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Iraq: U.S. Intelligence Agencies Call Recovered Trailers “Strongest Evidence” of Biological Program By Mike Nartker The trailers — one captured by Kurdish forces near the northern Iraqi city of Mosul and turned over to U.S. troops in late April and a second discovered by U.S. troops at the al-Kindi Research, Testing, Development and Engineering site in Mosul early this month — have long been suspected of being mobile biological production plants. In an address before the U.N. Security Council in February, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell cited the existence of such mobile plants as evidence that Iraq had continued to attempt to develop weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Feb. 6). In their report, the two intelligence agencies compared the layout and inventories of the trailer recovered last month with information provided by an Iraqi chemical engineer who had managed one of Iraq’s mobile plants. The engineer was able to recognize pictures of the trailer as being similar to the mobile plant he had managed, including specific pieces of identical equipment, the report says. An analysis of the trailers has determined that they are likely to be a second- or third-generation design of the mobile facilities described by the Iraqi engineer, according to the report. The equipment discovered within the trailers, such as fermenters and systems to capture exhaust gasses, were installed in such a way as to create an “ingeniously simple, self-contained bioprocessing system,” the report says. The trailers were likely meant to be components in a two- or three-trailer unit, with both recovered trailers likely intended to produce biological agents in liquid slurry, the report says. It adds that the third trailer in such a unit would likely be equipped with equipment to prepare growth media and for post-harvest processing. According to the report, coalition experts have been unable to determine any legitimate uses for the recovered trailers that would justify the effort and cost of a mobile production capability. “We … agree with the experts that BW agent production is the only consistent, logical purpose for these vehicles,” the report says. Several theories, however, have been put forth as to possible alternative uses for the trailers, according to the report. For example, a May 13 New York Times article reported that experts have suggested the trailers might have been used to produce biopesticides or to refurbish Iraqi anti-aircraft missiles. The report dismissed such theories, however, saying the exhaust collection systems and the size of the equipment found in the trailers are unnecessary for biopesticide production. In addition, U.S. missile experts have been unable to determine how the trailers could refurbish anti-aircraft missiles, the report says. The report was less critical, but sill dismissive, of claims made by senior al-Kindi officials that the trailers were used to produce hydrogen for artillery weather balloons. While some of the equipment found in the trailers could be used to produce both biological agents and hydrogen, the trailers’ design would be “inefficient” for hydrogen production, the report says. The report’s assessment of the trailers helps to verify claims made by the United States concerning Iraq’s WMD efforts prior to the war, U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said yesterday. “It’s very important to recognize that programs that we had said existed do exist; that the kind of equipment that we had said existed does exist,” Boucher said. Some independent experts, however, have criticized the CIA-DIA report’s findings. In an issue brief released yesterday, the Institute for Science and International Security criticized the intelligence agencies for determining that the recovered trailers were used to produce biological agents by eliminating other possible uses. The institute said the use of such a methodology was “controversial … under any circumstances.” “Given the high stakes for the United States to prove the existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, this methodology is particularly suspect,” the institute said. The institute also criticized the report for relying so heavily on information gathered from the Iraqi chemical engineer, saying that much of the information recovered from human sources on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction has been “flawed.” In addition, the institute raised the possibility that the report might have been written with “a preferred conclusion” in mind. In its brief, the institute called for an independent investigation of the trailers, adding that a “logical group” to conduct such an investigation would be the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. Such an investigation is needed to improve the credibility of the U.S. findings, the institute said. “Because the United States has such a vested interest in proving the existence of WMD in Iraq, the report’s findings cannot be trusted without independent confirmation,” the institute said.
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