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U.S.-Russia I: RAND Report Says Accidental Launch Threat Growing By David Ruppe The report describes three possible scenarios for such a launch, including a rogue commander or terrorist who intentionally fires a missile, a training accident or system malfunction that accidentally launches a missile, or an erroneous perception by one nation that it is under attack, leading it to order a counterattack. Neglecting these risks “could produce possibly the greatest disaster in modern history, and possibly in world history,” said former Senator Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, which funded the report, Beyond the Nuclear Shadow: A Phased Approach for Improving Nuclear Safety and U.S.-Russian Relations. The study offers a range of recommendations for reducing the danger, including the deployment of a “small” 250-interceptor U.S. national missile defense system that could address an accidental or unauthorized Russian launch. The Bush administration is developing a missile defense system to defend against prospective threats from smaller countries, and so far has announced plans to deploy 20 interceptors. Cold War Postures Remain The danger of an unauthorized or accidental launch has persisted in part because the two countries have maintained elements of their Cold War nuclear weapons postures — in particular, thousands of nuclear warheads on high alert, the study says. “Although both countries have significantly reduced their nuclear forces, they still retain nuclear postures and deterrence doctrines formulated when tension between them was much higher than it is today,” it says. The danger of a launch has increased largely because many key Russian capabilities have deteriorated, including its missile-launch detection system, conventional weapons, nuclear weapons and the reliability of its military personnel, according to the report. Increased U.S. nuclear capabilities may also have led Russia to perceive that its strategic forces are less able to survive a U.S. first strike, thereby prompting Russia to maintain a heightened alert status, according to the report. It cited a growing U.S. strategic superiority, enabled in part by the advent of the Trident submarine. The vessel, with its “accurate missiles and powerful warheads, has allowed the United States to make a significant portion of those Russian [silo-based] forces vulnerable,” the report says. Only 20 to 200 Russian nuclear weapons might survive a surprise U.S. nuclear attack, it says. U.S. success with using precision-guided munitions, its continued attack submarine patrols near Russian home bases and submarine operating areas, and any plan for a large national missile defense system might also contribute to Russian insecurity, the report says. Perceiving its forces as vulnerable, Russia may be implementing a “launch-on-warning” approach to warfare requiring rapid reaction, “probably within 10 or 15 minutes,” for launching some 3,000 warheads, it says. “This means there is very little time to verify that early warning information from satellites and land-based radars is correct,” the report says, noting that U.S. nuclear weapons also could be launched in minutes. Recommendations The potential threat is so serious that it should be made a top priority later this month at the summit between President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Nunn said. “Today, Presidents Bush and Putin must each ask the question: Are our weapons driving our policy? Have the machines taken over?” he said at report’s release yesterday. Nunn urged each leader to order his defense leadership, through joint collaboration, to lower the alert status of each side’s nuclear forces. “That would reduce toward zero the risk of accidental launch or miscalculation and provide increased launch decision time for each president,” he said. Nunn dismissed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed by Bush and Putin in May 2002 as a “faith-based” agreement, criticizing its requirement that each party implement the treaty restrictions for only one day in 2012. The RAND report recommends a number of steps intended to build trust and reduce the risk over time, including: * an immediate, unilateral stand-down of all U.S. nuclear forces to levels set out in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty; * the movement of U.S. ballistic missile and attack submarines away from Russia; * a reduction in the launch readiness of some U.S. silo-based missiles, and eventually all nuclear forces; * the installation of early warning sensors outside U.S. and Russian missile silos, as well as U.S. assistance for Russian early warning radar and satellites; * the removal of W-88 nuclear warheads from Trident submarines; * the installation of destruct-after-launch mechanisms on ballistic missiles; and * the deployment of a “limited” U.S. national missile defense system — if proven to work — of 250 ground-based interceptors and as many as nine additional X-band radars to guard against an accidental or unauthorized Russian launch. Missile Defense Option The report describes such a missile defense system as “small” and says it could be effective if Russia did not perceive it as threatening Russian deterrence. “The missile defense system presented in this option might be an effective tool for meeting nonproliferation and counterterrorism goals,” it says. The report says the proposed system would be able to intercept only a small number of Russian warheads and could “be rendered useless if Russia deploys countermeasures on its missiles that can penetrate the defense.” Russia might nevertheless regard a large U.S. missile defense system “as a threat to their strategic deterrent and thus feel compelled to take steps more apt to lead to an accidental or unauthorized launch.” The report also says the system could negate China’s current nuclear deterrent, possibly provoking it to “substantially increase the size and readiness of its nuclear arsenal,” producing a Cold War-type U.S.-Chinese nuclear relationship and a “serious degradation of global nuclear safety.” [EDITOR'S NOTE: The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group, Inc.]
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