Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz (AFP/Getty). IAEA Describes Broad and Systematic Iranian Concealment of Nuclear Activities By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Iran has systematically concealed wide-ranging nuclear activities including the production of small amounts of plutonium and low-enriched uranium, but it is not clear whether the country has tried to develop a nuclear weapon, the International Atomic Energy Agency told its Board of Governors yesterday in a confidential report (see GSN, Nov. 10)...Full Story

Latest CIA WMD Threat Assessment Highlights Syrian Nuclear Ambitions By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — In a marked shift from previous assessments, the CIA said in a report released today that it is monitoring Syrian nuclear intentions with “growing concern” (see GSN, Nov. 5)..Full Story

Conference Finds Great Variance in How Biological Weapons Treaty Is Implemented By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire GENEVA — According to information collected this year, a significant number of parties to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention have not passed or adequately enforced domestic laws to implement the treaty’s restrictions, senior diplomats said here yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 10)...Full Story

	Tuesday, November 11, 2003

Latest CIA WMD Threat Assessment Highlights Syrian Nuclear Ambitions By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — In a marked shift from previous assessments, the CIA said in a report released today that it is monitoring Syrian nuclear intentions with “growing concern” (see GSN, Nov. 5) The unclassified semiannual report, covering a period from Jan. 1 to June 30 of this year, assesses the WMD and ballistic missile threat posed by a number of countries of U.S. concern, including Iran and North Korea. The report also outlines the proliferation activities of several supplier countries, such as China and Russia. In its report, the CIA said that it is monitoring Syrian nuclear activities with increased concern, noting continued Syrian-Russian agreements on nuclear cooperation and Damascus’s expanded access to foreign nuclear-related expertise. Previous agency assessments of Syrian nuclear weapons efforts, however, do not describe U.S. interest in Syrian nuclear activities in such ominous language. As for other Syrian weapons issues, the CIA says that Syria continued during the first half of this year to seek foreign assistance to develop a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability. Syria has also relied on other nations, primarily North Korea, for assistance with its liquid-propelled missile program, the report says.  Concerning biological and chemical weapons, the report says that it is “highly probable” that Syria has continued to work to develop an offensive biological weapons capability and that Syria continues to seek foreign assistance and equipment for its chemical weapons program. Syria’s alleged WMD activities have come under increased attention from both the Bush administration and the U.S. Congress. In a speech last month in London, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton noted U.S. concerns over Syrian nuclear activities, especially concerning Syrian efforts to acquire nuclear-related dual-use technologies. Bolton also described Syria’s chemical weapons program as “one of the most advanced Arab state chemical weapons capabilities.” According to recent reports, however, Bolton has come under criticism for allegedly exaggerating the WMD threat posed by some countries of concern, including Syria (see GSN, Nov. 3). In Congress, the U.S. House of Representatives last month overwhelmingly approved the Syrian Accountability Act, which would require the president to impose new rounds of economic sanctions against Damascus if its fails to end its WMD activities. The Senate is expected to soon approve the bill, which has received growing White House support. In another shift from previous assessments, today’s CIA report briefly notes the continued effort by coalition forces in Iraq to search for evidence of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s alleged WMD and ballistic missile efforts (see GSN, Nov. 10). Previous agency assessments conducted last year, however, included a number of claims concerning Iraqi WMD efforts that have since been disputed, such as allegations that Iraq acquired thousands of high-strength aluminum tubes for use in uranium enrichment activities and that Iraq retained a “small force” of prohibited Scud-type missiles. Today’s report also appeared to indicate reduced U.S. concerns surrounding Sudan’s biological and chemical weapons efforts, saying “the U.S. is working with Sudan to reconcile past concerns about its attempts to seek [chemical weapons] capabilities from abroad.” Previously, the agency said that Sudan has aspired to develop chemical weapons program and that it possibly was “interested” in developing a biological weapons program. Iran The CIA continued to warn today of the threat posed by suspected Iranian and North Korean efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. The report says the agency “remains convinced” that Iran pursued during the first half of this year a “clandestine nuclear weapons program,” noting concerns over Tehran’s effort to develop enrichment technologies for weapons purposes and efforts to acquire weapon-grade material using both highly enriched uranium and low burn-up plutonium (see related GSN story, today). Reuters reported today, however, that the International Atomic Energy Agency has circulated a report indicating the lack of evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. “To date there is no evidence that (Iran’s) previously undeclared nuclear material and activities … were related to a nuclear weapons program,” Reuters quoted the IAEA report as saying. “However, given Iran’s past pattern of concealment, it will take some time before the agency is able to conclude that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes,” it says. The CIA report also says that Iran has continued to engage in missile-related cooperation with entities in the former Soviet Union, China and North Korea with the aim of developing a self-sufficient missile production capability. While the report says Iran is “also pursuing longer-range ballistic missiles,” Iranian officials have recently said they have no plans to develop a longer-range variant of the Shahab missile (see GSN, Nov. 10). In addition, during the first half of 2003 Iran sought production technology and expertise from Chinese entities with the aim of developing an indigenous nerve agent production capability, the report says. It also says that Iran has continued to seek dual-use biological equipment, adding that while such equipment may have legitimate uses, it also could aid Tehran’s biological weapons program. North Korea The CIA said in its report that it is continuing to monitor and assess North Korea’s nuclear weapons efforts. The report warns that Pyongyang’s nuclear-capable Taepodong 2 ballistic missile, which is estimated to be able to hit targets within the United States, “may be ready for flight testing” (see GSN, Sept. 11) In addition, North Korea is “nearly self-sufficient” in developing and producing ballistic missiles, and “has demonstrated a willingness” to transfer both missile technologies and complete systems to other countries, the report says. It also says that during the first half of this year, Pyongyang continued to obtain dual-use chemicals that could be used for weapons purposes and that it maintain a biological weapons production capability. Suppliers In addition to describing the WMD threat posed by countries of concern, the CIA in today’s report also examined countries that could be potential suppliers of WMD programs — listing China, North Korea and Russia as “key suppliers.” While praising China’s growing commitment over the past several years to nonproliferation, the report says the “proliferation behavior of some Chinese companies remains of great concern.” It notes that during the first half of 2003, Chinese entities engaged in ballistic missile-related projects with Iran and Pakistan. Over the past year, the United States has sanctioned a number of Chinese companies, in some cases multiple times, for alleged missile-related transfers (see GSN, Oct. 30). The CIA report also says that there is evidence that Chinese entities provided dual-use chemical weapons-related production equipment and technology to Iran during the first half of 2003. With regard to Russia, the report describes “cash-strapped” industries, such as those in the aerospace, chemical, defense and nuclear fields, as “eager to raise funds via exports and transfers” (see GSN, Nov. 3). It also warns that Russian universities and scientific institutes “showed a willingness” to raise funds by providing WMD- and missile-related teaching to foreign students. During the first half of 2003, Russian entities continued to engage in missile-related assistance to countries such as China, India and Iran, the report says. It also says that Russian entities have remained a “key source” of dual-use materials, equipment and training for countries seeking to develop biological and chemical weapons. In addition, today’s CIA report also notes North Korean threats to export nuclear weapons and Pyongyang’s continued missile-related exports to the Middle East, South Asia and North Africa. Such exports during the first half of this year were a major source of hard currency for Pyongyang, which in turn was used to support continued North Korean missile programs, the report says. Back to top       House Approves Global Expansion of Cooperative Threat Reduction The U.S. House of Representatives last week authorized funding to expand the Cooperative Threat Reduction program outside the former Soviet Union and the Senate is expected to pass the bill this week, Senator Richard Lugar’s (R-Ind.) office announced (see GSN, Aug. 18). The fiscal 2004 defense authorization bill, completed by House-Senate negotiators last week and approved by the full House Friday, contains the entire $450 million request by the White House for the program originally created by Lugar and former Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) to help dismantle Russia’s Cold War WMD arsenal. The House attempted to cut the portion of the bill devoted to chemical weapons destruction by almost $30 million, but after the House-Senate conference it remained at its original level of more than $200 million. The House also opposed the legal provision that allows U.S. officials to spend up to $50 million outside the former Soviet Union but it was retained in the final version of the bill. Lugar said that the ability to conduct CTR projects in other areas of the world prone to weapons proliferation is a “vital component” of U.S. national security strategy. “Despite the tremendous progress realized by the Nunn-Lugar program in the former Soviet Union, the United States continues to lack even minimal international confidence about many foreign weapons programs. In most cases, there is little or no information regarding the number of weapons or amounts of materials a country may have produced, the storage procedures they employ to safeguard their weapons, or plans regarding further production or destruction programs,” Lugar said in a press statement (Lugar release, Nov. 10). [EDITOR’S NOTE: Sam Nunn is chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and Richard Lugar serves on NTI’s Board of Directors. NTI is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.] Back to top

IAEA Describes Broad and Systematic Iranian Concealment of Nuclear Activities By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Iran has systematically concealed wide-ranging nuclear activities including the production of small amounts of plutonium and low-enriched uranium, but it is not clear whether the country has tried to develop a nuclear weapon, the International Atomic Energy Agency told its Board of Governors yesterday in a confidential report (see GSN, Nov. 10). The IAEA cited “serious concerns” about Iran’s activities. The agency said that although Iran’s breaches involve small quantities of nuclear material that “would require further reprocessing before being suitable for weapons purposes,” they “have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing.” Since the IAEA board in September set a deadline for increased Iranian cooperation, though, Iran has promised and “shown active cooperation and openness,” according to the report (see GSN, Sept. 12). At the prodding of the United States and other countries concerned that Iran could be seeking nuclear weapons under cover of peaceful activities, the board in September passed a resolution setting an Oct. 31 deadline for Iran to step up cooperation with the agency, including by suspending uranium enrichment activities and signing the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Iran said last month during a visit by European foreign ministers that it would comply with the resolution (see GSN, Oct. 29). Yesterday, Tehran officially informed the IAEA of its intention to comply with the demands, and the IAEA report includes mention of the late-breaking development, indicating Iran promised to suspend enrichment as of yesterday and to “act in accordance with the provisions of” the Additional Protocol “pending its entry into force.” IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei termed the letter “a welcome and positive development.” Yesterday’s report, obtained today by Global Security Newswire, was requested in the September resolution and will be a focus of discussion when the board meets next week in Vienna. The report covers mainly developments since the board’s last meeting, in particular an Oct. 21 letter from Iran to the IAEA that contained numerous revelations about the country’s past concealment of nuclear activity. “To date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities … were related to a nuclear weapons program. However, given Iran’s past pattern of concealment, it will take some time before the agency is able to conclude that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes,” the report reads. Brookings Institution proliferation expert Michael Levi said the “main point here is that the deception has been far more systematic and long-term than had been previously believed,” adding that the report includes “an immense amount of detail that really hasn’t been in public before.” “If any one of this litany of activities had been found in Iraq, it would have been a massive violation of Iraq’s obligations. The difference is that Iran is not being held to the same set of standards,” for strategic and political reasons, Levi said today in an interview. According to the report, “Iran has now acknowledged that it has been developing, for 18 years, a uranium centrifuge enrichment program, and, for 12 years, a laser enrichment program. In that context, Iran has admitted that it produced small amounts of LEU [low-enriched uranium] using both centrifuge and laser enrichment processes and that it had failed to report a large number of conversion, fabrication and irradiation activities involving nuclear material, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium.” “Based on all information currently available to the agency, it is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored,” the report says. Report Details Iranian Omissions, Now Acknowledged The report covers secret Iranian efforts to reprocess nuclear material, enrich uranium and develop a heavy-water reactor. The IAEA indicated that, although Tehran has for many years failed to declare materials and activities as required, it is now providing the agency with information and materials to corroborate its belated acknowledgments. “Iran’s nuclear program, as the agency currently understands it, consists of a practically complete front end of a nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, heavy-water production, a light-water reactor, a heavy-water research reactor and associated research and development facilities,” according to the report. The report indicates that, starting Oct. 9, Iran provided the IAEA with important, previously undisclosed information about uranium conversion in the country. Between 1981 and 1993, Iran said, it conducted bench-scale preparation of uranium dioxide, uranium trioxide, ammonium uranyl carbonate, uranium tetrafluoride and uranium hexafluoride at facilities in Esfahan and Tehran. In its Oct. 21 letter to the IAEA, Iran added that such bench-scale and laboratory activities involved both material exempted from IAEA safeguards and safeguarded material declared to the IAEA as a process loss ― a deception Levi called a “particularly disturbing incident.” On Nov. 1, Iran “agreed to submit” to the IAEA “all relevant inventory change reports (ICRs) and design information to cover those activities,” according to the report. Also in the Oct. 21 letter, Iran said that from 1998 to last year, it tested centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Co. site in Tehran using uranium hexafluoride imported in 1991; that from 1991 to 2000, it conducted laser enrichment activities, using 30 kilograms of undeclared uranium metal; and that from 1988 to 1992, it irradiated seven kilograms of uranium dioxide targets and “extracted small quantities of plutonium.” The latter activity involved safeguards-exempt depleted uranium, Iran subsequently told the agency, adding that the “experiments had been carried out to learn about the nuclear fuel cycle and to gain experience in reprocessing chemistry.” “Neither the activities nor the separated plutonium had been reported previously to the agency,” the IAEA said. As with its uranium conversion activities, Iran promised the agency to provide the necessary materials and information for verification of its claims about reprocessing. Iran said Nov. 1 that it would “submit all nuclear material accountancy reports and design information … covering these activities” and “presented the separated plutonium and the irradiated unprocessed targets to agency inspectors,” according to the report. The uranium centrifuge activities described in the Oct. 21 letter involved 1.9 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride, “the absence of which the state authorities had earlier attempted to conceal by attributing the loss to evaporation due to leaking valves on the cylinders containing the gas,” the report indicates. In another enrichment development, Iran acknowledged during an Oct. 2-3 IAEA visit to the country that it has imported and installed “laser-related equipment” at a facility in Tehran: a laser spectroscopy laboratory in 1992 and a large vacuum vessel in 2000. Although Iran told IAEA inspectors during a subsequent October visit that equipment and people related to the laser spectroscopy laboratory would be made available to them, the interviews and provision of equipment were “deferred,” according to the report. Iran further acknowledged during an Oct. 27-Nov. 1 IAEA visit that it set up a pilot laser enrichment plant at Lashkar Ab’ad in 2000, a project that involved contracts for information and equipment and included laser enrichment experiments conducted between October of last year and January of this year with previously undeclared, imported natural uranium metal. “The laser enrichment one really makes you wonder. You have to really be concerned about how far that’s gone, because it’s very easy to hide,” said Levi. For the enrichment activities, as it did for the conversion and reprocessing activities, Iran has moved to come clean. The country has “agreed to provide the relevant ICRs and design information” on the centrifuge enrichment “and to present the nuclear material for agency verification.” Regarding laser enrichment, Tehran provided the IAEA with some equipment and material Oct. 28 and said Nov. 1 that it would “submit all of the relevant ICRs and design information and … present the nuclear material for agency verification.” Iran has also provided the IAEA with information on domestic and imported centrifuge components to help the agency verify Tehran’s claim that traces of highly enriched uranium found in IAEA environmental sampling were already present when Iran imported the items. Levi said the agency’s language in the report is insufficiently tough, given the breaches described. He accused the agency of adopting a fundamentally flawed approach to Iran by suggesting it can eventually determine whether Iran has peaceful intentions, rather than simply stating that the country has already shown it is not “playing by the rules.” Although “the IAEA continues to insist that with enough investigation, it can determine whether this is a peaceful nuclear program or not,” Levi said, the agency cannot do so with certainty and has already found ample evidence to support allegations that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon. “There is no mandate for the IAEA to find a nuclear arms program. … It’s incredibly difficult to find the capability to assemble a bomb … and the IAEA has found a hidden program to produce fissile materials,” Levi said. “It’s impossible to present all the new evidence,” Levi added, “without sending a clear message that Iran has been in massive violation of its NPT obligations. … Certainly, Iran needs to pay a price for its willful violations of the NPT ― at the minimum, it should lose whatever right it may have once had to enrich uranium.” Back to top       Experts Say North Korea Probably Has Nuclear, Chemical Weapons By David McGlinchey Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction remain the subject of speculation, guesswork and rough estimates, but the secretive nation has probably developed both nuclear and chemical weapons, according to a panel of experts who spoke here Friday at a forum sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (see GSN, Nov. 10 and related story, today). North Korea has commonly exaggerated or lied about its capabilities, but “a lot points to a small nuclear arsenal,” said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security. He said North Korea could enrich uranium in gas centrifuges without Western intelligence agencies detecting the activity “unless North Korea admits to this program or there is a defector.” “I would say that there is considerable uncertainty,” said panel member John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org. Pike, who provided a briefing on North Korean missile development, said that North Korea observers can draw some conclusions from available information but must realize how much is still unknown. “You can sort of bound the uncertainty. … The focus of the presentations was intended to differentiate between what we know, and what we know we don’t know,” Pike told Global Security Newswire. Western observers believe that North Korea has researched biological weapons and weaponized chemical agents, but beyond that “there is uncertainty,” said Elisa Harris, a senior research scholar at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies. International assessments of North Korea’s chemical and biological weapons capability vary widely, but experts generally agree that North Korea has a biological weapons research program and chemical weapons efforts that are “probably more advanced” because Pyongyang started research and development in the late 1960s.  “I don’t think there’s much uncertainty about North Korea’s ability to weaponize [chemical agents],” she said, but “there is uncertainty about the size of the stockpile.” Over the weekend, the CIA announced publicly that it believes North Korea has developed working nuclear weapons and does not need to test them. The intelligence agency submitted a letter to Senator Pat Roberts (R-Kan.), the head of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, outlining the CIA belief that North Korea probably has “one or two simple fission-type nuclear weapons.” Pike criticized the CIA report for not acknowledging the limitations of U.S. intelligence on North Korea. “I thought that a lot of that stuff on North Korea was fairly worthless … because it was so clear,” he said. Pike said that he assumes North Korea has developed as many as eight nuclear weapons, but he said that the CIA report should have focused on the “range of uncertainty.” “We’ve seen that with Iraq, where the politicians stripped out all the caveats. Iraq was open book compared to North Korea,” he said. Back to top       One-Fifth of Japan’s Lower House Support Consideration of Going Nuclear Nearly 20 percent of Japan’s lower house of parliament believe that Tokyo should consider becoming a nuclear weapons state if international developments push the country in that direction, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Aug. 22). Japan is the only country to have been struck with nuclear weapons and the subject has traditionally been taboo. As North Korea has developed its nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, however, Japanese lawmakers have become more open to the idea of possessing a nuclear capability, according to AP. The Mainichi newspaper conducted the poll before Sunday’s elections, and 83 out of 480 lawmakers said they were in favor of considering the idea. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi does not favor considering nuclear weapons and has said that he has no intention of altering Tokyo’s long-standing opposition to the idea. Of the 83 lawmakers, however, 63 were from Koizumi’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party. “I don’t think the percentage is worrisome,” said Takashi Inoguchi, a professor of international relations at Tokyo University. “It is a normal response considering the situation surrounding the country,” Inoguchi added. Some Japanese, however, have said that the country is forgetting the lessons of World War II. “As more young people become lawmakers, fewer have experienced war, and they don’t know the suffering nuclear weapons cause,” said Terumi Tanaka, who survived the nuclear attack on Nagasaki and heads a survivors’ support group (Chisaki Watanabe, Associated Press, Nov. 11). Back to top

Conference Finds Great Variance in How Biological Weapons Treaty Is Implemented By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire GENEVA — According to information collected this year, a significant number of parties to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention have not passed or adequately enforced domestic laws to implement the treaty’s restrictions, senior diplomats said here yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 10). The diplomats have convened this week for an annual meeting of treaty parties to discuss the problem and encourage states to either adopt or improve domestic legislation intended to implement the treaty. The pact bans the development, production and possession of biological agents for nonpeaceful purposes. “The vast majority of the now 151 BWC states parties have clearly recognized the necessity for and identified the first steps for engaging in practical efforts to combat the growing biological weapons problem,” U.S. delegation leader Ambassador Donald Mahley told the meeting. “However, much work remains for many states parties who lack or have yet to undertake effective efforts on a national level to implement the obligations they have assumed by becoming states part[ies], and thus to strengthen the BWC regime,” he said. The U.S. assessment and others appeared to be based on descriptions of current implementation measures that were exchanged at a meeting of national experts in August (see GSN, Aug. 13). Swiss representative Ambassador Christian Faessler said the level of existing treaty implementation measures varies among the pact’s participants. “The meeting of experts clearly showed that the level of development of national legislations and the extent to which measures are applied vary significantly between states parties.” The August meeting produced a lengthy report containing descriptions of the domestic measures adopted by many of the 85 states that attended. The report was compiled into a CD-ROM and was circulated among the treaty parties. Collective or Independent Standards Some nations here have pushed for this week’s meeting to produce a requirement, or at least recommendations, for greater uniformity in how treaty parties implement the pact’s requirements. “For the same reason that we have domestic laws, we also need international treaties and conventions, to codify rights and obligations of members of the community of sovereign states,” said Indian Ambassador Rakesh Sood. “If unilateral actions could provide adequate assurances to the international community, good faith would constitute the norm,” he said. Others argued against uniformity of treaty implementation measures, citing the complexity of many differing national approaches to implementation. “In our view, rather than seeking agreement on a common approach or on a set of minimum standards, it would be better to make all national legislations and measures more efficient and to promote their implementation,” Switzerland’s Faessler said. A Question of Time Many diplomats and experts agreed that this week’s meeting would be unable to formulate even a common understanding of what national implementation measures should look like. There would be “little time to develop agreed language for such common understandings and effective action during the one-week meeting,” said Graham Pearson, a former British chemical and biological weapons official who is now with the University of Bradford. U.S. Ambassador Mahley said an attempt to negotiate common elements could “dangerously delay [the] institution of strict measures” and could result in a “least-common-denominator model.” Other nations, including members of the European Union, argued on the other hand that some common elements of national implementation measures were identified at the August meeting and they could be readily incorporated into a final document this week in the form of recommendations. Making such recommendations should be the “primary task” of the meeting, said German Ambassador Volker Heinsberg. Treaty parties are scheduled to meet annually to discuss this and related issues as they prepare for the treaty’s sixty review conference in 2006. Back to top       U.S. Program Develops Civilian Skills for Russian Biological Warfare Experts Officials at several U.S. universities want to send scientists to Siberia to help former Soviet biological weapons researchers enter the broader scientific community, the Albuquerque Tribune reported yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 16). The effort is part of a U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency program to help biological weapons researchers from the former Soviet Union transfer their skills to nonweapons projects. “Russian biological weapons laboratories are run-down, but they’re still terrific high-level containment facilities,” said Alan Zelicoff, a biological weapons expert and University of New Mexico professor. “When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Russian government stopped funding those labs. The thing of it is, if we don’t fund them, somebody else will,” he added. Officials are concerned that terrorists or rogue nations could gain from the uncontrolled biological weapons expertise and facilities. “We want to help these former bioweapons researchers convert to other types of work, and we want to bring them into the larger scientific community,” said Roger Hagengruber, director of the University of New Mexico’s Office for Policy, Security and Technology. Officials from Pennsylvania State University are also involved in the project (Sue Vorenberg, Albuquerque Tribune, Nov. 10). Back to top

Army Officials Seeking Permission to Store Chemical Weapons Byproduct for Longer Than Originally Planned U.S. Army officials want to prolong the storage of a chemical weapons destruction byproduct at the Newport Chemical Depot in Indiana after a plan to dispose of the byproduct was cancelled in the face of local opposition, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Oct. 24). The Army’s plan to chemically neutralize more than 1,200 tons of VX nerve agent now stored at Newport is expected to produce about 900,000 gallons of hydrolysate as a byproduct. Officials had intended to ship the hydrolysate to a waste treatment facility in Dayton, Ohio, but local opposition there killed the plan. The Army now plans to request permission to store the hydrolysate for a longer period at Newport, AP reported. Environmental regulators are planning a public hearing Thursday in Newport on the Army’s request (Associated Press/WTHITV.com, Nov. 11). Back to top

IAEA Helps Secure Radioactive Source in Ivory Coast The International Atomic Energy Agency last month assisted an operation to secure a disused radioactive source in Ivory Coast, the agency announced yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 3). The operation, involving IAEA, French and Ivorian authorities, removed a sealed cesium-137 source from a small bunker at the University of Cocody in the capital of Abidjan. The source was then transported to France, where it arrived Oct. 30, for storage. France had initially provided the radioactive source to Ivory Coast in 1969 for use in studies on food preservation, according to the IAEA. In addition to the cesium-137 source, several other radioactive sources at the site were recovered and the bunker housing them was dismantled, the IAEA said. The operation was conducted through the African Regional Cooperative Agreement, with France providing $225,000 and the IAEA providing $80,000 (IAEA release, Nov. 10). Back to top       Los Alamos Warns of “Dirty Bomb” Threat A study prepared by the U.S. Energy Department’s Los Alamos National Laboratort warns that many radioactive sources still lack adequate security, making them attractive targets for terrorists seeking to develop a “dirty bomb,” the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Sept. 9). “The world of radiological sources developed prior to recent concerns about terrorism, and many of the sources are either unsecured or provided, at best, with an industrial level of security,” the report says. According to the report, there is a “very significant” threat that terrorists could conduct a dirty bomb attack, which combines radioactive material and conventional explosives. “There is no shortage of radioactive materials that could be used,” it says. The report also warns that security measures currently being implemented to better protect radioactive sources “are unlikely to significantly alter the global risk picture for a few years” (John Solomon, Associated Press/Corpus Christi Caller-Times, Nov. 11).   Back to top

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