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IAEA Reports Few Instances of Diverted, Undeclared Nuclear Materials, Activities By Mike Nartker WASHINGTON — The International Atomic Energy Agency last year found only two instances of diverted nuclear materials or of undeclared materials and activities in countries where safeguards inspections were conducted, the agency announced last week (see GSN, June 30). Last year, the agency conducted safeguards activities in 40 non-nuclear weapons-states where both comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol were in force or being applied. Under comprehensive safeguards agreements, countries are required to accept IAEA safeguards on all fissionable materials. The Additional Protocol to a country’s safeguards agreement gives that agency the ability to conduct more intrusive monitoring of a country’s nuclear activities. The Bush administration has proposed making the Additional Protocol a requirement for countries seeking access to nuclear materials. There were 40 countries in 2003 in which both comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol were in effect. The organization found no indications of diversion of nuclear materials or of undeclared materials and activities in 19 of those nations, the agency said in its annual safeguards statement. The 19 countries were Australia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Ecuador, Ghana, the Holy See, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Slovenia and Uzbekistan. In an additional 19 countries, the agency found no indication of nuclear materials diversion, but was still working to evaluate possible undeclared materials and/or nuclear programs. Spokesman Mark Gwozdecky refused to comment last week on when the agency might complete its safeguards conclusions for the remaining countries, noting that a “variety of factors” may need to be addressed. “Conclusions can only be drawn when the agency has had sufficient information and has completed sufficient activities to do so, including resolving any questions or inconsistencies with regard to declared information,” he said in a written response to Global Security Newswire. The remaining two countries — Iran and Libya — were found last year to have violated their safeguards agreements by engaging in undeclared nuclear activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency said. Iran’s nuclear program, which Tehran claims is intended for civilian power production only, has been the subject of several IAEA reports and Board of Governors’ resolutions. Most recently, Iran announced last month that it would resume producing uranium enrichment centrifuge components, and Iranian lawmakers said last week that they may move to scrap an agreement reached last year with three European countries under which Tehran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment in return for nuclear technology (see related GSN story, today). Libya revealed earlier this year that it had covertly obtained uranium enrichment technology, which was subsequently dismantled and shipped to the United States as part of Libya’s pledge to end its WMD efforts. In March, the IAEA Board of Governors approved a resolution referring the Libyan case to the U.N. Security Council, but indicated no need for further action against Tripoli since it had “remedied the situation,” Gwozdecky said. The IAEA also conducted last year safeguards activities in 98 countries that had comprehensive safeguards agreements in place but lacked the Additional Protocol. Of these countries, 36 of which had “significant nuclear activities,” no indications were found of diversion of nuclear materials that had been placed under IAEA safeguards, the agency said. The agency was unable last year to conduct safeguards inspections in North Korea due to Pyongyang’s decision in late 2002 to expel agency personnel who had been monitoring the 1994 nuclear freeze agreement there. In June of last year, the agency conducted safeguards activities in Iraq to verify the nuclear material subject to safeguards at the Tuwaitha nuclear complex. In April 2003, the nuclear materials stored at Tuwaitha, such as natural and low enriched uranium, were subject to looting and as much as 10 kilograms of material may have been dispersed, the agency said. It added, though, that the amount and type of missing material was “not sensitive from a proliferation point of view” (see GSN, May 24). In addition, the agency found no signs last year of diverted nuclear materials that had been placed under agency safeguards and no signs of misuse of nuclear-related facilities and equipment under safeguards in Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan. These four countries have “item-specific” safeguards agreements in place with the organization. Under such agreements, the agency is required to ensure that the specific nuclear-related items placed under safeguards are not diverted to military uses. Early this year, top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan confessed to having transferred nuclear-related technologies to Iran, Libya and North Korea; and there is suspicion that other countries may have also been clients. The agency did not note such transfers in its 2003 safeguards statements, however, because the lack of a full-scope safeguards agreement with Pakistan means the agency does not have authority there, Gwozdecky said (see GSN, June 23). Safeguards activities were conducted last year at “selected facilities” of four of the five declared nuclear weapons states — China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States — according to the agency. In those four countries, the agency found no diversion of nuclear materials that had been placed under safeguards. “On this basis … the agency concluded that the nuclear material under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for,” the agency said. Russia is the fifth recognized nuclear weapons state. In the five nuclear weapons-states, the agency has in effect “voluntary offer agreements,” under which each country has offered some of its civilian nuclear materials and/or facilities from which the agency may choose which to impose safeguards. No facilities were selected in Russia last year for the application of agency safeguards, the agency said in its report. By the end of last year, 45 non-nuclear weapons-states that are NPT members had not yet brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as required under the treaty. As a result, the agency was unable to conduct safeguards activities in those countries.
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