French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and Iranian President Mohammad Khatami met in Tehran yesterday (AFP/Getty). Officials Call Iranian Nuclear Opening a “Promising Start,” but Reserve Final Judgment Iran’s decision yesterday to allow more intrusive international monitoring of its nuclear activities and to suspend uranium enrichment has been called a “promising start” by Western officials. They added, however, that full implementation of the Iranian promises would be needed to resolve lingering doubts over Tehran’s nuclear intentions (see GSN, Oct. 21)...Full Story

North Korea Dismisses U.S. Assurance Offer as “Laughable” North Korea yesterday rejected U.S. President George W. Bush’s recent offer of a multilateral security assurance and again demanded a direct guarantee that Washington would not attack pre-emptively (see GSN, Oct. 21)...Full Story

Soviet Union Once Deployed Smallpox-Tipped ICBMs By David McGlinchey Global Security Newswire GENEVA — During the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union armed strategic ballistic missiles with the deadly smallpox virus and readied them for use against the United States, a former Soviet military biologist said here yesterday...Full Story

	Wednesday, October 22, 2003

Senate Intelligence Committee Clears White House of Bullying Iraqi Intelligence Analysts The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has found no evidence that the Bush administration pressured U.S. intelligence analysts to produce reports fitting the White House’s views on the threat posed by Iraq, USA Today reported today (see GSN, Oct. 20). “None (of the analysts) have indicated any intimidation,” committee Chairman Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) said. Roberts refused to detail the full findings of his committee’s inquiry into prewar U.S. intelligence on Iraq, saying that a report would be declassified this fall and is “90 to 95 percent done.” The committee’s report will focus on the “credibility and timeliness of the intelligence prior to the war regarding weapons of mass destruction,” Roberts said (John Diamond, USA Today, Oct. 22). Back to top       FBI Creates WMD Section The FBI has created a new section designed to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, the New York Post reported today (see GSN, Sept. 30). While counterterrorism agents routinely practice WMD scenarios, experienced agents are spread out within the FBI and needed to be brought together, said bureau counterterrorism and counterintelligence chief Larry Mefford. The lack of progress in the FBI’s investigation into the 2001 anthrax attacks also illustrated the need for a WMD section, he said, adding that an official has not yet been named to head the section. “We’ve learned a lot from the anthrax investigation. It’s been extremely challenging,” Mefford said (Brian Blomquist, New York Post, Oct. 22). Back to top

Officials Call Iranian Nuclear Opening a “Promising Start,” but Reserve Final Judgment Iran’s decision yesterday to allow more intrusive international monitoring of its nuclear activities and to suspend uranium enrichment has been called a “promising start” by Western officials. They added, however, that full implementation of the Iranian promises would be needed to resolve lingering doubts over Tehran’s nuclear intentions (see GSN, Oct. 21). Iran’s decision was announced in a joint declaration yesterday following talks between Iranian officials and the foreign ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom. According to the declaration, Iran has agreed to engage in “full cooperation” with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to resolve all outstanding issues “through full transparency.” In the declaration, Iran agreed “to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol and commence ratification procedures.” The protocol to Iran’s nuclear safeguards agreement would allow IAEA inspectors to conduct more intrusive inspections and monitoring activities in Iran. In addition, Iran agreed to “voluntarily suspend all uranium enrichment and processing activities as defined by the IAEA.” For their part, France, Germany and the United Kingdom agreed to “recognize the right of Iran to enjoy the peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” the declaration says.  It also says the three countries are “resolved [that] Iran could expect easier access to modern technology and supplies in a range of areas” once concerns over Tehran’s nuclear program are resolved. In addition, the three countries have also agreed to help Iran promote the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East (Reuters, Oct. 21). Iranian President Mohammad Khatami today said that the Additional Protocol would need to be presented to the Iranian Parliament for approval. “It will have to be presented to Parliament. It is like all other agreements,” he said (Parinoosh Arami, Reuters II, Oct. 22). Hassan Rohani, secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, said the Additional Protocol would likely be signed before an IAEA meeting scheduled for Nov. 20. “I don’t think we will sign it before October 31 but probably before November 20,” Rohani said, referring to the Oct. 31 deadline set by the IAEA for Iran to provide more information on its nuclear program (Reuters/Jordan Times, Oct. 22). European Response The three European officials involved in the recent Iran talks — British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin and German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer — praised Iran’s decisions to sign the Additional Protocol and to suspend uranium enrichment. “This is, we hope, a promising start,” de Villepin said. “We are on the right track, and we must all keep the momentum,” he added (Financial Times, Oct. 21). “This agreement is opening a serious process to resolve the nuclear issue between Iran and the international community,” Fischer said (Reuters/Jordan Times). IAEA Praise IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei also praised the declaration yesterday. In an interview with Arms Control Today, ElBaradei said that Iran still needed to provide a comprehensive and accurate declaration of its past nuclear activities to fully alleviate concerns over its nuclear program. “If we get a comprehensive declaration, and we are able to verify that it is accurate and complete and if we get the protocol and we are able to implement the protocol in all future activities in Iran, then I think this would be a leap forward in terms of the international community's concerns about Iran's nuclear program,” ElBaradei said (Arms Control Today, Oct. 21). U.S. Response U.S. President George W. Bush today offered more restrained praise. “It looks like they’re accepting the demands of the free world and now it’s up to them to prove that they’ve accepted the demands. It’s a very positive development,” Bush said during a joint press conference held with Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (Financial Times). Other U.S. officials, however, were less optimistic, according to the New York Times. “Frankly, I’d say there’s a good reason for healthy skepticism about what Iran will actually do, as opposed to what it says,” a senior U.S. State Department official said (Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, Oct. 22). Implementation British Foreign Minister Straw warned that the “significance” of the joint declaration could only be judged through Iran’s implementation. “It’s been an important day’s work but you can only judge its significance in time and through implementation,” Straw said yesterday (Reuters/Jordan Times). Iran announced today that it would provide the IAEA with documents on its nuclear program by the end of the day, according to Reuters (Arami, Reuters II). Rohani said the suspension of uranium enrichment activities would be maintained for an undetermined time. “We voluntarily chose to do it, which means it could last for one day or one year, it depends on us,” Rohani said. “As long as Iran thinks this suspension is beneficial it will continue, and whenever we don’t want it we will end it,” he said. David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, said that only a complete end to Iran’s uranium enrichment efforts would end the crisis surrounding Tehran’s nuclear program. “A freeze is good, but what we need is a halt to the uranium enrichment program if there is going to be a solution to this crisis,” Albright said (Reuters/Jordan Times). U.S. Isolation Meanwhile, a senior Iranian official said today that yesterday’s declaration demonstrated the ineffectiveness of U.S. strategies. “A big conspiracy has been foiled ... (and) the United States has been isolated,” said Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran’s representative to the IAEA. The declaration “showed the U.S. that global issues can’t be resolved by war and destruction, but by dialogue. It’s a victory for us, the EU and the international community,” he said. Implications of a Quid Pro Quo Speculation that the declaration would allow EU firms to replace Russia as nuclear technology suppliers to Iran did not upset Russian officials. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said today that Moscow would continue to cooperate with Iran’s nuclear program (see GSN, Oct. 14). “Russia is prepared to continue cooperating with Iran, including in the nuclear sphere, in strict compliance with international obligations,” he said (Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Oct. 22). In addition, the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry today said yesterday’s declaration will make it easier for Russia to construct the Bushehr nuclear reactor in Iran. “Russia has come under certain pressure because of Bushehr … this agreement will certainly simplify and make our cooperation easier,” ministry chief spokesman Nikolai Shingaryev said (Agence France-Presse II, Oct. 22). In Washington, a U.S. State Department spokesman played down the technology access portion of the joint declaration and asserted that the EU effort did not differ from the U.S. approach to Iran. “I do not see anything that says that the Europeans have offered something in return” for Iranian nuclear transparency, spokesman Adam Ereli said yesterday. “It is important that Iran follows through on these commitments, and that’s the first step. And, you know, what happens later down the road, at this point, is purely speculative,” he said. Ereli further denied that there had been any negotiation between the European foreign ministers and Iranian officials. “There’s been no negotiation, there has been … no deal,” he said (U.S. State Department release, Oct. 21) Back to top       North Korea Dismisses U.S. Assurance Offer as “Laughable” North Korea yesterday rejected U.S. President George W. Bush’s recent offer of a multilateral security assurance and again demanded a direct guarantee that Washington would not attack pre-emptively (see GSN, Oct. 21). The U.S. plan is “laughable and doesn’t deserve even any consideration,” said a commentary from the Korean Central News Agency, the state-run information outlet. “We have asked for the United States to stop its hostile policy and [for] a bilateral treaty between North Korea and the United States, and not for some sort of security guarantee,” the statement said. Responding to the statement, Bush said he would “stay the course” and maintain the new U.S. strategy. “I guess they’re trying to stand up to the five nations that are now uniting in convincing North Korea to disarm and my only reaction is we’ll continue to send a very clear message to the North Koreans,” Bush said yesterday during a visit to Indonesian island of Bali (Nesirsky/Kyoung-wha, Reuters, Oct. 22). The U.S. offer still lacks important details that Washington plans to work out with North Korea’s neighbors — China, Japan, Russia and South Korea. Of  particular importance is the form the multilateral assurance will take. The Bush administration has steadfastly refused to consider a bilateral treaty with North Korea, largely because it distrusts Pyongyang, but also because conservatives in the U.S. Congress would then be granted the power to reject the pact, according to the Los Angeles Times. Instead the administration is considering two previous agreements as possible models that would not require congressional approval. The first is a 1981 agreement signed with Algeria as part of the deal to free U.S. hostages in Iran. At the time, Iran refused to negotiate with the United States directly and used Algeria as an intermediary. In the eventual agreement, the United States promised Algeria that it would unfreeze Iranian assets and “not intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs.” “If the North Koreans get a security guarantee signed by the U.S. but guaranteed by China, that would add a considerable measure of credibility,” said Gary Sick, a former national security council official who worked on the Iranian hostage deal. The second model is the 1994 multilateral security assurance offered to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to persuade them to transfer to Russia the nuclear weapons they inherited from the fallen Soviet Union. Under that agreement, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States promised not to attack the three nations or to exercise “economic coercion” against them. The assurance also promised that the nuclear powers would seek U.N. assistance if any of the three soon-to-be non-nuclear states were threatened with nuclear weapons, but stopped short of promising to defend them if they were threatened or attacked by Russia. “It was an assurance, not a guarantee,” said Tufts University professor Robert Pfaltzgraff. “We’ve given (security) assurances in a variety of ways in the past, and we’ve done this with regard to allies, but we haven’t done it with enemies,” he said. Another unresolved detail in the U.S. offer is what would be demanded of North Korea for it to receive the security assurance. The United States would almost certainly demand that North Korea rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and accept intrusive inspections, according to the Times. Some Bush administration officials are also recommending that Pyongyang should renounce its suspected chemical and biological weapons capabilities as well, but others have argued that such demands would kill any deal (Sonni Efron, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 22). Congressional Delegation Ready for Pyongyang Visit Meanwhile, a U.S. congressional delegation is scheduled to visit North Korea next week, group leader Representative Curt Weldon (R-Pa) announced yesterday. Weldon led another delegation to Pyongyang earlier this year (see GSN, June 30). Weldon said the bipartisan U.S. House delegation would try to put a “human face” on U.S.-North Korean relations. “I’m not there to negotiate. We’re there to simply explore ideas,” he said. Weldon said the group would try to visit North Korea’s nuclear complex at Yongbyon (Ken Guggenheim, Associated Press/San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 22). Back to top       U.S. State Department Official Dismisses Saudi Arabia Nuke Reports A U.S. State Department official yesterday dismissed a recent report that Pakistan had reached an agreement with Saudi Arabia to provide nuclear weapons technology in exchange for oil, according to DAWN (see GSN, Oct. 21). “This story has been going around for a couple of decades. It seems very improbable to me that the Pakistanis will do so,” the State official said. “I am not in a position to confirm or deny but it does not seem likely,” the official added. Nail al-Jubair, a spokesman for the Saudi Embassy in Washington, also denied the United Press International report, saying it got basic facts wrong. While the report says the Saudi-Pakistani collaboration agreement was reached during a Saudi delegation visit to Pakistan over the weekend, Saudi and Pakistani news sources had reported the visit as occurring earlier, al-Jubair said. The report was “so absurd that it is not even worth issuing a denial,” al-Jubair said (Anwar Iqbal, DAWN, Oct. 22). Israeli Official Asserts Saudi-Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Collaboration Despite the discrediting comments, the head of Israeli military intelligence said yesterday that Saudi Arabia is attempting to purchase Pakistani nuclear warheads for use on its missiles. Senior Saudi officials are directing talks with Pakistani officials to purchase nuclear warheads that could be loaded onto ballistic missiles based in the Arabian Peninsula, Maj. Gen. Aharon Zeevi said. He added that Saudi Arabia was believed to be seeking nuclear weapons in response to Iran’s nuclear program (New York Post, Oct. 22). Pakistan Agrees to Station Missiles in Saudi Arabia, Sources Say In addition, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily reported today that Pakistan has agreed to station long-range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia. The missiles would be under Pakistani command, but would have some form of joint command-and-control, sources said (Bodansky/Copley, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, Oct. 22). Back to top       Growing Indian Strength Could Lead Pakistan to Increased Reliance on Nuclear Weapons Arms control experts are concerned that a growing disparity between India’s conventional military forces and those of its South Asian rival Pakistan will lead Islamabad to become increasingly reliant on its nuclear arsenal, the Wall Street Journal reported today (see GSN, Oct. 16). Within the next five years, Israeli, Russian and U.S. defense companies are expected to bid for a variety of military contracts with India worth up to $10 billion, according to the Journal. U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwell said India and the United States are ready for “far more ambitious interaction in this field,” including possible Indian purchases of U.S. defensive WMD equipment.  India has denied, however, that the planned arms purchases are meant to intimidate Pakistan. “We’re not in an arms race with Pakistan,” a senior Indian aide said. Indian and Pakistani defense analysts have said, however, that Pakistan’s economic situation will make it difficult for it to keep up with India’s military spending. Already, Pakistan is spending more than a quarter of its budget on defense, the Journal reported. “Pakistan will either keep up by spending on conventional arms or become dependent on its nuclear arsenal. … Nuclear weapons will become their answer for everything,” said P.R. Chari, a research professor at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi. Senior Pakistani diplomat Maleeha Lodhi warned that the increasing disparity between the two countries’ militaries could raise serious problems. India’s increasing military forces “poses new security challenges to Pakistan, which already is confronted with an asymmetry in air power with India,” Lodhi said. “This will lead to a strategic disaster,” Lodhi added (Solomon/Hussain, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 22). Back to top       United States Eases Licensing Requirements for Nuclear Technology Exports to Kazakhstan By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The United States has amended its national export control laws to make it easier to export nuclear technology to Kazakhstan, according to a notice published today in the Federal Register (see GSN, May 22, 2002). The U.S. Export Administration Regulations have been amended to include Kazakhstan among the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the notice says. The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a 40-member organization that establishes export control regulations for nuclear trade, and the group agreed to add Kazakhstan in 2002. The amended regualtions will help ease burdens on U.S. exporters by reducing licensing requirements for those exports to Kazakhstan controlled for nuclear nonproliferation reasons, according to the notice. Kazakh Energy and Mineral Resources Minister Vladimir Shkolnik today praised the United States for amending its export control regulations to include Kazakhstan among NSG members. “We believe this decision confirms the strengthening of the relations of strategic partnership between Kazakhstan and the United States based on the many years of close joint resolution of problems of disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction,” Shkolnik said in a statement. “We believe this decision will promote further strengthening of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries in this sensitive area,” he said. Experts have warned that Kazakhstan poses proliferation concerns because of weak border controls and enforcement of export controls. In addition, there are also concerns that would-be terrorists could obtain in Kazakhstan nuclear weapons-related materials or other radioactive materials that could be used to build a radiological weapon.  During a conference held earlier this month at Harvard University in Boston, Togzhan Kassenova of the Institute for Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds in the United Kingdom cited a 1992 study conducted in Kazakhstan that compiled an inventory of about 100,000 registered radioactive sources, which were used during the Soviet era for medical and industrial purposes. Currently, however, only about half of those sources are still registered, she said (see GSN, Oct. 6). Back to top

Soviet Union Once Deployed Smallpox-Tipped ICBMs By David McGlinchey Global Security Newswire GENEVA — During the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union armed strategic ballistic missiles with the deadly smallpox virus and readied them for use against the United States, a former Soviet military biologist said here yesterday. The Soviet Union had the missiles armed and ready to launch “in the beginning of the 60s,” according to Ken Alibek, a former senior scientist in Moscow’s biological warfare research program. Alibek defected to the United States in 1992 and is now the executive director of George Mason University’s Center for Biodefense in Virginia. Alibek spoke at the Smallpox Biosecurity conference here, which was sponsored by smallpox vaccine producer Acambis. He said the smallpox missiles were classified as strategic weapons, which Soviet officials never intended to use except in the most dire circumstances. Alibek also said the smallpox virus was extremely potent and was thoroughly tested by Soviet researchers. It was “absolutely obvious” that the effect of some biological weapons “would exceed some forms of nuclear weapons,” he said. The little-known Soviet program sought to defeat the technical problems of preserving biological agents during the re-entry phase of the missile’s flight and of dispersing the agents over a wide area. “It has always been considered extremely difficult to deploy or deliver biological weapons in a militarily significant way,” said Jon Wolfsthal, deputy director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nonproliferation Project. “If Alibek is right, this would be the only known case of strategically deployed biological weapons,” he said. Over the past four decades, there have been reports of Soviet research into techniques of protecting and dispersing biological agents on missiles, according to John Pike of GlobalSecurity.org. The reports indicated research into warhead cooling systems to preserve the agent, warhead parachutes to slow their re-entry and the dispersal of the biological agent through smaller bomblets contained in the warhead. “They had conducted tests at the time that involved decelerating the warhead to the point that it could disperse the biological agent,” Pike said. “The Soviets did a lot weird stuff. They were pretty frisky,” he added. Back to top       U.S. Smallpox Official Acknowledges Vaccination “Targets Were Not Achieved” By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — After vaccinating only one-tenth of the target number of health workers against a potential smallpox attack, the United States has abandoned such benchmarks and is focusing on efforts such as training, communications and post-attack vaccination capability, a leader of the program said here today (see GSN, Oct. 16). Raymond Strikas, who coordinates smallpox preparedness efforts at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Immunization Program, said in a speech at Harvard University’s BioSecurity 2003 conference here that the program has come up against “public complacency” about the smallpox threat in the wake of military victory in Iraq and is now operating based on an “action plan” that covers communications strategy, state and local preparedness and consideration of how to speed post-attack vaccination. The voluntary immunization program was launched late last year, and Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson said Dec. 13 that Washington had designated an initial group of more than 439,000 first responders to be targeted for vaccination under the program. The White House mentioned similar numbers, and some officials cited an eventual goal of 10 million vaccinations, but fewer than 40,000 people have been inoculated. “We’re not using those numbers,” Strikas said today of the initial targets, because it is “not in our best interest. … Obviously, the targets were not achieved.” Instead of focusing on targets for individual vaccinations, he said, CDC is now “working with state and local colleagues to determine what would be the number of teams” ― made up primarily of “health care personnel from participating hospitals who would evaluate, manage and treat” smallpox cases ― necessary to respond to an outbreak. He suggested that training and other activities are a greater focus in work with the teams than is vaccination, but he added, “Obviously, response team vaccination, we could do more work there.” Strikas disowned remarks published last Wednesday by USA Today, which quoted him as saying the immunization program had “ceased.” The program has not “ceased,” he said today, stressing that the United States is “much better prepared to manage a smallpox outbreak” than at the outset of the effort and that billions of dollars have been spent at the state and local level to increase preparedness. At a smallpox conference in Geneva, however, another top U.S. official yesterday said the program had indeed stopped and new efforts were needed to revitalize or reshape it. “The vaccination program came to a halt,” said D.A. Henderson, the principal science adviser to the U.S. Health and Human Services Department and the architect of the international effort that successfully eradicated smallpox three decades ago. “The question is, how hard do we push to continue the vaccinations,” Henderson said during the Smallpox Biosecurity conference, sponsored by smallpox vaccine producer Acambis. Between Jan. 24 and Sept. 26, Strikas said, 38,542 health care workers, public health workers and others were vaccinated against smallpox under the program. Strikas showed graphs indicating new vaccinations tapered off seriously by April and flattened out almost completely by May, a phenomenon he attributed in part to events in Iraq. “Hostilities in Iraq ceased, and people perceived the threat might be much less than it was earlier,” Strikas said. Asked about CDC’s own evaluation of the current threat, he said, “I don’t have any better information on threat analysis than perhaps anybody in this room does.” He cited concern about the potential whereabouts of smallpox samples from countries of the former Soviet Union (see related GSN stories, today). Public fears of adverse effects from smallpox vaccination have also hindered the effort. Strikas said such apprehensions were unwarranted, however, and said the civilian program has seen no reports of feared side effects such as eczema vaccinatum, erythema multiforme major, fetal vaccinia, progressive vaccinia or vaccinia transmission to contacts, Strikas said. He added, though, that there have been unexpected side effects, including seven ischemic cardiac events. CDC is “now convinced that smallpox vaccine can cause myo- [and] pericarditis,” he said, but does not have sufficient data to link the vaccine with ischemic cardiac events or dilated cardiomyopathy. David McGlinchey contributed to this report from Geneva. Back to top       U.S. Health Officials, Experts, Debate Smallpox Vaccination Response By David McGlinchey Global Security Newswire GENEVA — During a biological security conference here yesterday, top U.S. health officials sparred over U.S. vaccination policy in the event of a smallpox terrorist attack (see GSN, Oct. 16). Smallpox was eradicated more than a quarter century ago, but the United States is now leading an effort to defend against the potential spread of the disease by terrorist groups. Key to those biological defense efforts is the issue of a post-strike vaccination program. D.A. Henderson — who led the smallpox eradication effort and is now a top adviser to the U.S. Health and Human Services Department — was the senior voice in favor of the current search and containment theory. Henderson was joined by Emory University professor Michael Lane and World Health Organization official David Heymann in supporting the policy, which emphasizes ring vaccinations around smallpox outbreaks and “contact tracing” of those who have been in close proximity with infected individuals. Ring vaccinations, supporters say, would prevent hundreds of nationwide deaths by inoculating fewer patients with the sometimes dangerous and always controversial vaccine (see related GSN story, today). Peter Jahrling, the principal scientific advisor at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute and Infectious Disease, argued for mass vaccinations after a smallpox attack, citing research findings from a team headed by Yale University professor Edward Kaplan as well as the results of the 2001 Dark Winter biological terrorism simulation (see GSN, Jan. 10). Jahrling said that if terrorists spread smallpox, health officials will not be able to know every place the virus has been released and ring vaccinations would be ineffective. “If TV [targeted vaccination] is optimal, choosing MV [mass vaccinations] would lead to a few incremental deaths,” Jahrling wrote in his slides. He said, however, that choosing small-scale vaccinations when mass vaccinations are needed “could lead to a disaster with many incremental deaths.” The debate was mostly good natured and restricted to speeches, but Lane — of Emory University — lashed out at the Kaplan study, calling the effort “weird.” “Mass vaccination, unless you get very close to 100 percent, does not” stop the spread of smallpox, according to Lane. He said that “naturally occurring smallpox does not spread like wildfire,” and “mass vaccination is wasteful and dangerous, and diverts scarce resources.” Jahrling said, however, that the Dark Winter exercise proved that once a smallpox attack has been detected health officials cannot assume that they know the size or scope of the outbreak. Yesterday’s debate continued today with Jahrling asking, “Why are we so timid about pre-event vaccinations? If we had herd immunity, it would take smallpox bioterrorism right off the table.” Lane countered, “To use the vaccine for a disease that does not exist seems unwise.” Back to top       Rapid, Accurate Biological Attack Detection Capability Is Years Away, Experts Say By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON ð— A device for rapidly detecting biological terrorism agents that is both fast and inexpensive could take six years or more to develop, two U.S. government technology experts said yesterday. The current device widely used by U.S. federal authorities — at the 2002 Winter Olympics, other sporting events and increasingly in major cities through a government initiative — is called the Biological Aerosol Sentry Information System (see GSN, Feb. 21). About the size of a speaker’s podium, it is designed to detect a release of a biological agent and have it analyzed and confirmed at a separate location within several hours. The system provides U.S. authorities with a “detect-to-treat” capability — informing them after an attack has begun. The Bush administration, meanwhile, is beginning to focus seriously on developing a “detect-to-warn” capability, said Elizabeth George of the U.S. Homeland Security Department’s science and technology program. Speaking at Harvard University’s Biosecurity 2003 conference here, she estimated that such a system could be developed in “perhaps a six-year time frame.” Another U.S. official offered a similar assessment. Patrick Fitch, a program leader at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, said he was a “little less optimistic,” but said a usable detect-to-warn device might be possible by the end of the decade. The challenge, he said, is to develop a device that is small, fast and cheap, so it could be made widely available and easily transportable. Ideally, each unit would cost less than $10,000 and give an accurate reading in less than two minutes, he said. A mass spectrometer system currently costs about $100,000, he said. Shortening the time needed to detect biological agents could save many lives, George said. “If we wait until people start presenting with illness, it’s too late, we’ve lost a lot of lives,” George said. The estimated treatment periods for smallpox, anthrax and plague are significantly less than their incubation periods — meaning that by the time full symptoms show it may be too late to find all the people who were exposed and prevent fatalities. Some agents, moreover, such as Ebola, currently are basically untreatable. Fitch said existing technology can already detect agents rapidly, but more time is needed to confirm the accuracy of the detection and to identify the detected agent. A significant difficulty is in discriminating dangerous biological agents from materials naturally occurring in nature, he said. “The closest thing to that now are optical detectors,” he said, but added that they have trouble accurately distinguishing weapons agents from peaceful substances. “We can’t afford false positives. If an alarm goes off during the Superbowl and we have to clear everybody out. Those people won’t be very happy about it,” he said. Back to top       U.S. Health Officials Highlight Surveillance Systems By David McGlinchey Global Security Newswire GENEVA — Senior U.S. health officials here yesterday touted several developing health surveillance systems and said that the programs will make it easier to detect a biological terrorist attack (see GSN, Oct. 10). Public health advocates and specialists have made recent appeals for improved national health surveillance, both to defend against biological terrorism and to monitor naturally occurring health trends. Saying that currently, “our surveillance is kind of slow,” U.S. Army Lt. Col. Julie Pavlin said the military has successfully established the Electronic Survillance System for the Early Notification of Community-based Epidemics (ESSENCE). The ESSENCE program tracks health trends at more than 300 fixed U.S. military installations worldwide, reporting indicators such as a high rate of respiratory infections, according to Pavlin. The program can detect an outbreak “earlier than most existing systems,” Pavlin said. The White House is now pushing the BioWatch air-monitoring system — according to Lawrence Kerr, the assistant director for homeland security in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. BioWatch, an urban surveillance system designed to detect an aerosolized biological attack, has air monitors in 31 cities, according to Kerr (see related GSN story, today). Back to top       U.S. Biological Preparedness Plans Should Include Hoax Response, Official Says By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Emergency response plans for biological incidents need to include planning for responding to hoaxes, a Washington-area emergency response official said yesterday (see GSN, June 10). Speaking yesterday at a Harvard University’s Biosecurity 2003 conference here, Arlington County, Va., Fire Chief Edward Plaugher said that false incidents have the potential to overwhelm emergency response systems. Following the 2001 anthrax attacks in the eastern United States, there were reports throughout the world of anthrax hoaxes, often involving a letter or package containing suspicious white powder.  During his presentation, Plaugher cited the particularly egregious example of Clayton Lee Waagner, who was charged by the U.S. Justice Department last year of having sent more than 550 anthrax hoax letters to abortion providers (see GSN, Oct. 18, 2002). Plaugher said yesterday that there is a need to include emergency responders in planning to respond to hoaxes, which can have the added benefit of helping to forge links with law enforcement officials that would be useful in responding to a real incident. Such plans should include measures to keep the public from overreacting and to maintain public confidence in the ability of first responders to respond to an actual incident, he said.  As an example of where poor planning by first responders led to decreased public confidence, Plaugher cited a 1997 hoax that occurred at the B’nai B’rith headquarters in Washington. The hoax involved a petri dish labeled anthrax that was sent to the building’s mailroom. After responding, emergency response officials tried to make those at the scene undergo decontamination, but many refused to do so because the responders could not adequately explain the potential threat, Plaugher said. The refusal of many law enforcement officials to undergo decontamination led to questions as to who was in charge at the scene, he said. If hoaxes are not included in emergency response plans, Plaugher said, then “we can really blow this.” Back to top

France to Conduct Simulated Chemical Weapons Attack on Paris Subway France is set to conduct a simulated chemical attack tonight on the Paris Metro subway system, according to the Associated Press (see GSN, Sept. 8). The simulated sarin attack will occur at the Invalides station and will involve 500 first responders, AP reported. Simulated victims will be treated and decontaminated in special tents that will be set up at a nearby park, police officials said. They refused to provide further details, however, to maintain an element of surprise for those scheduled to be involved. French police also said that the exercise has been planned for months and was not being conducted in response to specific terrorist threats (John Leicester, Associated Press, Oct. 22).   Back to top

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