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Iraq II: Small WMD-Agent Releases Could Cause Heavy Casualties in Iraq, Neighbors By David Ruppe Use of a nuclear weapon in Iraq by the United States, for retaliation or other purposes, could be just as devastating to the civilian population, depending on the size of the weapon and whether the detonation were near a major city, the analysis suggested. The calculations were performed by the Natural Resources Defense Council, which used special software — developed for the Pentagon — to model a number of potential WMD scenarios in a U.S.-led war on Iraq. The scenarios also included various Iraqi chemical weapons attacks against Tel Aviv and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and U.S. nuclear retaliatory attacks on Baghdad and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s home city of Tikrit. The program, called Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability, was created for the military by the Science Applications International Corp. and licensed by the Pentagon to several nongovernmental organizations (see GSN, Nov. 27, 2002). Depending on the scenario, the most serious casualties might occur from an anthrax release. Such a release could be caused an Iraqi attack or by an accidental release caused by U.S. forces bombing an unknown cache, according to Matthew McKinzie, the NRDC analyst who modeled the scenarios. In a potentially worst-case scenario, an Iraqi attack against Kuwait City spraying 30 kilograms of anthrax from an aerial drone under certain wind conditions could infect 800,000 people, McKinzie calculated. “This is one of the most terrible scenarios we looked at … when you start talking about that many casualties, you’re in the range of nuclear weapons scenarios,” he said. The United States has accused Iraq of having drones capable of performing such attacks. McKinzie also calculated the release of a relatively small quantity of anthrax spores, just half a kilogram, from a hypothetical, damaged facility at Abu Ghraib near Baghdad. With a gentle wind blowing over Baghdad, the model showed a resulting spore plume that might produce more than 300,000 infections. “What you find is that even for light damage to such a facility and subkilogram quantities of anthrax that’s released, you actually have a substantial plume that’s produced, a plume that can cause anthrax infections, because only a very low number of anthrax spores can cause an infection,” he said. In the two cases the models assumed that the attacked populations were not widely inoculated against anthrax or treated with antibiotics. While not considered as contagious as smallpox, anthrax is described by a U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention fact sheet as one of the most dangerous diseases because of the relative ease with which it can be mass-produced and disseminated to a large population. Treated early with antibiotics, a fatal infection can usually be prevented. In previous known cases, fatality rates for an infection from inhalation have ranged from 90 percent to 100 percent. U.N. inspectors reportedly expect to receive a declaration soon from Iraq on any existing or destroyed anthrax holdings. Chemical Attacks Less Deadly NRDC, which has not taken an official position on the possible war, calculated that potential Iraqi chemical weapons attacks would probably produce far fewer casualties than biological or nuclear attacks, in part because of the need to concentrate a significant amount of gas on a location. “What NRDC took away from this analysis is really that all weapons of mass destruction are not equal, that the scenarios that we calculated paint very different pictures of chemical, nuclear or biological attacks,” he said. Using the software, NRDC calculated a chemical weapons artillery barrage or ballistic missile attack against a heavily populated area using the deadly nerve agent sarin might cause at most thousands of casualties for unprotected individuals. Iraq is believed by U.S. intelligence agencies to have hidden hundreds of 155 mm artillery shells containing chemical weapons. In addition, Iraq is suspected of possessing some Scud missiles and other, longer-range missiles that could be armed with weapons of mass destruction. U.S. Nuclear Retaliation Considered U.S. President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have both alluded to the possibility of using U.S. nuclear weapons in retaliation for Iraqi chemical or biological weapons use. On Sept. 14, Bush reportedly signed a secret national security directive allowing for the possible use of nuclear weapons for attacking deeply buried facilities or in retaliation for chemical and biological weapons attacks (see GSN, Jan. 31). Low casualties resulting from an Iraqi chemical attack against Israel or U.S. forces, however, would make nuclear retaliation disproportionate and therefore unjustifiable, McKinzie said. “I don’t think any of these scenarios justify a nuclear retaliation. The response would be disproportional and would reopen [the issue of] the use of nuclear weapons, which in my view would probably be more damaging in terms of encouraging others to increase their arsenals or gain arsenals,” said Thomas Cochran, director of NRDC’s nuclear program. A 50-kiloton U.S. nuclear attack on Baghdad might cause 400,000 casualties, with 175,000 deaths, NRDC calculated. A similar nuclear attack on less-populated Tikrit could produce 107,000 casualties, with 68,000 dead. There has been a concern Israel would respond with a nuclear attack if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein attacked it with chemical weapons. A ballistic missile attack against Tel Aviv using 225 kilograms of sarin would produce an estimated 3,000 casualties, with more than 31,000 people potentially exposed, according NRDC’s model. Similar numbers would result from the same chemical weapons attack on Kuwait or Riyadh, McKinzie said. U.S. Targeting Considerations Hussein commonly locates militarily significant structures near civilian ones, such as schools and hospitals, with the apparent intent of deterring strikes on those facilities or forcing foreign attackers to risk negative publicity by causing significant civilian casualties, U.S. officials say. The U.S. Defense Department has indicated U.S. military forces will take potential noncombatant casualties, civilian infrastructure damage, culturally sensitive sites, and the proximity of so-called “human shields” into account when targeting bombings in the event of war. “We strike only military targets while taking extraordinary care to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties and to minimize collateral damage. Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, flaunts the laws of war and co-locates military and civilian facilities, and employs human shields,” a Pentagon spokesman said at a March 3 briefing on targeting. A senior defense official also said at the briefing the military may try to attack suspected WMD facilities, but would use tactics intended to mitigate the release of WMD agents. “We might also target some of those kinds of facilities with special operating forces, as opposed to kinetically, with bombs,” the official said. “There’s also some good studies on the kinetic effect of various types of munitions on various types of chemicals. And so you may be able to incinerate some of those in the actual attack itself,” the official said. The official said, “There are some studies” suggesting similar results could be achieved in striking biological weapons facilities with conventional bombs. Existing weaponry may not be satisfactory, however, as the Bush administration is seeking congressional approval to research the possible development of low-yield nuclear weapons that would incinerate the agents in chemical and biological facilities (see GSN, March 6). Wind an Important Factor NRDC’s modeling showed that wind speed and direction were important factors in calculating the effects of WMD attacks. For the Abu Ghraib scenario, if the winds were blowing where they usually do on a March morning, which is not toward Baghdad, then casualties could be in the range of 1,000 people, the group calculated. A strong wind could also significantly affect the effectiveness of a drone anthrax attack, reducing casualties even if the attack used a much greater quantity of anthrax. McKinzie said Hussein might be more inclined to use chemical or biological weapons against civilians because the weapons would have much less impact on U.S. and allied military forces who are equipped with defensive equipment and are vaccinated against some biological agents. He cited a 1998 book by one expert, former U.S. military officer Albert Mauroni, which argued that weapons of mass destruction could cause “mass destruction” against an unprepared civilian population, but they would probably cause only “mass disruption” against a force with proper equipment and training. U.S. soldiers in the area are reportedly being vaccinated for smallpox, anthrax and a range of other diseases, and have been supplied with suits and other equipment for defense against an attack. Bunker Busters The modeling software was developed in part to aid the Pentagon in planning U.S. attacks against targets housing chemical, biological and nuclear materials. The models assess how and where a biological or chemical agent disperses by incorporating atmospheric conditions such as temperature, wind and humidity, and terrain, and transferring its calculations onto a map of the area in question (see GSN, June 5, 2002). They also incorporate the physical properties and toxic effects of the weapons, as well as data about how the agents might be deployed by Iraq. The software can also calculate the effects of nuclear explosions, including blast, heat, radiation and fallout. NRDC has calculated significant collateral devastation if Bush were to order a nuclear attack against a deeply buried bunker hidden under or near one of Hussein’s presidential palaces. Such facilities are suspected near a presidential facility in Mosul, in northern Iraq, and one in Tikrit, McKinzie said. “Even with a very small yield of a half-kiloton, you have to bury the nuclear weapon tens of meters, 50 meters or more into the ground to contain that fallout,” he said, adding that so far the military has been unable to design an earth-penetrating weapon that can burrow that deep. “You still get a ferocious amount of fallout from low-yield nuclear weapons buried deeply into the ground,” he said.
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