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Biological Weapons Convention Requires Updates to Match Technological Change, Group Says By David Ruppe WASHINGTON — Members of the treaty banning biological weapons must update the pact at its 2006 review conference or watch it become irrelevant, according to a report released last week by a Geneva-based group. “Bioweapons Report 2004,” the first of an annual series produced by the nonprofit Bioweapons Prevention Project, was released at a meeting of Biological Weapons Convention members. It assesses the global state of technology that could be used to create biological weapons and the strength of the norm against such efforts. The report says the treaty faces continued challenges, including state-sponsored biological weapons programs, “apparently” growing interest by nonstate entities in biological agents, and “the future threat posed by unconstrained developments in science and technology which may enable states, organizations or even individuals to develop stable and controllable agents to cause indiscriminate harm.” “Biological warfare is closely related to the knowledge of disease,” it says. Research and development for legitimate purposes, such as for medicine, pharmaceuticals, agriculture and biological defense, “generates considerable knowledge about the potential offensive use of certain substances to interfere with biological processes in humans, plants and animals,” the report states. Potential technological advancements of concern, the report says, include those for modulating the immune system, mechanisms enabling microorganisms to evade immunological defenses, and targeted delivery systems — gene vectors and immunotoxins — for transferring foreign cells to particular areas of the body. The 153-member treaty “lacks effective mechanisms for monitoring and verifying whether or not states parties are complying with their treaty obligations,” the report states. It notes also that many states have failed to produce required data on biological activities, called “confidence-building measures,” intended to promote transparency and clarity about treaty compliance. “If nothing happens in 2006, we could really be moving toward the end of the BWC,” said Jean Pascal Zanders, who directs the project. “Right now, it’s already been eight years since the norm was updated in light of scientific and technological developments. If it doesn’t happen in 2006 … it could be 15 years.” At the same time, “the rate of [biotechnological] growth is exponential,” he said. Member states attempted to modify the treaty in a number of ways at the 2001 treaty review conference, including by creation of an official monitoring body; however the United States opposed the amendments and the effort collapsed (see GSN, Nov. 15 2002). The next review conference is scheduled for 2006. Between the conferences, experts and officials from states parties have been meeting to discuss certain topics related to the treaty. The meeting of treaty parties that ended Friday in Geneva, the second such meeting, addressed: — strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals and plants; and — enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease. Experts from the treaty parties met in July to discuss those issues and urged a number of recommendations, including that states individually strengthen their capabilities for detecting, diagnosing and combating infectious disease and provide aid and cooperate internationally to that end. A final document produced at the meeting Friday evening said the treaty members could implement the recommendations of the experts meeting, but did not direct them to take any new action. The current program of meetings, however, “only have a limited mandate to discuss five sets of topics and they cannot reach legally binding agreements,” according to the BWPP report. The report also forecasts scientific advances that might be expected between now and the 2011 review conference as a way of urging action in 2006. It predicts that: — massive U.S. investment in biothreat research could result in a dramatic rise in knowledge of pathogenic mechanisms and the immune system’s defenses; — the biotechnology industry will expand to many new countries, and the means for conducting research will become more simple and available, increasing “significantly” the “potential for misuse;” — “we should expect surprises” from scientific developments; and — more could be learned about genetic differences between ethnicities, in the interest of advancing medicine, which also “could bring us back to discussion of ethnic weapons.” The report calls for a more responsive mechanism for reviewing scientific developments other than the five-year review conferences, “if the [convention] is not to be seen as an irrelevant relic.”
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