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Kay Reports Finding No Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, But Some Biological Warfare “Activities” By David Ruppe They also have found no evidence that Iraq had active nuclear or chemical weapons programs when U.S. and British forces invaded last March, nor have they discovered any evidence of biological weapons production, though they did find evidence suggesting clandestine research activity on weapons-capable biological agents, he said. The 1,200-member, U.S.-sponsored team, called the Iraq Survey Group, also ruled out the possibility that two equipment-laden trailers found this spring in Iraq were intended for mobile biological weapons production (see GSN, Aug. 11), despite U.S. President George W. Bush’s May declaration that the trailers proved “we found the weapons of mass destruction” (see GSN, June 2). In addition, Kay reported that no information has been uncovered to indicate that Iraq had prepared chemical rounds for rapid deployment against the invading forces (see GSN, Sept. 30). Despite the lack of weapon discoveries, Kay said his team has uncovered “dozens of WMD-related program activities” and equipment previously concealed from U.N. inspectors. He said his conclusions were preliminary and that further investigation is warranted. “We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapons stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and our only task is to find whether they have gone,” Kay said in testimony to a joint hearing of the House and Senate intelligence committees that was released to the public. “We are still very much in the collection and analysis mode,” he said. The Bush administration had cited a threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to make its case for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, which began last March and the subsequent occupation. Some officials had said there was evidence Iraq was attempting to develop nuclear weapons and that they feared Iraq might one day share them with terrorists. Invading U.S. military forces did not report finding any banned weapons, however, and the Bush administration has been criticized for using the survey group instead of the standing U.N. arms inspection commission to search for banned weapons. The group so far has spent an estimated $300 million on the search and the administration reportedly is asking for another $600 million and six to nine months more to continue the investigation, according to the New York Times. No Visible Nuclear or Chemical Weapons Programs Kay said deposed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein wanted to obtain nuclear weapons and would have if U.N. sanctions had been lifted. He said, though, that “to date we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material.” He said there was no indication of activities related to an Iraqi centrifuge enrichment program. U.S. intelligence agencies had previously reported that Iraqi had tried to import aluminum tubes for uranium enrichment centrifuges. Kay’s team did find, however, some evidence that Iraq took steps to preserve some technological capability from its pre-1991 nuclear weapons program. Kay also said Iraq appeared to have no significant chemical weapons program. “Multiple sources with varied access and reliability have told ISG that Iraq did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled CW program after 1991,” he said. “Information found to date suggests that Iraq’s large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW munitions was reduced — if not entirely destroyed — during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of U.N. sanctions and U.N. inspections,” he said. Biological Weapons Activities Suspected While Kay indicated no evidence of biological weapons stores or production, he said the group uncovered “significant information” indicating “biological warfare activities,” including “research and development of BW-applicable organisms, the involvement of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in possible BW activities, and deliberate concealment activities.” “All of this suggests Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents,” he said. In particular, he said a reference strain of a biological organism that could be used to produce biological weapons was found concealed in a scientist’s home and that “new research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin” that was not reported to U.N. inspectors was uncovered. Kay said a prison that might have been used for biological weapons testing on humans had been “explicitly ordered” not to be declared to the United Nations. He said investigators have begun to uncover a “clandestine network of laboratories and facilities” within Iraq’s intelligence apparatus that was not declared to U.N. inspectors. “We are still working on determining the extent to which this network was tied to large-scale military efforts or BW terror weapons, but this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW capable facilities and continuing R&D — all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production,” he said. Milton Leitenberg, a professor and arms control expert at the University of Maryland, said today the evidence Kay has produced so far on Iraqi biological agent activities does indicate a biological weapon program was underway, though a “little” one. “I think there are no problems answering that there are no stockpiles, there are no weapons in the sense of munitions, there are no bulk agents. “But I don’t think you can say those things [Kay described] aren’t part of a program. Every one of them is a material breach. There shouldn’t have been a pathogen in a refrigerator. There shouldn’t have been any equipment in a mosque. There shouldn’t have been those two dozen or 20 laboratories in the Iraqi intelligence service,” Leitenberg said. Two Trailers Ruled Out Prior to the invasion, U.S. officials had said Iraq possessed trailers containing specialized equipment that were apparently intended for mobile biological weapons production and at least two suspected trailers were later found by occupying forces. Kay’s report yesterday said the Iraq Survey Group was yet “unable to corroborate the existence of a mobile [biological weapons] BW production effort.” It said an investigation ruled out the two trailers were intended for biological weapons production and other suspected purposes, saying “technical limitations would prevent any of these processes from being ideally suited to these trailers.” Kay said the group has identified individuals who were at one time part of a mobile program and would continue to search for evidence of its existence. Chemical Weapons Attack Plans Discounted The Iraq Survey Group has also found no evidence that Iraq had prepared chemical weapons rounds for quickly attacking invading U.S. and British forces. Kay said the inspectors “acquired information related to Iraq’s CW doctrine and Iraq’s war plans for [countering the invasion], but we have not yet found evidence to confirm prewar reporting that Iraqi military units were prepared to use CW against coalition forces.” A British document controversially claimed an Iraqi order had been given to be capable of launching a chemical attack in 45 minutes. President George W. Bush in September 2002 had restated that claim and the White House had issued a statement saying Iraq “could launch a biological or chemical attack 45 minutes after the order is given.” As for Iraq’s ballistic missile efforts, the Kay’s team found evidence that Iraq was engaged in missile development activities “that would have, if [the invasion] had not occurred, dramatically breached U.N. restrictions placed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War.” “The Iraqis were engaged in a very full-scale program that would have extended their delivery systems out beyond 1,000 kilometers,” Kay told reporters after the hearing.
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