U.S. to Increase Nonproliferation Aid to Kazakhstan

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United States and Kazakhstan this week agreed to expand efforts to prevent the spread of biological weapons (see GSN, July 30).

Under the agreement signed Wednesday, the United States pledged to support Kazakh efforts to prevent biological proliferation through several initiatives. The two countries will work to prevent the spread of biological weapons-related expertise by organizing cooperative research programs, to secure dangerous pathogens by improving security at Kazakh biological facilities, to consolidate pathogen stocks at central repositories, to eliminate Cold War-era biological weapons-related infrastructure and to improve Kazakhstan’s ability to detect and respond to potential bioterrorist attacks.

The United States will also provide Kazakhstan with an additional $35 million for projects such as the joint study of dangerous pathogens to develop new medical countermeasures and to prevent outbreaks in Central Asia.

The agreement is the “first time we’ve had a comprehensive biological weapons engagement with Kazakhstan,” said Mark Hayes, a spokesman for Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.).

The agreement amends a U.S.-Kazakh bilateral agreement reached in 1995 to implement the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which seeks to secure and dispose of former Soviet weapons of mass destruction. The effort is also known as the Nunn-Lugar program after its architects, Lugar and former Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.).

“Kazakhstan’s signing of the amendment is a testimony of the firm and consistent commitment of President Nursultan Nazarbayev and our government to the cause of nonproliferation,” Kazakh Ambassador to the United States Kanat Saudabayev said in a statement yesterday.

“The people of Kazakhstan, who experienced firsthand the horrifying consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction, are adamant to continue to be at the forefront of the global fight against the proliferation of these deadly weapons,” Saudabayev added.

Kazakhstan was home to the Soviet nuclear weapons test site at Semipalatinsk, which is believed to have had disastrous health effects on nearby residents.

The former Soviet state contains several biological facilities established during the Soviet era, including a former large-scale anthrax production site at Stepnogorsk and two research institutes that possess pathogen collections. While Kazakhstan is not a member of the Biological Weapons Convention, officials there have said they plan to join by the end of the year, according to a U.S. State Department official.

The amendment signed this week was first proposed three years ago, but was delayed, in part, due to reluctance by Kazakhstan to share with the United States some requested pathogen strains for research, according to Hayes. Among the pathogen types requested by Washington were anthrax, plague, tularemia and viral hemorrhagic fevers. Kazakhstan has since agreed to provide all requested strains, Hayes said.

“We’ve worked out those kinks,” he said.

Lugar traveled to Kazakhstan in summer 2003 to help persuade officials there to sign the agreement.

“I applaud the work of the Department of Defense and the administration in concluding this important work with the government of Kazakhstan,” Lugar said in a statement Wednesday. “This is a critical step forward in addressing the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”

[EDITOR’S NOTE: Sam Nunn is chief executive officer, and Richard Lugar serves on the board, of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. NTI is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by the National Journal Group.]

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