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Pentagon Inspector Finds Risk of Russian Noncompliance With U.S.-Funded Disarmament Efforts By David Ruppe WASHINGTON — Following on warnings issued twice before, a U.S. Defense Department agency has found that there continue to be risks that Russia will not fully cooperate on a number of nuclear and chemical weapons destruction activities with the United States (see GSN, Dec. 10, 2003). The report, released last month by the Pentagon’s Office of the Inspector General, says the United States should have negotiated agreements delineating more specific Russian responsibilities regarding the activities. “DOD could have better managed the risks associated with those projects had it negotiated implementing agreements that better defined Russia’s requirements, thus making Russia more responsible for the storage and elimination of Russian weapons of mass destruction,” it says. The projects are paid for through the Defense Department’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which funds the dismantlement and secure storage of former Soviet weapons of mass destruction. The CTR program has faced steady criticism from its detractors since its 1991 inception, including congressional criticism last year over instances in which Russia did not uphold agreements (see GSN, May 29, 2002). The report also says management controls over the Cooperative Threat Reduction program still are “not adequate to ensure that facilities constructed to aid Russia in the storage and destruction of weapons of mass destruction were used for their intended purpose.” In a letter responding to the report, Undersecretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation Lisa Bronson wrote, “In general we agree with the conclusions of the report.” Risks CitedAccording to the report, Russia might not fully use a fissile material storage facility the program has paid to construct. While construction of the facility was scheduled for completion in December, Russia still has not committed to providing the amounts and types of fissile materials for which the facility was designed, the report says. Further, there are no agreements yet to obtain fissile material from Russia’s Defense Ministry. “As such, DOD does not have adequate assurance that Russia will provide or store any amount or types of eligible fissile material” in the storage facility, it says. Bronson responded that the Defense Ministry is responsible for less than 40 percent of the material intended for storage at the facility. The remaining material could come from the Atomic Energy Ministry and possibly from commercial sources, said Paul Walker, an expert at Global Green USA. There also are risks that Russia could rescind land allocation for a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchye, the report says (see GSN, Nov. 24, 2003). Additional risks cited by the report include: * Potential delays in obtaining design approvals for the facility that could cause construction schedules to slip and costs to climb; * the possibility that Russia will not use a designed bituminization building for the facility — bitumin is a type of asphalt in which neutralized chemicals are encased for long-term storage; and * the chance that operation of the facility will be suspended or terminated because of environmental laws. Previous TroubleIn two previous reports, the inspector general cited two instances in which Russia did not follow through on Cooperative Threat Reduction program agreements. Those reports said that Russia had not used a missile fuel disposal facility and had halted a solid rocket motor disposition project because it could not obtain a land allocation, wasting $95.5 million and $99.7 million respectively. “The two current CTR projects … are at risk of meeting the same fate as [the] two other CTR projects that we reported on,” the latest report says. It says the Defense Department had spent $372.8 million to design and construct fissile material containers and their storage facility and $203.9 million on the chemical weapons destruction facility as of July 2003. “But Russia may not fully utilize those items to store fissile material and destroy chemical weapons,” the report says. Responding to Pentagon criticism last year, Pentagon officials said they would take measures to ensure better Russian compliance with program agreements, which were signed prior to the current administration. Bronson said Pentagon officials have worked “diligently” to secure legally binding commitments for long-term monitoring of materials at the fissile materials storage facility and to mitigate chemical weapons destruction risks. Retired Air Force Brig. Gen. Thomas Kuenning, who until last October served as director of Cooperative Threat Reduction program, said last month that current U.S. emphasis on negotiating more specific agreements has slowed up cooperation with Russia and advocated greater high-level political support for the program. Walker of Global Green said pinning countries down on specifics could be unrealistic given the complexity of disposition activities, including the ever-present potential for local public opposition. “I think on the whole it’s important to have the details specified up front as much as one can on major investment projects in Russia,” he said. “But I think you also have to be realistic as well. When you look at these projects in the United States, for example, open burning or open detonation of missiles or deconstruction of major weapons systems or specifically the destruction of chemical weapons, the projects change almost month-to-month. There are always technical glitches, permitting glitches, and sometimes management mistakes made,” he said. “A certain degree of flexibility is needed over the long term,” he said.
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