A Bush administration proposal to build new laboratories throughout the United States to conduct research on biological weapons agents has come under criticism for undue secrecy from residents in the proposed areas where the new laboratories would be built, United Press International reported last week.  In addition, the proposal has also been criticized for giving more people access to dangerous agents and for poor oversight (see GSN, June 25).

The $2.5 billion proposal would seek to double the approximately 20 existing high-security biological laboratories, according to UPI.  Many of these new facilities would be constructed at university campuses and in urban areas.  Area residents and political action groups oppose the proposal, however, because of the high level of secrecy surrounding what pathogens would be studied at the new laboratories and whether the danger to the surrounding areas has been fully considered.

In interviews with UPI, area residents of proposed sites for the new laboratories, such as Davis, Calif.; Boston; Long Island, N.Y.; and Portland, Ore., have said they believed that many of the potential dangers surrounding the new laboratories have not been made public.  The legislation calling for the new laboratories, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, however, makes it illegal for U.S. agencies to release information about who has agents or what activities they are conducting, UPI reported.  In addition, such information has also been exempted from the Freedom of Information Act, and those who release such information face fines of up to $250,000.

Information on security problems at laboratories, such as theft of agents, cannot be released, according to UPI.  Information on the accidental release of agents or toxins will also not be provided.

Supporters of the new laboratories, however, have said that area residents’ concerns are exaggerated.

“We’ve built these laboratories in ways that they can be operated safely,” said Ron Atlas, president of the American Society for Microbiology.  “Is anything absolutely failsafe?  Probably not.  Do we have an excellent system of redundancy and safety?  Yes,” he said (Divis/Horrock, UPI, July 2).

Expanded Access

Critics of the new laboratory proposal have also said that the construction of new facilities will give thousands of additional people access to dangerous pathogens, increasing the risk that some agents might be stolen, according to UPI.

Each new proposed biological defense facility would have between 150 and 300 scientists, resulting in a total of up to 6,000 additional people with access to dangerous pathogens, according to the Sunshine Project, a private study group in Austin, Texas.  Many of the proposed laboratories would be located at college campuses, urban areas or industrial parks where perimeter security would be more difficult to maintain than at military sites, UPI reported.

Richard Ebright, a microbiologist at Rutgers University’s Waksman Institute, said he believes that an increase in laboratories would increase the risks of pathogen proliferation.

“Each new facility that maintains stocks of agents for biowarfare or bioterrorism becomes a potential source of deliberate or accidental releases, and each additional person trained in handling those agents and possessing those agents becomes an additional possible point of deliberate or accidental release,” Ebright said.

One concern, according to Ebright, is that new regulations on who can possess and use biological weapons agents require only minimal background checks.  Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, the attorney general is required to conduct a search of “criminal, immigration, national security and other electronic databases” to determine if the individual is associated with a terrorist group or is a foreign agent, according to UPI.  The person also cannot fall under several other criteria, such as conviction of a felony, being an illegal alien or having been judged to be mentally ill.

The law does not appear to require, however, the types of interviews typical for those seeking to receive high-level security clearances, according to UPI.  In addition, once a person is registered to handle pathogens, they can then submit a list of others to be approved on an expedited basis.  Those who are registered also do not need to undergo another background check for five years.

Supporters of the White House proposal, however, have said that the expansion is necessary to conduct research into vaccines and treatments against biological weapons agents. 

“We are not talking about training people on how to weaponize materials,” Atlas said.  “What we are talking about is training people on how to find vaccines and therapeutics,” he said (Divis/Horrock, UPI, July 1).

Poor Oversight

According to critics, the Bush administration’s proposal suffers from poor oversight, which could lead to duplication and poor implementation, UPI reported.

The administration’s biological defense program, which includes the laboratory expansion project, is administered by nine U.S. agencies, including the Defense and Energy departments, the National Institutes of Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  There is no organization that is responsible overall for the laboratory expansion project, however, nor have public hearings been held to examine whether different laboratory construction plans complement or duplicate each other, according to UPI.

“We are in need of an overarching look at what labs are needed and where,” said Marylea Kelley, executive director of Tri-Valley CAREs, a watchdog group that opposes the development of an Energy Department biological defense laboratory at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.  “This is being played out in community after community across the nation,” Kelley said.

For example, a section of Maryland could be home to several high-security biological defense laboratories, UPI reported.  The U.S. Army’s Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, located at the Edgewood Arsenal/Aberdeen Proving Ground, plans to upgrade to a Biosafety Level 3 facility.  At the Aberdeen section of the site, the Battelle Memorial Institute plans to use funding to construct a new Biosafety Level 3 laboratory.  The University of Maryland is seeking an NIH grant to construct a Biosafety Level 4 laboratory at Aberdeen.  At Fort Detrick in Frederick, Md. — located about 85 miles away from Aberdeen — both the Army and NIH operate Biosafety Level 4 facilities, with the NIH planning to construct a second such facility there.  In addition, a private research company that conducts research for the Army has a Biosafety Level 3 facility in Frederick.

John La Montagne, deputy director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, said that coordination on the new laboratory projects is currently only conducted through “informal processes” among the various involved agencies.

“There is no coordinating council as such; maybe there will need to be at some point,” La Montagne said.  “At the moment it’s done through informal processes between the agencies,” he said.

La Montagne also said that some duplication might be beneficial, noting the positive effects duplication has in general science.

“In the real world of scientific research ... or any kind of human endeavor, there is invariably going to be some level at which one could argue that this person is doing something similar to another person,” La Montagne said.  In science we generally think about that as a positive because it gives an independent confirmation of a laboratory investigation,” he said (Divis/Horrock, UPI II, July 1).

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