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Risk of Nuclear Attack Greatest in Three Decades Due to Terrorists, Nonproliferation Expert Says By Chris Schneidmiller WASHINGTON — The world is at greater risk of a nuclear attack now than it has been for three decades as terrorists continue to seek nuclear material and security measures remain inadequate to block their efforts, a nonproliferation expert said yesterday. There are four major opportunities for nuclear terrorism, William Potter said: terrorist acquisition of an intact nuclear weapon, theft of fissile material that could be used to develop a crude bomb, an attack on a nuclear installation and use of a radiological “dirty bomb.” “All of these nuclear threats are real. All deserve the attention of the international community,” said Potter, director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Potter is a lead author of the center’s new book, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, and he discussed the two-year study’s warning during a panel discussion on nuclear terrorism at a nonproliferation conference hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The heightened danger of a nuclear attack comes from terrorists’ willingness to use a nuclear weapon and the likelihood that some organizations could develop a radiological device if they obtained the right material, according to the book. Potter said the study calls on world governments to reduce the potential for an attack of the highest consequences — one using an actual nuclear weapon. Recommendations include accelerating the securing and elimination of highly enriched uranium that could be used to develop a nuclear weapon; reducing risks in Central and South Asia that Islamic terrorists will acquire atomic arms; and safeguarding vulnerable Russian nuclear weapons. “Failure to act swiftly will ensure that terrorists will win what [former U.S. Senator] Sam Nunn has called the race between cooperation and catastrophe,” Potter said. The United States also must prepare for the aftermath of the most likely nuclear terrorist threat — use of a device that combines radioactive material and a conventional explosive, the book states. While the explosion of a dirty bomb could cause casualties, the released low-level radiation is unlikely to kill anyone, said panel speaker Michael May, a Stanford University professor and former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. However, the radiation would force the evacuation and subsequent decontamination of an area of up to several city blocks, May said. There are tens of millions of radioactive material items today in the world, used everywhere from hospitals to industrial sites, May said. Hundreds of thousands could be dangerous, and thousands go missing each year, he said. “There’s a fairly good possibility of use [of a dirty bomb] unlike, we hope, a nuclear weapon,” May said. Tighter regulations must be established on licensing and accounting for radioactive material, and options must be expanded for proper disposing of items, he said. May also called for stronger preparations for the aftermath of a radiological attack, including setting standards for the evacuation of an attack area and for the eventual repopulation of the area, better decontamination methods and equipment and training for first responders who would be called to the attack site. While Potter and May focused on the danger of a terrorist nuclear attack, the final two speakers at the panel discussed what has already been done to meet that threat. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which oversees the nation’s commercial nuclear power reactors, has revised its threat assessments of terrorist attacks and increased cooperation with other government agencies, said Carnegie Institution President Richard Meserve, former NRC chairman. The commission has also beefed up inspections and pressed the private facilities to strengthen security, Meserve said. Each reactor has “concentric circles” of security that include fencing, full vehicle searches at gates, access control systems, intrusion detectors reinforced concrete walls, steel barriers, and a trained and well-armed security force. “Anyone who tells you a facility can’t be attacked is wrong,” Meserve said. However, “The capacity of [security] is very significant and I believe it’s far higher than people in the public realize,” he added. The General Accounting Office stated in a report last year that the commission played down the significance of security problems at civilian reactors and operated flawed exercises on terrorist attacks. Critics in Congress have accused the agency with making insufficient security upgrades since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks (see GSN, June 4). Meanwhile, a GAO study issued yesterday called on the U.S. Energy Department to prepare plans to meet heightened threat assessments by the end of fiscal 2006 at five DOE facilities that contain plutonium and highly enriched uranium that could be used for a crude nuclear weapon. The U.S. government is also continuing to work with other countries to block diversion of fissile material, said panel speaker Paul Longsworth, deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration. There are dozens of facilities in dozens of countries “where security is probably not what it should be,” Longsworth said. The international effort is focused on securing fissile material, border interdiction of material and reducing civilian uses of the substances, he said. “Once you get the fissile material it’s probably easier than we would like” to use,” Longsworth said. Longsworth pointed to a recently announced U.S. plan, called the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, as one aspect of U.S. work to secure fissile material. The Energy Department effort includes repatriating spent nuclear fuel and highly enriched uranium fuel to the United States and Russia, and converting civilian nuclear reactors from using highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium, which would be extremely difficult to use in a weapon. The United States is also equipping borders, seaports and airports with detection equipment and training personnel to identify dual-use technology and other materials, Longsworth said. Longsworth and Meserve were grilled during a question-and-answer session by some audience members who questioned reactors’ security against an airplane attack and the continued use of plutonium at two U.S. facilities, among other topics. Both men acknowledged that protection efforts are works in progress. “It will never be fast enough until we are done with this work,” Longsworth said. “And I want to reassure you we’re working to get that work done,” he added.
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