Iran’s representative to the IAEA, Ali Akbar Salehi (left), met with IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei in October. Salehi was dismissed from his job this week following complaints from Tehran that he provided inadequate information to his foreign ministry (AFP/Getty). Iran Fires IAEA Representative Iran’s representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, said yesterday that he has been relieved of his duties, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Dec. 1). Salehi did not give any reasons for his dismissal (William Kole, Associated Press/Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 5). He did, however, appear frustrated with the manner in which he was removed from his position and replaced by Bozorgmehr Ziaran. Reports did not give details about Ziaran...Full Story

Putin Criticizes Russian Nonproliferation Approaches By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Russian President Vladimir Putin Wednesday criticized Russian nonproliferation policies, saying Russia lacked a “coherent system” to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Nov. 3)...Full Story

U.S. Researchers Back Distributing Potassium Iodide Near Nuclear Plants By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Authorities should make potassium iodide pills available to people living near nuclear power plants in the United States so that they will have the cancer-fighting pills available in their homes in the event nuclear material is released in an attack or accident, according to a study released yesterday (see GSN, April 24)...Full Story

	Friday, December 5, 2003

Putin Criticizes Russian Nonproliferation Approaches By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Russian President Vladimir Putin Wednesday criticized Russian nonproliferation policies, saying Russia lacked a “coherent system” to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Nov. 3). In an opening address to a meeting of the Russian Security Council convened to discuss nonproliferation issues, Putin said the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction, especially to terrorists, remained “the chief global threat of the 21st century.” He noted Russia’s long borders and vast stockpiles of Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction, saying that nonproliferation remained a “top priority” issue. Even so, Putin criticized Russian nonproliferation efforts, singling out Russia’s export control system and its lack of trained nonproliferation specialists. “Elements of that [nonproliferation] work, such as, for example, export control[s], thus far, unfortunately give no right to speak of a coherent system,” he said. U.S. concerns with Russian export policies stretch back to the mid-1990s, when the United States first detected “serious problems” concerning Iranian entities obtaining first missile-related, then nuclear-related technologies, a U.S. State Department official told Global Security Newswire today. From 1998-1999, the United States sanctioned 10 Russian entities for alleged illegal transfers, with eight still under penalty, the official said. Last month, the CIA released an unclassified semiannual report of the WMD capabilities of countries of concern that listed Russia among supplier countries. The report warned that the economic situation in Russia has led Russian companies and research institutions to becoming increasingly interested in transferring WMD-related goods and expertise. According to the CIA, Russian entities have transferred nuclear- and missile-related technologies to several countries, such as Iran and India, and have remained a source for countries interested in developing chemical and biological weapons programs (see GSN, Nov. 11). “Russia is a target-rich environment for proliferators of all kinds,” the State Department official said. While praising the efforts Russia has made over the past several years in enacting and strengthening its export control regulatory system, the CIA assessment said that enforcement “remained a serious concern.” “Top officials must make a sustained effort to convince exporting entities — as well as the bureaucracy whose job it is to oversee them — that nonproliferation is a top priority and that those who violate the law will be prosecuted,” the CIA report said. The State Department official also said that Russia’s written export control regulations are “pretty good,” but concerns still remain regarding their enforcement and the priority Moscow places on them. The United States is continuing to work with Russia to crack down on illegal transfers by Russian entities, to help improve Russian export licensing and to pressure Moscow to end potentially illegal transfers to countries of concern, the official said. In his remarks to the Russian Security Council, Putin called for reprioritizing nonproliferation in national security policy and for an “in-depth and systematic analysis” of nonproliferation activities by Russian agencies.  “We must expressly define the role of each department, eliminate the duplication of their functions and enhance control over the quality of their work,” he said. In addition, Putin also called for greater coordination of nonproliferation policies, including export control regulations, among all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The CIS consists of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. Putin warned against using promises of implementing nonproliferation policies as a bargaining chip in negotiations with other countries. “Any attempts to use this theme as an instrument of momentary political or economic gain … should meet with resistance and an appropriate response on our part,” he said. Instead, Russia should view nonproliferation as being in its own interest, according to Putin. “I shall once again stress that competent and effective policies in the field of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction spell the security of our state as a whole and our citizens, promote international stability and enhance Russia’s prestige in the world,” he said. Back to top       Israeli General Criticizes Tel Aviv’s Role in Assessing Iraqi WMD Capabilities An Israeli brigadier general has accused Israeli intelligence of being involved, along with U.S and British intelligence services, in overstating Iraq’s prewar WMD capabilities, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Dec. 4). In a report for Tel Aviv University’s Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Brig. Gen. Shlomo Brom said that Israeli intelligence provided “an exaggerated assessment of Iraqi capabilities,” leading to “the possibility that the intelligence picture was manipulated.” “In the questioning of the picture painted by coalition intelligence, the third party in this intelligence failure, Israel, has remained in the shadows,” the report says. “Israeli intelligence was a full partner to the picture presented by American and British intelligence regarding Iraq’s nonconventional capabilities,” it adds. The report accuses intelligence agencies of having had a “one-dimensional perception” of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. “At the heart of this perception lay the colorful portrait of an embodiment of evil, a man possessed by a compulsion to develop weapons of mass destruction in order to strike Israel and others, regardless of additional considerations,” it says. A spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon refused to comment on the report (Molly Moore, Washington Post, Dec. 5). Israeli lawmaker Yossi Sarid has called for an inquiry into Israeli intelligence on prewar Iraq, saying the assessment of Iraq’s WMD capabilities could have an impact on future assessments. “We’ve lost credibility both domestically and internationally” by exaggerating the threat, Sarid said. “If we now come with grave data about Iran’s arming with weapons of mass destruction, who is going to take us seriously? They might say, ‘It’s hard to believe you because you exaggerated about Iraq,’” he added (Joshua Mitnick, Washington Times, Dec. 5). Some Israeli lawmakers and academics, however, have criticized Brom’s report, according to the Associated Press. While agreeing that there was a failure to assess Iraq’s WMD capabilities accurately, Yuval Steinitz, head of the Israeli parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, said that “to say Israel is the prime mover in this is extremely farfetched.” “They haven’t found Saddam, either, but does that mean there was no Saddam Hussein?” said Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat research center at Bar-Illan University (Associated Press/USA Today, Dec. 5). Back to top       Washington Scheduled to Host PSI Meeting Next Week Military and law enforcement experts from countries involved in the Proliferation Security Initiative, a U.S.-led effort to interdict WMD-related cargo shipments, are scheduled to meet next week in Washington (see GSN, Oct. 16). The Dec.16-17 meeting will involve experts from the 11 original PSI members — Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. Experts from Canada, Denmark, Norway and Singapore also expected to attend. The meeting is set to discuss ways that any gaps in existing legal authority for the initiative can be filled, either through national legislation or international action, as well as information-sharing measures, U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton said earlier this week. While the United States is willing to “pursue diplomatic solutions” whenever possible to address proliferation concerns, Washington and its allies are also willing to engage in more “robust” tactics, such as interdiction, if necessary, Bolton said. “If rogue states are not willing to follow the logic of nonproliferation norms, they must be prepared to face the logic of adverse consequences. It is why we repeatedly caution that no option is off the table,” he said (U.S. State Department release, Dec. 2). Back to top

Iran Fires IAEA Representative Iran’s representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, said yesterday that he has been relieved of his duties, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Dec. 1). Salehi did not give any reasons for his dismissal (William Kole, Associated Press/Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 5). He did, however, appear frustrated with the manner in which he was removed from his position and replaced by Bozorgmehr Ziaran. Reports did not give details about Ziaran. “I have not been told about this, and what little information I have is because of reading media reports. I have a right to complain about [Iranian Foreign Minister] Mr. [Kamal] Kharazi , as I did not think he would do such a thing,” Salehi said. “This action has raised doubts and suspicions among the entire international community … What a pity Mr. Kharazi did not exercise more tact and a little more patience, since he could have done this in another way,” he added. Salehi said he would have preferred to be involved in the transition. “By saying that he could have done this in another way, I mean that he could have asked the outgoing representative to introduce his successor to the IAEA. Then actions would have taken their normal course. As a matter of principle, before introducing the new representative, he should have had a meeting with the former representative to praise him, if he had done positive works, or criticize him, for any negative work,” he added. Salehi said that he did not know when Ziaran would assume his new role. He suggested reporters ask Kharazi why he was dismissed without warning. “I am not the only one who is astonished. All members of the agency, Western ambassadors, ambassadors of the Nonaligned Movement, and the director general of the IAEA have contacted me several times to express their surprise and astonishment. I did not know what to tell them.  All I could say was that I had to leave because my four-year term had ended,” he said (Iranian Labor News Agency/BBC Monitoring, Dec. 5). From Tehran, Kharazi said the Foreign Ministry would now handle IAEA affairs. “We decided recently that the Foreign Affairs Ministry should be in charge of Iran’s representation to the IAEA, since in the past we were not filled in with the details,” he said (Beirut Daily Star, Dec. 3). The move could signal a disorganized Iranian approach to nuclear negotiations, according to AP. Despite repeated promises and intense international pressure, Iran has yet to sign the Additional Protocol to its nuclear safeguards agreement, which would open its nuclear facilities to more intrusive IAEA monitoring, agency officials said yesterday. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said that he expects Iran to sign the agreement shortly. A Western diplomat said that the international community is waiting “for Iran to keep its promises and sign” (Kole, Associated Press/Philadelphia Inquirer). France, meanwhile, announced that it plans to push Iran toward permanently freezing its uranium enrichment efforts. Iran has previously said it would only temporarily suspend its enrichment activities. Asked if France wants Iran’s enrichment and reprocessing activities permanently halted, Foreign Ministry spokesman Herve Ladsous said “that is what we have on our mind, definitely.” “We did not say it in so many words because we’re dealing with a country which has its sensitivities, but yeah, the objective is to have an Iran with peaceful atomic energy (and) prevent proliferation of mass destruction weapons,” he added (Carol Giacomo, Reuters, Dec. 5). Back to top       Washington Denies Delaying North Korea Talks The United States yesterday denied reports it is delaying talks on the North Korean nuclear standoff, and a U.S. State Department spokesman blamed Pyongyang for the holdup (see GSN, Dec. 4). “We are ready to go. North Korea has not yet agreed to a date,” said State Department spokesman Adam Ereli. “It’s not that we’re standing in the way. We’re ready to talk,” he added. A senior U.S. official said that Pyongyang is attempting to gain U.S. concessions before the talks begin. “I’m not saying that there won’t be something before the talks, but you can’t negotiate the round before the round,” the official said. “You have to leave some things for the talks,” the official added (Stephen Collinson, Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Dec. 5). A former State Department expert on North Korea said earlier this year, however, that difficult issues must be ironed out before talks begin. The logistics of formal negotiations, including North Korean formal declarations, the need for translations and the large number of delegates at the talks, reduce the opportunity for tangible diplomatic progress, according to Jack Pritchard, who served as the U.S. special envoy for negotiations with North Korea. “Does that mean that we will resolve the problem bilaterally? No … but we will lay the groundwork,” he said. Pritchard dismissed previous talks as “drive-by meetings” (see GSN, Sept. 8; David McGlinchey, Global Security Newswire, Dec. 4). China is urging Washington to provide Pyongyang with a nonaggression guarantee after it renounces nuclear weapons and that demand could delay talks, a Bush administration official said yesterday. The official gave credit to China for attempting to push North Korea toward a settlement (Barry Schweid, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Dec. 4). U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, meanwhile, said that negotiations between allies before the talks is proving to be as difficult as “herding cats” (Collinson, Agence France-Presse). Back to top       Russia Tests Ballistic Missile Russia test launched an SS-19 long-range ballistic missile today as part of Moscow’s effort to extend the service life of the 25-year-old weapon, ITAR-Tass reported (see GSN, Dec. 2). The launch was intended to check the missile’s performance and systems, according to ITAR-Tass. The Russian Strategic Missile Troops could continue to deploy the SS-19 and other similar missile systems for another three decades, according to the Russian news service (ITAR-Tass/BBC Monitoring, Dec. 5). The missile was launched from a Russian cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, according to the Associated Press (see GSN, Dec. 10, 2002). “The missile was launched to test whether all its parameters were in order and whether is was safe to use,” a Russian Space Forces spokesman said. The missile did not carry a warhead (Associated Press/London Guardian, Dec. 5). Back to top       Pakistan Denies British Claims of Nonproliferation Assistance Pakistan yesterday denied British claims of assistance intended to prevent the spread of Pakistani nuclear technology (HiPakistan.com, Dec. 5). Earlier this week, the British Foreign Office released a white paper saying the United Kingdom was helping Pakistan to secure its nuclear technology. “We are … working with the Pakistani authorities to prevent technology associated with Pakistan’s nuclear program spreading to others,” the paper says (Mike Nartker, GSN, Dec. 5). A Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman said yesterday, however, that there has been no contact with the United Kingdom on what was described as a “nonissue.” The spokesman also said that Pakistani nuclear technology was under the “most solid” control and no outside assistance was needed (see GSN, Aug. 7, 2002). “Just as we had the capacity to become a nuclear power, we also have in place systems and checks to ensure that our technologies do not go to third countries,” the spokesman said (Hi Pakistan). Back to top

Australian Participation in U.S. Missile Defense System Worth Little, Former U.S. Official Says Former U.S. Assistant Defense Secretary Philip Coyle has said that while Australia has agreed to participate in the U.S. missile defense system, there is little it can offer to boost the system’s effectiveness, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported today (see GSN, Dec. 4). “Say North Korea were to launch a missile towards the United States, Australia’s not in the right place to see that,” said Coyle, who oversaw U.S. testing of its missile defense efforts for the Clinton administration. “While it certainly could help to relay signals to other satellites, it’s too far away to be able to see the first launch of an enemy missile like North Korea,” he said. Instead, Australia’s participation is more valuable to the United States for political reasons, Coyle said (ABC Online, Dec. 5). Meanwhile, Australia’s decision to join the U.S. missile defense system has increased pressure on Canada to follow suit, according to CanWest News Service (see GSN, Sept. 11). Incoming Prime Minister Paul Martin wants to develop closer ties with the United States, which could be achieved through Canadian participation in U.S. missile defense efforts, CanWest News Service reported (Blanchfield/Curry, CanWest News Service/Edmonton Journal, Dec. 5). Back to top

U.S. Researchers Back Distributing Potassium Iodide Near Nuclear Plants By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Authorities should make potassium iodide pills available to people living near nuclear power plants in the United States so that they will have the cancer-fighting pills available in their homes in the event nuclear material is released in an attack or accident, according to a study released yesterday (see GSN, April 24). The congressionally mandated study, produced by an expert committee convened by the National Research Council, recommends that potassium iodide tablets be “predistributed” to all people aged 40 and under, especially pregnant and lactating women, living near nuclear plants. The council called on states and municipalities to determine how and where to stock and distribute potassium iodide and on the federal government to maintain a potassium iodide stockpile, fund state and local efforts, and consider extending the allowable shelf life of potassium iodide. The researchers provided a model for states and cities to use in determining where and how to conduct potassium iodide distribution, which in the United States has generally focused on 10-mile emergency planning zones around nuclear facilities. Potassium iodide works to prevent the thyroid from absorbing cancer-causing radioactive iodine, an expected component of material that would be released in a containment failure at a nuclear power plant. Potassium iodide does nothing to counteract the effects of other dangerous isotopes that can be released in a nuclear incident, including those likely to be used in a radiological “dirty bomb.” The council’s recommendations appear to go beyond current federal policy as implemented by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The commission, which recommends that states consider predistributing potassium iodide as part of emergency planning, offered in December 2001 to provide the drug upon request to states that have residents within 10 miles of nuclear plants. It has provided 18 such states with a total of more than 10 million pills, but the program does not provide for continuing provision of the pills, as called for in yesterday’s report (see GSN, Feb. 5, 2002). “We felt that it should not be a one-time offer and it should not be just giving the pills out,” said research committee member Edward Wilds, who directs the Connecticut Environmental Protection Department’s Radiation Division. Emergency Management Director Donald Hall of Calvert County, Md., which was singled out for praise in the report for the effectiveness of its federally supported potassium iodide program, echoed the research committee’s concern about the future of the drug’s predistribution (see GSN, Jan. 14, 2002). Hall suggested that the commission’s provision of potassium iodide to states could be an unsustainable “political” move. “What our problem is, is we get it started, and they’re not going to fund it anymore, and the locals are going to have to fund it,” he said. The advantages of predistribution over stockpiling of the drug remain a matter of some debate. Hall said Calvert County “always … agreed with the stockpiling more than the distribution anyway” before Maryland obtained federal resources for distribution. He added that Calvert County’s planning for evacuation provides for enough “cushion” that potassium iodide distribution might not become especially important. The researchers stressed the importance of local and state decision-making in distributing the drug to account for varying conditions around the country. “A strategy is needed,” they wrote, “whereby local planning agencies could develop geographic boundaries for a KI [potassium iodide] distribution plan based on site-specific considerations, because conditions and states vary so much that no single best solution exists.” The study also indicates a need for “a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses, short-term and long-term successes and failures and resource requirements of different KI distribution plans implemented in the United States and abroad.” According to a related study released this year by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Nuclear Energy Agency, countries such as the Czech Republic, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland distribute potassium iodide widely to people living near nuclear plants. Countries including Australia and Japan stockpile but do not predistribute the tablets, while distribution varies geographically in countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom (see GSN, Aug. 5, 2002). Although potassium iodide is the most widely known medical countermeasure for nuclear incidents, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration moved after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, to investigate other products that could be useful against the effects of isotopes other than radioactive iodine. The FDA announced in January of this year that it had found ferric hexacyanoferrate, better known as “Prussian blue,” generally “safe and effective” for use against the effects of radioactive cesium and thallium.  In September, the FDA made a similar announcement on pentetate calcium trisodium and pentetate zinc trisodium, which encourage excretion of transuranium isotopes. In October, the agency approved a specific version of Prussian blue, produced by Heyl and known as Radiogardase.   Back to top

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