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Iraqi WMD Still a Threat, U.S. Official Says From Wednesday, May 5, 2004 issue.

Iraqi WMD Still a Threat, U.S. Official Says

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Preventing Iraqi weapons of mass destruction from reaching terrorists was the primary justification for the U.S. war on Iraq and those suspected weapons, still undiscovered by U.S. forces, continue to pose a potential threat, a senior U.S. defense official said yesterday.

“One of the great problems with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is … there is always the danger they could get into the hands of terrorists or other people you don’t want to acquire them. It’s a serious problem worldwide and it’s obviously a problem in Iraq,” said Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, speaking at the American Enterprise Institute. 

More than a year after the invasion, U.S.-led investigators have failed to uncover any chemical or biological weapons or evidence of active production, according to government reports (see GSN, March 31).

President George W. Bush and other senior administration officials, though, have maintained that chemical and biological stores may still exist — either hidden within Iraq or smuggled out of the country.

“They could still be there. They could be hidden,” Bush said during a press conference last month (see GSN, April 14).

Danger Previously Conveyed

Just before the March 2003 invasion, Bush used as his primary justification for war the potential that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction could be obtained by terrorists.

“The danger is clear: Using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other,” he said in a major televised address two days before the war.

In a statement to the U.N. Security Council a month before the invasion, Secretary of State Colin Powell said the Iraqi government and international inspectors had failed to account for, among other material, an estimated 30,000 chemical and biological munitions, botulinum toxin, VX nerve agent and bulk biological agents.

“These are not trivial matters one can just ignore and walk away from and say, well, maybe the inspectors will find them, maybe they won’t,” he said.

Powell presented evidence to the U.N. Security Council earlier that month, arguing that Iraq was concealing chemical and biological weapons from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission.

“If we consider just one category of missing weaponry — 6,500 bombs from the Iran-Iraq war — UNMOVIC says the amount of chemical agent in them would be in the order of 1,000 tons,” he said.

Feith’s comment yesterday, in response to a question, was unusual, as senior administration officials since the invasion have rarely discussed in public any dangers posed by the unaccounted-for weapons.

Officials instead have argued that removing the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was the principal purpose of the war — to eliminate the potential that Hussein might have shared such weapons with terrorists whether or not he had them at the time.

“Even knowing what I know today about the stockpiles of weapons, I still would have called upon the world to deal with Saddam Hussein,” Bush said during the press conference last month, calling Hussein “a dangerous man.”

Feith restated that view yesterday, saying the strategic rationale for the war did not hinge on whether or not classified U.S. intelligence indicated Iraq had chemical or biological weapons stockpiles.

Rather, it depended on assessments about the nature of the Saddam Hussein’s regime and its activities.” 

“The danger was too great that Saddam might give the fruits of his WMD programs to terrorists for use against the United States,” he said.

Investigation Continues

Some critics charge the administration no longer believes Iraq possessed chemical or biological weapons just prior to the war.

“They’ve been convinced since last November that they weren’t there, that in fact they were destroyed,” said Lawrence Korb, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress in Washington.

Feith yesterday, though, said administration officials were certain Iraq had possessed such weapons and said that the CIA-run Iraq Survey Group was continuing its efforts to account for them.

“We are still in the process of finding out exactly what the situation is, what happened with Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, which we know Saddam had,” he said.

In October 2003 and again in March, the group reported finding no evidence of WMD stocks since it began its work in June 2003, but said it was still searching. 

The group’s former chief, David Kay, this year said that after searching, and interviewing Iraqi scientists, he believes sanctions and inspections discouraged the Iraqi government from stockpiling weapons and that weapons were probably destroyed over time (see GSN, March 16).

Korb said Kay told him last November that Iraq Survey Group personnel were being diverted by the administration to other intelligence-gathering work, and that the group had good reason to doubt the existence of the weapons. 

“When they interrogated the prisoners, the prisoners said the whole thing was a sham, that, ‘we never reconstituted them. The whole thing was, we were bluffing,’” Korb said.

The March report by Kay’s successor, Charles Duelfer, said Iraqi scientists and managers who might have unconventional weapons information were extremely reluctant to speak freely, fearing for their personal safety.

Feith said yesterday the prospect of terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction is still the administration’s foremost security concern.

“The principal strategic danger to the United States in the war on terrorism is the possibility that terrorists could get their hands on chemical, biological or nuclear weapons,” he said.


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