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U.S.-Russia: Experts Call For “Nuclear Czars” to Oversee Nonproliferation Efforts By Mike Nartker In their letter to the U.S. and Russian academies, John Holdren, chair of the U.S National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control and Nikolai Laverov, a member of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Science and Technology Advisory Council, reported on the progress of a joint U.S.-Russian committee that has worked to develop recommendations to strengthen cooperation in nuclear nonproliferation efforts. “There can be no doubt ... about the interest of proliferant states and terrorist groups in trying to exploit the continuing inadequacies in the protection of nuclear weapons, materials, technologies and expertise in order to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities; and there can be no doubt about the intolerable consequences that would ensue if even one such weapon were exploded in a U.S. or Russian city,” Holdren and Laverov said in their letter. Yesterday, CIA Director George Tenet told a U.S. Senate committee, “The desire for nuclear weapons is on the upsurge. Additional countries may decide to seek nuclear weapons as it becomes clear their neighbors and regional rivals are already doing so. The ‘domino theory’ of the 21st century may well be nuclear.” One of the U.S.-Russian committee’s main recommendations is that both the United States and Russia should appoint a full-time, high-level official to oversee each country’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts. These officials would also be responsible for improving bilateral cooperation and would update their presidents on the progress and needs of nonproliferation programs. The idea of appointing a single official to mange nonproliferation efforts is not new. Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, now co-chairman of the private Nuclear Threat Initiative, made a similar recommendation during a speech in mid-November 2002. While serving in Congress, Nunn co-sponsored the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which provides U.S. assistance to securing former Soviet weapons of mass destruction and related materials. “The first step is to put our own houses in order — identifying, accounting for, and securing the weapons and materials in Russia and the United States,” Nunn told a nonproliferation conference in Washington. “Each president should appoint one high-level person, reporting directly to the president, to take full responsibility for this issue, and this issue alone,” he added. Some experts have argued that, if a nonproliferation czar is created, the position should be a new one, and not merely another responsibility for an existing White House official. For example, some have said a new deputy national security adviser, who would also have their own staff, should fill the position, said Matthew Bunn, senior research associate at the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University. A disadvantage to this, however, is that National Security Council staff members are only accountable to the White House, and the official in charge of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts needs to be both responsible to the president and Congress, Bunn said. Regardless of the exact position developed, the new official has to be part of the White House with direct access to and full confidence of the president, Bunn said. He made a similar point in a May 2002 report, Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action. “[U.S.] President [George W.] Bush needs to appoint someone in the White House who reports directly to him, who has no other mission but this — someone tasked to wake up every morning thinking, ‘What can I do to keep nuclear weapons out of terrorist hands today?’” said the report, co-authored by Holdren and Anthony Weir, both of Harvard’s Managing the Atom Project. Although many experts have said that a White House-level official is needed to act as a nonproliferation czar, there has been little consideration of the idea within the Bush administration, Bunn told GSN, adding that it was unlikely that any action would be taken. Those officials in charge of nonproliferation programs, now scattered among various U.S agencies such as the Defense, Energy and State Departments, have quietly opposed placing so much control in the hands of the White House, he said, adding that such officials would be unlikely to “go on the record” with their criticism. Up on Capitol Hill, however, there has been much more support from Congress for the idea, Bunn said. For example, in 1996, legislation was proposed to establish a single position to oversee nonproliferation programs, but that provision was ultimately watered down and an existing deputy national security adviser simply added monitoring nonproliferation issues to his other responsibilities. Even so, there has been “strong support for this idea on Capitol Hill for a number of years,” Bunn said. It is unlikely, however, that the current Congress will introduce a bill to create a nonproliferation czar position, Bunn said. He noted that Republican-led Congresses typically avoid dictating to a Republican president how to set up his administration. Fissile Materials The committee has also recommended several measures to reduce the amount of available fissile materials. For example, priority should be given to consolidating Russian stockpiles of highly enriched uranium at fewer, more secure storage sites and on returning to Russia small stockpiles of Soviet-era HEU currently outside of Russia. The committee praised the August 2002 joint U.S.-Russian-Yugoslav mission to return more than 100 pounds of HEU to Russia from a Yugoslav research reactor (see GSN, Aug. 23, 2002). Enough fissile material was recovered during that mission to produce two nuclear weapons, according to reports. The U.S.-Russian “Megatons to Megawatts” program, under which the U.S. Enrichment Corp. purchases uranium taken from Russian nuclear weapons for use as fuel in nuclear power plants, needs to be expanded, Holdren and Laverov said in their letter (see GSN, Oct. 4, 2002). The agreement, signed 10 years ago Monday, has provided the United States with enough fuel to power a city the size of Boston for about 230 years, USEC has said. Even so, Russia should accelerate the conversion of weapon-grade materials to fuel beyond the rate needed to implement the U.S. purchase agreement, the committee recommended. While the U.S.-Russian HEU deal is currently designed to ensure that the Russian uranium does not further depress the worldwide LEU market, “proliferation concerns should take priority over economic ones,” Holdren and Laverov said. The United States and Russia also need to expand their efforts to convert research and test reactors to use low-enriched uranium, Holdren and Laverov said, noting that efforts to convert U.S. research reactors to LEU use have been stalled because of a lack of funding. “This issue needs more attention in both countries, as a matter of urgency,” they said. In September 2002, the nonprofit Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council released a report calling for increased support for a joint U.S.-Russian program to develop alternative fuels for research reactors to aid in their conversion to LEU use (see GSN, Sept. 27, 2002). RANSAC noted several concerns regarding the U.S.-Russian Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program, including a lack of funding and technical difficulties in converting research reactors to use the developed alternative fuel assemblies. “It is vitally important that this effort receive renewed political and financial support in both the United States and Russia,” the RANSAC report said. “The program could make an important contribution to the effort to eliminate vulnerable HEU stockpiles in Russia and those other countries that possess Soviet-designed research and test reactors,” it added. A high priority should be placed on international cooperative efforts to decommission Russian nuclear submarines, Holdren and Laverov said. They noted that the nuclear fuel in use in Russian submarines is at varying states of enrichment. Because of this, “some of the spent fuel may represent a significant proliferation hazard and most of it represents a serious radiological terrorism hazard — both to theft and radiological dispersion and to sabotage,” they said. Training The committee has recommended that the United States and Russia should also increase funding to train nonproliferation workers and to make them fully aware of the threats of diversion of fissile materials (see GSN, Dec. 6, 2002). Programs should also be created to train new nonproliferation workers and managers in order to fill that gaps likely to be created by strengthening and expanding nonproliferation programs, according to Holdren and Laverov. “Those involved today in guarding and managing nuclear material need training to make them fully understand the importance of the role they are playing in ensuring U.S., Russian and world security,” Holdren and Laverov said in their letter. “They are literally at the front line of the global struggle to stem the spread of nuclear weapons, and many of them do not know it,” they added. [EDITOR'S NOTE: Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]
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