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United States: Abraham Calls for “Immediate Corrective Action” to Improve Security at National Laboratories By Mike Nartker “The Department of Energy views security as the critical responsibility of the national laboratories, and we treat any lapse or failure as significant,” Abraham said in a press statement. “Therefore, I have directed NNSA Administrator [Linton] Brooks to launch a comprehensive security overhaul at the national labs and to put in place any immediate changes he deems necessary,” he added. One of the three national laboratories — Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico — announced yesterday new management changes prompted by an independent investigation into allegations that internal security investigations were blocked or that investigators experienced retaliation. Among the management changes, which are effective immediately, was the resignation of Dave Nokes, Sandia vice president for national security and arms control, according to a laboratory press release. Nokes resigned at Sandia President C. Paul Robinson’s request, the release said. He will be replaced by Al Romig, currently Sandia vice president for science, technology and partnerships, with a replacement for Romig to be announced soon. “Changes, especially when unexpected, are particularly difficult,” Robinson said in a statement, “but they hopefully serve to assure continued public confidence and support for Sandia and all our programs. This has been a very trying experience. I know the changes we’re making today will make us stronger.” GAO Criticizes NNSA Security Program Management Meanwhile, the U.S. General Accounting Office released a report yesterday criticizing the NNSA for failing to effectively manage its safeguard and security program that oversees security at the three national laboratories, as well as the four U.S. nuclear weapons production sites (see GSN, June 16). According to the May report, congressional auditors found that the NNSA had failed to be “fully effective” in its management of the safeguards and security program in four key areas — defining clear roles and responsibilities for site offices, assessing sites’ security activities, oversight of contractors’ corrective action plans and staff allocation. “As a result, NNSA cannot be assured that its contractors are working to maximum advantage to protect critical facilities and material from individuals seeking to inflict damage,” the report says. Brooks told a House Government Reform subcommittee yesterday, however, that he was confident that security at NNSA sites was effective in preventing potential terrorists from gaining access. Since the NNSA’s creation in 2000, the agency’s management structure has been in “a state of flux,” with a full implementation of a revised management structure not expected to be completed until September 2004, the GAO report says. This “flux” has had an effect on the agency defining site offices’ safeguards and security responsibilities, it says. The lack of a functional management structure, and the resultant confusion over responsibilities, has led to inconsistencies among NNSA sites as to how to conduct security assessments, according to the report. Three of the seven sites use an Energy-required survey approach to assess security, which is a comprehensive review lasting two weeks. The remaining sites, however, instead rely on a surveillance approach, which uses a smaller number of NNSA officials to oversee one or more aspects of a contractor’s security activities throughout the year. These sites have been able to use the surveillance approach, the report says, because the NNSA has not issued guidelines on complying with Energy policy on conducting surveys while it conducts the management reorganization. In addition, the GAO also found that NNSA contractors often do not conduct Energy-required analyses when preparing corrective action plans to fix security flaws, according to the report. Out of 43 such plans reviewed between 1999 and 2002, less than half included a required root cause analysis, and less than 25 percent included required risk assessment or cost-benefit analyses, the report says. “Potential opportunities to improve physical security at the sites are not maximized because corrective actions are developed without fully considering the problems’ root causes, risks posed or cost versus benefit of taking corrective action,” the report says. The NNSA is also facing shortfalls in both security staff and expertise, the GAO report says. Officials at five NNSA sites said they either have or expect to have between two and six vacancies for positions to oversee contractors’ security and safeguards activities, it says. The report found that many such vacancies occur because staff members are reluctant to be relocated to areas seen as less desirable and because the NSSA has frozen hiring activities because of budget constraints. In its report, the GAO made several recommendations to improve security management, such as the formalization of the responsibilities of site offices to conduct oversight and the use of the survey approach at all sites to conduct security assessments. The GAO also recommended that the NNSA ensure that contractors develop corrective action plans based on root-cause, cost-benefit and risk-assessment analyses; and that the agency develop a plan to allocate security staff at sites to provide effective long-term oversight. During yesterday’s National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations Subcommittee hearing, Brooks said he agreed with most of the issues the GAO raised in its report and its recommendations. “I believe the GAO did concentrate on the right things. I believe most things in life are a question of management, and this is clearly a question of management,” Brooks said. “If we do not get the management of safeguards and security right, we will not ever fix the problem,” he said. Brooks said, however, that he disagreed with the GAO’s recommendation that the survey approach to conducting security assessments should be the only method used at NNSA sites. He defended the surveillance approach, calling it “equally effective,” and said Energy policy should be modified to legitimize the use of the surveillance method. Brooks also said the NNSA had developed several new measures to help improve security, which the agency would soon formally announce. The new measures include increased U.S. and contractor security experts and directives to site managers to increase surveillance and to file periodical reports to Brooks himself. In addition, the NNSA plans to systematically re-examine a number of external reviews conducted on the agency to determine if recommendations were implemented, as well as create two panels to review physical security problems and personnel concerns, Brooks said. The panels will be headed by outside experts, he added.
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