|
|||||
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
 |
 |
    |
|
|
|||
 |
|
||
|
|||
|
|
|
|
||||||||
|
United States, Russia Need to Do More to Secure Nuclear Materials, Harvard Researchers Say By Mike Nartker WASHINGTON — The United States must do more to quickly secure stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials in Russia and other countries to prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists, according to a report released today by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (see GSN, May 14). In the two years following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, less nuclear material was adequately secured against potential terrorists than the amount secured in the two years prior to the attacks, says the report, prepared by Harvard University researchers Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier. In addition, the report criticizes the Bush administration’s funding for nuclear material security efforts, noting that the budget for such efforts from fiscal 2002-2005 was about 15 percent more than the funding level from the end of the Clinton administration. Much of the increase, the report says, came from congressional action and not White House requests. “The facts are that the amount of inadequately secured bomb material in the world today is enough to make thousands of nuclear weapons; that terrorists are actively seeking to get it; and that with such material in hand, a capable and well-organized terrorist group plausibly could make, deliver and detonate at least a crude nuclear bomb capable of incinerating the heart of any major city in the world,” Bunn and Wier wrote. The report identifies three areas of concern where “urgent action” is needed to protect weapon-grade materials — Russia, research reactors in use around the world and Pakistan. While noting the improved economic and security situation in Russia, the report warns that weapon-grade material there still remains vulnerable to would-be terrorists. Bunn and Wier cite Russian media reports that the Chechen militants who seized a Moscow theater and hundreds of hostages in October 2002 had initially considered capturing a Moscow site that possessed highly enriched uranium. The report also warns of continued security problems at Russian nuclear sites, noting a security manager at the Seversk nuclear material processing facility who reported that guards there regularly conduct patrols without ammunition in their guns to prevent accidental firings. According to the report, U.S.-funded security and accounting upgrades were conducted on 35 tons of Russian nuclear material in fiscal 2003. That amount represents only 6 percent of the estimated 600 tons of vulnerable Russian material, the report says, adding that at the pace of 35 tons per year, it will take 13 years from now to complete security upgrades on all vulnerable materials within the former Soviet Union. “Until that time, the world is relying, without transparency or confidence, on whatever security improvements Russia is able to afford on its own,” the report says. In addition to nuclear materials in Russia, about 20 metric tons of highly enriched uranium is used as fuel in civilian research reactors around the world, according to the report. Warning of relatively low security at many facilities, the report says that research reactor fuel elements are small enough to be easily stolen by terrorists and that information on extracting uranium from the fuel elements is available in open literature (see GSN, April 15). Concerns surrounding Pakistan, according to the report, are based less on the security of its guarded nuclear facilities than on the “very, very high” threat posed by both nuclear personnel who may be sympathetic to radical Islamic militants and by remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban operating within the country. As an example of the insider threat, the report notes top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who was highly respected for his role as the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and who confessed earlier this year to transferring nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. RecommendationsIn their report, Bunn and Wier called for “sustained presidential leadership” to help quickly and effectively secure stockpiles of nuclear materials. The report calls on U.S. President George W. Bush to issue a new presidential directive that would label the securing of nuclear material worldwide as a top national priority and would set targets of securing all nuclear weapons and fissile materials in the former Soviet Union within four years and worldwide within six years. In addition, Bush should launch a “global cleanout” program to quickly remove weapon-grade materials from the most vulnerable sites around the world and should appoint a senior high-level official “with full-time responsibility” to oversee all nuclear material security efforts. Already, some action has been taken on the report’s recommendation of a “global cleanout” program. The U.S. Senate voted last week to amend the fiscal 2005 defense authorization bill that would authorize funding for such a program. A set of new nuclear nonproliferation measures expected to be announced this week by U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham is also anticipated to include a cleanout program (see GSN, May 20). The report also calls on Russian President Vladimir Putin to implement several necessary measures, such as enshrining nuclear material security as part of Russia’s national security policy, appointing a senior-level official to oversee nuclear material security efforts, assigning adequate funding resources and working to eliminate bureaucratic obstacles to U.S.-Russian security cooperation (see GSN, May 10). The report also envisions a role for the remainder of the Group of Eight economic powers, which in 2002 initiated the Global Partnership to pledge $20 billion over 10 years for nonproliferation efforts, primarily in Russia. The G-8, which consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, should use a summit set to be held next month in the United States to expand the Global Partnership to secure nuclear material stockpiles wherever they may be located in the world, the report says (see GSN, April 27). In a telephone interview today, Bunn told Global Security Newswire that the three most essential recommendations were the fast elimination of vulnerable stockpiles of nuclear materials, Russian presidential-level efforts to improve cooperation with the United States and the creation of new partnerships with other countries to address materials not in Russia or covered by a global cleanout program. While both Bush and Putin are “genuinely concerned” about the possibility of terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons, many policy-makers around the world hold to a set of “myths” as to how terrorists might acquire nuclear weapons, Bunn said. For example, Bush has suggested in public statements that the main way terrorists might obtain a nuclear weapons is through a rogue state, Bunn said. The report illustrates that terrorists are more likely to obtain such weapons through a failure by states to adequately protect warheads and materials. [EDITOR’S NOTE: The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]
| ||||||||||
Back to top
