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Iraq: IAEA Begins Survey of Tuwaitha Nuclear Complex An International Atomic Energy Agency team yesterday began inspecting parts of the Tuwaitha complex, the main site in Iraq’s former nuclear program, to determine the extent of looting of radioactive materials there (see GSN, June 6). The seven-member team surveyed a three-building storage center at the complex known as Site C, according to Reuters. The IAEA team was accompanied by U.S. troops (Reuters/Business Recorder, June 9). Area residents said that looters emptied barrels taken from the complex and then sold them to people who knew nothing about Iraq’s former nuclear efforts. The barrels were then used to store food and water, and were also washed in the nearby Tigris River, all of which has raised health concerns, according to Agence France-Presse. A U.S. military spokesman said, however, that the Tuwaitha site posed minimal health risks. “Our initial assessment is that the risk for health effects is not large,” the spokesman said. “We have had folks there at the site, my deputy went there and his teeth are still there, and his hair is still in,” the spokesman added (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, June 7). Weapons Programs Meanwhile, a former senior Iraqi intelligence officer has said the Iraqi intelligence services established a network of small laboratories after 1996 with a goal of someday resuming full biological and chemical weapons production. Each weapons team consisted of up to four scientists who were unknown to U.N. inspectors, the officer said. The teams worked on computers and conducted experiments in bunkers and safe houses around Baghdad, the officer said. The former intelligence officer said he worked mainly “on the money side” of the effort since the 1980s, which helped to fund a network of local trading companies that were covertly operated by Iraqi intelligence operatives to obtain materials for weapons programs. The officer said he made several trips between the mid-1990s and 2001 to help oversee the clandestine acquisition network. He also said he obtained money for the effort from secret bank accounts in Egypt, Jordan, Switzerland and other countries. The small weapons laboratories did not produce any actual weapons, nor do any weapons now exist in Iraq, the officer said. The teams did, however, create plans to quickly begin WMD production if U.N. sanctions were lifted, the officer said. “We could start again anytime. It’s very easy. Especially biological,” the officer said. “The point was, the Iraqis kept the knowledge,” he said. U.S. troops, however, “will never find anything here. Only oil,” the officer said (Bob Drogin, Los Angeles Times, June 8). Mobile Laboratories Questioned Some U.S. and British intelligence analysts are skeptical of the Bush administration’s claims that two trailers discovered in Iraq were mobile biological facilities, according to the New York Times. Instead, they said the White House claims were marked by a rush to judgment (see GSN, May 29). “Everyone has wanted to find the ‘smoking gun’ so much that they may have wanted to have reached this conclusion,” said one intelligence expert who has seen the trailers. “I am very upset with the process,” the expert said. The trailers lacked equipment for steam sterilization, normally required for any type of biological agent production, analysts said. The lack of such a piece of equipment would increase the risk of contamination, thereby producing failed weapons agents, according to the Times. The trailers also only had the ability to produce small amounts of biological agents in liquid form, which would then have to be furthered processed at another facility, according to analysts. In addition, the trailers lacked equipment to easily remove germ fluids from the processing tanks onboard. The CIA stands by its assessment, made in a white paper released last week, that the trailers were most likely for use to produce biological weapons agents, according to an agency spokesman. Skeptics “are entitled to their opinion, of course, but we stand behind the assertions in the white paper,” CIA spokesman Bill Harlow said (Miller/Broad, New York Times, June 7). U.S. Intelligence A number of top Bush administration officials have recently defended the U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction prior to the war, according to reports. National security adviser Condoleezza Rice yesterday said the White House had made the best judgment on Iraq’s suspected WMD efforts as it could with the information it had, and that previous CIA directors had made the same assessments since 1996. “Successive CIA directors, successive administrations, have known that we had every reason to judge that he had weapons of mass destruction,” Rice said on NBC’s Meet the Press, referring to ousted Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Both Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell yesterday denied that the Bush administration had exaggerated Iraq-related intelligence in order to increase support for war. They both said more time is needed to find evidence of Iraq’s WMD programs, according to the New York Times. “The fact is this was a program that was built for concealment,” Rice said. “We’ve always known that. We have always known that it would take some time to put together a full picture of his weapons of mass destruction programs,” she said (David Sanger, New York Times, June 9). Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld last week also defended U.S. intelligence on Iraq, saying the current weapons search in Iraq will validate a presentation made by Powell in February to the U.N. Security Council. “(The intelligence has) been enriched as they’ve gone through this past period of years, and that I believe that the presentation made by Secretary Powell was accurate and will be proved to be accurate,” Rumsfeld said, adding that the Pentagon would cooperate if the U.S. Congress began an inquiry into Iraq-related intelligence (U.S. Defense Department release, June 6). Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) yesterday criticized the U.S. intelligence on Iraq’s WMD efforts, saying U.S. credibility was at stake if such weapons were not found. The likely presence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction “was turned into a certainty over and over and over again by the administration,” Levin said. If such weapons are not found, “the credibility and reliability of our intelligence is going to be challenged in the future, and it’s going to be much more difficult for us to lead the world,” he said (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, June 9). British Intelligence Meanwhile, British intelligence officers have said they have a “smoking gun” that proves that British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s staff pressured them on Iraqi WMD-related intelligence, according to the London Independent. “A smoking gun may well exist over WMDs, but it may not be to the government’s liking,” a senior source said. “Minuted details will show exactly what went on. Because of the frequency and, at times, unusual nature of the demands from Downing Street, people have made sure records were kept. There is a certain amount of self-preservation in this, of course,” the source added (Sengupta/McSmith, London Independent, June 8). In addition, British Home Secretary David Blunkett said yesterday that a dossier on Iraq’s efforts to conceal WMD programs should not have been published (see GSN, Feb. 7). The dossier, which included information taken from a graduate student’s thesis that had been published online, was prepared by Alastair Campbell, Blair’s communications director, Blunkett said. Campbell had previously written the chief of the Secret Intelligence Service to apologize for discrediting the service by releasing the dossier, according to the London Telegraph. Campbell promised the British intelligence services that the government would take “far greater care” in using material prepared by them in the future (George Jones, London Telegraph, June 9). Al-Qaeda Operatives Deny Iraqi Connection Two high-ranking al-Qaeda operatives in U.S. custody have separately denied that their organization worked with Hussein, according to several intelligence officials. Abu Zubaydah, captured in March 2002, said during interrogations that the idea of working with Hussein had been discussed among al-Qaeda leaders, but terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden rejected the proposal because he did not want to be beholden to Hussein, according to an official who has read the CIA classified report on the interrogation (see GSN, Nov. 18, 2002). Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was captured in March of this year, also has said during interrogations that al-Qaeda had no desire to work with Iraq, according to the New York Times (see GSN, May 12). The CIA has refused to comment on what the two men might have said during interrogations. A senior intelligence official played down the reports, saying that statements made by captured al-Qaeda operatives must be taken with a high degree of skepticism (James Risen, New York Times, June 9).
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