created a broad program to develop countermeasures to defeat a U.S. missile defense system, according to a chapter in the report, China’s Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles and Conventional Capabilities. The chapter was prepared by Mark Stokes, country director for China and Taiwan in the U.S. defense secretary’s office, in an unofficial capacity. Countermeasures developers have focused on two main avenues, countersurveillance and counterintercept, the report says. Countersurveillance The countersurveillance strategy is designed to prevent U.S. sensors from detecting ballistic missiles and their warheads, the report says. To this end, China has worked to develop passive electronic countermeasures such as chaff to confuse X-Band radar systems and active electronic countermeasures such as radar jammers. Analysts at the Chinese National University of Defense Technology have researched electronic countermeasures to sensors on the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 and the Sea-Based Midcourse interceptors, which have been proposed for use in the U.S. missile defense system, according to the report. China is also examining ways to reduce sensors’ ability to detect ballistic missiles during their midcourse and terminal flight phases, the report says. Engineers have experimented with altering the shape of reentry vehicles to reduce their radar signatures, the report says. They also are working to reduce infrared signatures. Researchers have conducted experiments on “cold screen technology,” in which a warhead is encased in an aluminum alloy and liquid nitrogen is placed between the warhead and the shell, the report says. In some experiments, infrared sensors normally capable of detecting an unshrouded reentry vehicle 3,000 kilometers away were unable to detect a cold-screen-protected warhead at more than three meters, the report says. Chinese engineers have worked to develop two kinds of decoy measures — saturation and deception. Saturation measures such as balloons have been praised for their relative ease of technology and low costs, the report says. Researchers are also working on electronic decoys that emit a radar return similar to an actual reentry vehicle. To counter U.S. anti-missile lasers, Chinese engineers have worked on fast-burn boosters, the report says, adding that concerns have been raised over possible quality control problems related to stage separation and accuracy (see GSN, July 15). The report also says that some observers have reported research efforts into boost-phase maneuvering systems, but there is so far no hard evidence as to any actual development. Counterintercept China has worked on several measures to block interceptors from engaging targets. One method that has been examined is the use of multiple warheads, the report says, adding that China has researched multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology since the 1970s (see GSN, Feb. 12). The report cites Chinese missile designers who have said that real and decoy warheads could be combined through the use of MIRV technology. Researchers are also working to develop maneuverable reentry vehicles to complicate missile defense tracking, according to the report. Efforts have focused on programming a reentry vehicle to maneuver during its terminal flight phase — about 20 to 30 seconds before engaging a target, the report says. To counter U.S. boost-phase intercept systems such as the Airborne Laser, China is researching missile spinning and hardening, the report says. Missile spinning, designed to reduce the concentration of a laser on a single spot, and hardening might not render a missile immune to boost phase defenses, but they probably would lower the number of laser shots available per mission, the report says. Other Measures China also has several other missile defense countermeasures under consideration, including non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, anti-satellite measures and anti-radiation missiles, according to the report. Chinese engineers have experimented with the use of EMP weapons, such as a high-powered microwave warhead, to knock out space-based and ground-based missile defense sensors, the report says. “PLA [People’s Liberation Army] writings indicate that fielding of an EMP warhead is a relatively high priority,” the report says. China has also conducted research on anti-satellite measures since the 1960s, according to the report. To counter a missile defense system, ASAT measures would be directed against satellite systems in low-Earth orbit — for example, the Space Based Infrared System-Low system — or in highly elliptical orbits — for example, SBIRS-High (see GSN, Sept. 4). China has also increased efforts to distinguish actual satellites from decoys, the report says. To destroy radar installations within a missile defense system, China is attempting to acquire or develop anti-radiation missiles such as the Russian Kh-31P, according to the report. “There are persistent rumors of PLA procurement or joint production arrangement on the Kh-31P, which Chinese engineers note was specifically developed to counter the Patriot’s MPQ-53 radar and Aegis SPY-1D phased array radar,” the report says (see GSN, June 19). China’s countermeasure research program is apparently well advanced, but could also overwhelm China’s entire ballistic missile program, the report says (see GSN, Sept. 16). “Chinese research and development of missile defense countermeasures is extensive and appears relatively sophisticated. However, countermeasures introduce an added element of complexity into an already complex system,” the report says. “Despite significant investment, P.R.C. [People’s Republic of China] countermeasures on longer-range ballistic missiles are unlikely to keep pace with U.S. technologies. ... Nevertheless, the U.S. should hedge against unforeseen breakthroughs in P.R.C. countermeasure technology.” For further information, see:
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