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Iraq II: United States Appears Set on War, Experts Say By Mike Nartker The only options that could stall U.S. action against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein at this point would be either a “bullet in Saddam’s head” or “Travelocity [airline] tickets for a large amount of families,” former senior U.N. weapons inspector David Kay said yesterday during a Brookings Institution briefing. There is increasing evidence that the United States is building up the military force needed for war, said Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, noting the recent beginning of the deployment of the 101st Airborne Division to the region. Another sign that the United States is close to attacking will be any deployment of the “the first, the first and the first” — the 1st Mechanized Infantry division, the 1st Armored Division, or the 1st Armored Cavalry division, he said. U.S. President George W. Bush’s harsh criticism of Iraq’s human rights record during his State of the Union address last month is another indication of the administration’s intent to attack, said Kenneth Pollack, a member of the National Security Council staff during the Clinton administration (see GSN, Jan. 29). In his speech, Bush said, “International human rights groups have catalogued other methods used in the torture chambers of Iraq: electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues, and rape. If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning.” The White House had resisted having Bush present such a strong argument against Iraq’s human rights record, Pollack said, because, once made, such criticism could not be later withdrawn. Even if progress was made on resolving the conflict surrounding Iraq’s WMD efforts, inspections cannot resolve human rights concerns — leaving the need for military action to remove Hussein, he said. U.S. Plans The United States has two impending windows for war in March — the first 10 days and the last 10 days, O’Hanlon said. These low-moonlight periods would give U.S. forces optimal conditions for nighttime operations, he said. The United States could also begin an attack in early or late April for similar reasons, O’Hanlon said. A U.S.-led attack on Iraq would probably combine aspects of both the 1991 Gulf War and the recent war in Afghanistan to root out al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Pollack said, adding that U.S. ground forces would play a large role. Two recent developments — Jordan’s granting of overflight rights and Turkey’s decision to allow the stationing of U.S. troops there — will have strategic advantages, he said. U.S. forces stationed in Turkey could pin down and distract Iraqi forces in the northern part of the country as well as defend the Kurdish population there from retaliation. By being allowed to fly through Jordanian airspace, U.S. fighter aircraft will be able to better hunt down and destroy Iraqi Scud missile launchers in the western desert section of the country. Powell Makes the Case The expert panel yesterday uniformly praised U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s recent presentation to the U.N. Security Council of U.S. evidence demonstrating Iraqi noncompliance with U.N. resolutions, saying it helped bolster the case for military action (see GSN, Feb. 5). “One of the finest performances I’ve ever seen,” Kay said, adding that Powell’s presentation was so effective, no one present claimed afterward that Iraq was complying with inspectors. Ivo Daalder, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, agreed, saying the White House chose wisely when it picked Powell to present the U.S. argument. “Powell has more credibility than anyone else in the administration,” Daalder said. One of the strongest sections of Powell’s presentation was his warning that the United Nations needed to act or risk sinking into irrelevance, Kay said. “This body places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will without responding effectively and immediately,” Powell said in his presentation. Powell’s warning was a powerful threat to the smaller countries of the United Nations, who see the international body as one of their few checks on U.S. power and ability to act on a global stage, Kay said. Pollack said there were three target audiences for Powell’s presentation: the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. public and the international community. Of these, the Security Council is probably the least relevant because the council members will view any decision on whether to attack Iraq as a policy decision and are unlikely to be swayed by speeches, he said (see GSN, Feb. 6). While Powell was effective in increasing U.S. support for an attack by explaining the justification, he was less successful in convincing the international community, Pollack said. For example, most Arab states appear to have completely dismissed Powell’s presentation and the European reaction has been mixed at best, he said. What the United States needs to do now is “follow-through” on Powell’s efforts by continuing to send out administration officials to make the case against Iraq and by continuing to release U.S. intelligence showing Iraqi noncompliance, Pollack said. He added that while the leaders of a number of countries have privately expressed support for U.S. action against Iraq, they have also warned the United States that it needs to do more to increase public support within their countries. “Powell’s presentation was a great start, but it was [only] a start,” Pollack said. Ball in Hussein’s Court Following Powell’s presentation, Iraq might now choose to make a few technical concessions related to inspectors’ concerns, but is likely to continue to deny the bulk of the U.S. claims, said Amatzia Baram, a professor of Middle Eastern history at the University of Haifa in Israel (see GSN, Feb. 4). For example, Iraq could concede on the issue of allowing U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance flights, he said. Iraqi presidential adviser Amir al-Saadi was reported as indicating earlier this week that Iraq might be ready to compromise on this issue. Another area potentially open for compromise is the private interview of WMD scientists and technicians by inspectors, Baram said. The Associated Press reported today that Iraq has allowed a biologist to participate in such an interview. Hussein feels safe in allowing this because Iraqi intelligence services already know what information each scientist could possibly divulge, and even if the interviews are conducted without Iraqi minders present, the scientists and their families remain in “mortal danger,” Baram said. Iraq is not likely to make major concessions to the United States or inspectors, however, before the approval of a second U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force, according to Baram (see GSN, Feb. 4). That will be the “moment of truth,” for Hussein, he said. Once the threat of an attack is imminent, Hussein will be likely to gather his top advisers and seek their honest advice on what to do next, Baram said. While Hussein has enjoyed a public reputation as being a loose cannon, he often makes rational and calculated decisions at times of crisis, he said. There is a “50.5 percent” chance that Hussein will give in to a small extent on the WMD issue in an attempt to buy more time, Baram said, adding that the decision will be “the most difficult of his life.” Iraq sees its WMD arsenal as important for its survival — a view that would have to be balanced against the threat of a U.S. occupation of Baghdad, Baram said. A second U.N. resolution would be “the moment where they have to rethink the whole thing,” Baram said. The “Samson Option” If war did occur, however, Hussein might attempt what Baram called “the Samson option” — WMD attacks against his enemies in a scorched-earth fashion (see GSN, Oct. 11, 2002). Hussein would probably issue orders for chemical weapons attacks against U.S. forces to at least slow them down, Baram said. It is also possible that Hussein would order using biological weapons against the Shiite community in southern Iraq, which he would then blame on the United States, both in an attempt to slow a U.S. advance and to settle old scores, he said. As part of the Samson option, Hussein could also try to establish a place for himself in Arab history by ordering WMD attacks against Israel in an attempt to inflict mass damage, Baram said, noting that Hussein places a high importance on his future place in history. The United States has begun planning an information campaign to persuade Iraqi military officers to ignore orders to use weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Sept. 30, 2002). Such a campaign would involve the use of leaflets dropped on Iraqi positions, special aircraft messages and even electronic mail communications, according to reports. Baram doubted, however, that most Iraqi officers fully understood the U.S. legalistic approach, by which the United States has warned of war crimes charges against Iraqis who use weapons of mass destruction. Instead, the United States needs to make the Iraqi officers more afraid of U.S. punishment for obeying such orders than they are of Hussein, Baram said, adding that such a task will be difficult. Aftermath Once the United States has overthrown Hussein, the postwar occupation and reconstruction of Iraq will not be easy, the experts said. For example, U.S. troops cannot expect the same warm welcome from the Iraqi Shiite Muslim community that Israeli troops received from the Shiite Muslims in southern Lebanon when they invaded in 1982, Baram said. History has demonstrated that Iraqis are a fiercely nationalistic and difficult people, Baram said. “They’re proud of it,” he added. While the Iraqi population is likely to accept the U.S. presence in the end, the United States will have to be sensitive to Iraqi concerns, Baram said. He said this was a lesson the United Kingdom failed to realize when it occupied Baghdad after World War II. The United States will need to use local leaders who did not actively collaborate with the Baath Party, as well as opposition members in exile, to serve as links to the local population, he said. In the end, however, most U.S. troops should be able to leave Iraq fairly quickly after the fall of Hussein and Iraq should be able to gradually return to self-rule, Baram said. Kay, however, differed with Baram’s view that the Iraqi population would be any more difficult for the United States to oversee after Hussein. “I don’t know anyone in the Middle East who isn’t [difficult],” Kay said. For further information, see:
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