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Russia I: Strategic Submarines Made No Patrols Last Year, U.S. Navy Says By David Ruppe Likely explanations include low funding, safety concerns and a view in Moscow that the United States no longer poses a strategic threat warranting the patrols, analysts say. “Why bust a gut to get your subs out to sea if finances aren’t there, if there are particular safety considerations, if there is not a particular threat you are trying to deter with your sub patrols?” said Joshua Handler, a former Princeton University researcher. Peter Huessy of the U.S. National Defense University Foundation said the figures suggest Moscow “can’t very well be worried about us attacking them.” “Would you keep all your subs in port if you were worried about being attacked?” he said. However, Hans Kristensen, a consultant to the Natural Resources Defense Council, said the exact cause remains uncertain. “What’s unclear, obviously, is whether this is something that reflects a decision, or whether they are being forced to do this because of technical problems or prioritization,” he said. “They could have decided that these things are just not the priority anymore,” said Kristensen, who obtained the latest figures from the Office of Naval Intelligence through the Freedom of Information Act and recently published them in the July/August issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Downward Trends Combining the new information with earlier data collected by Handler, Kristensen said the number of Russian strategic submarine patrols decreased since the end of the Cold War from 37 in 1991 to 13 in 1997, and to none in 2002. The number of attack and cruise missile submarine patrols also decreased from 18 in 1991 to 13 in 1997, and to one in 2001 and three last year. The trends follow a decrease in the operational availability of Russian strategic submarines, according to Kristensen. Russia currently has 14 operational nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, down from 62 in 1990, he writes in the Bulletin. The Bulletin says Russian ballistic missile submarines did participate in exercises last October that involved intercontinental ballistic missile, cruise missile and antiballistic missile tests (see GSN, Oct. 25, 2002). “But that is qualitatively different from disappearing for a month or two under the Arctic ice pack,” Handler said. Kristensen said Russian submarines have the capability of launching from port, but said that option is not ideal. “They can’t hit all the targets they want to hit from port. And also they are very well vulnerable obviously when they lie there,” he said. Handler said the Russians might put submarines on patrols if they felt it was essential for security. “Sure, they don’t have the money, and the subs might be a little bit more unsafe than ours, but they obviously do not feel their national security is collapsing by virtue of having no sub patrols,” he said. The patrol estimates come amid signs of decreasing strategic tensions between the United States and Russia, but the Russian patrol reductions have not been mirrored by the United States. Kristensen said the United States deploys 14 strategic submarines, which perform an average of 3 1/2 patrols per year, each lasting about 70 days followed by in-port maintenance and training. Hair-Trigger Concerns A recently released RAND study suggested that deteriorating Russian strategic capabilities might increase the risk of a U.S.-Russian nuclear confrontation. It concluded that Russia’s shrinking strategic forces and weak early warning system are increasing the U.S. strategic superiority, prompting Russia to keep its mostly land-based forces on high alert, possibly increasing the likelihood of an accidental or unauthorized launch (see GSN, May 22). The study said financial reasons, as well as U.S. submarine tracking abilities, have led Russia to operate its strategic submarines close to Russian waters. It recommended keeping U.S. strategic missile and attack submarines away from Russia, saying the strategic submarines enable the United States to strike Russia in as little as 10 to 15 minutes. The Bush administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, announced in January 2002, indicated that the United States intends to keep its strategic triad of bombers, submarines and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in operation, but four Trident ballistic missile submarines will be removed from strategic service and nearly 4,000 sea-, land- and air-launched strategic warheads will be removed from their delivery platforms. Citing improving Russian relations, the review set a goal of taking all but 2,200 of its 6,000 deployed strategic warheads off their delivery platforms by 2012. The policy was codified in the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, which entered into force one month ago (see GSN, June 2). Russia relies principally on its land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles for deterrence, Kristensen said. He said U.S.-Russian abandonment of the never-implemented START II Treaty in favor of the new treaty has enabled Russia to continue to deploy the bulk of its strategic forces on multiple-warhead ICBMS.
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