|
|||||
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
 |
 |
    |
|
|
|||
 |
|
||
|
|||
|
|
|
|
||||||||
|
International Response: Moscow to Speed Up HEU Removal at Soviet-Era Research Reactors By Bryan Bender “We are planning joint programs to step up nuclear [and] radiation safety and physical protection of the facilities that are located in what are now foreign countries,” Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said Dec. 27. While praising Russian plans, private experts believe a more coordinated effort is needed to identify research centers that are at risk, earmark the needed funding, negotiate transfer agreements and then quickly secure the highly enriched uranium. They contend that the current process, which includes negotiations within, then between, governments and the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency, is taking much too long in light of the growing threat of nuclear terrorism. Officials say discussions are underway to streamline the process, which can take a year from conception to completion. For example, the United States and Russia first agreed to finance the transfer of highly enriched uranium from the research reactor located in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in March, but the material has yet to be removed (see GSN, Mar. 13, 2002). U.S. officials had set a goal of the end of 2002 to remove the material (see GSN, Oct. 22, 2002). Rumyantsev cited the highly publicized operation in Belgrade last year as the model for future joint operations to prevent weapon-grade material from being stolen or diverted by terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Aug. 23, 2002). U.S., Russian, IAEA and Yugoslav officials removed more than 100 pounds of highly enriched uranium from a research reactor at the Vinca Institute, enough to construct up to three nuclear bombs. The United States paid $2.5 million for the project out of State Department nuclear threat reduction funds, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a private nonprofit group, provided $5 million for environmental cleanup at the Vinca Institute. Former Soviet and East European Facilities There are about 350 sites in 58 countries that possess highly enriched uranium, according to nonproliferation experts. Of those sites, about two dozen have enough material to build an atomic weapon, they say (see GSN, Sept. 3, 2002). Most of those countries are former Soviet republics or were otherwise allies of Moscow and thus eligible for nuclear cooperation during the Cold War. Rumyantsev highlighted several countries as likely partners in securing large quantities of HEU in the coming year. “In the CIS [former Soviet] countries there is a large number of nuclear reactors for research purposes,” he said. “In the first place [there is] Ukraine.” “There are also reactors in countries other than the CIS — in the Baltics, [including one located at] Ignalina,” in Lithuania, Rumyantsev said. “There are also reactors in countries of Eastern Europe — in Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Finland,” he said. He said negotiations continue on securing the uranium from the Uzbek reactor. “Now we are considering the question about the return of spent nuclear fuel from the research reactor in Uzbekistan to Russia — for technological storage and processing. This kind of activity is being pursued.” International officials have several options for securing these facilities, including “downblending” their fuel from highly enriched to low-enriched uranium, decommissioning them in return for U.S. and other grants to keep scientists afloat until they can find suitable alternative work, or assisting in decommissioning facilities that have already ceased reactor operations. Process Unnecessarily Prolonged Despite increased Russian cooperation — and what observers consider increased willingness to take back nuclear material Moscow provided to research facilities over the years — experts believe the overall approach to securing these research reactors needs to be accelerated. “It takes more than a year in each case just to figure out who’s doing what,” said Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at Harvard University and a U.S. government adviser on nonproliferation issues. “After Sept. 11 we can’t afford to do that,” he said. Within the United States alone, several agencies must play a role and efforts to coordinate their activities often fall victim to bureaucratic impediments. The State Department is responsible for funding, out of the nonproliferation and disarmament fund; the Energy Department contains the relevant nuclear expertise; the Defense Department is responsible for the transportation of sensitive materials; and private, charitable entities such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative have also played a role. “What’s needed now is a single focused program with money, expertise and authority in a single set of hands to negotiate these removals all over the world,” Bunn said. Meanwhile, Bunn said large quantities of highly enriched uranium are at risk not only in the former Soviet states and Eastern Europe, but also within Russia itself. He estimates there are 30 tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia. “There are quite a number of HEU-fueled research reactors and fuel fabrication facilities in Russia,” he said. The Energy Department is currently assisting Moscow in consolidating this material, and Russia appears “much more interested” in disposing of their excess uranium fuel, Bunn said. In addition, some of the most at-risk facilities are outside the former Soviet sphere, but could receive similar aid. The United States, for example, has an established program to retrieve highly enriched uranium from research reactors it fueled (see GSN, Sept. 27, 2002). [EDITOR'S NOTE: The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group, Inc.]
| ||||||||||
Back to top
