The United States is set to aid the destruction of chemical weapons agent stored at a site in Albania (Senator Richard Lugar’s office). U.S. to Aid Destruction of Albanian Chemical Weapons By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The United States is set to aid the destruction of Cold War-era stockpiles of chemical weapons in Albania, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) announced yesterday (see GSN, April 26)...Full Story

Treaty Withdrawals by U.S., North Korea Possibly Undermined Arms Control, Researcher Says By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — By each pulling out of a major arms-control treaty in recent years, the United States and North Korea may have set precedents that “lowered the threshold” for future withdrawals, according to an essay in the 2004 edition of a respected international security almanac (see GSN, May 10)...Full Story

North Korea Says No Talks Until U.S. Meets Demands; Powell Rejects Bilateral Negotiations With Pyongyang North Korea said today it would not consider returning to six-party talks aimed at resolving the standoff over its nuclear program until the United States agrees to three specific demands, Reuters reported (see GSN, Oct. 21)...Full Story

	Friday, October 22, 2004

Pentagon Office Skewed Prewar Intelligence to Exaggerate Ties Between Iraq, Al-Qaeda, Senator Says By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A U.S. Defense Department office headed by Undersecretary for Policy Douglas Feith skewed prewar Iraq intelligence to exaggerate the alleged ties between former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime and al-Qaeda, according to a report released yesterday by Senator Carl Levin (Mich.), the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee (see GSN, Oct. 5). The 46-page report presents the findings of an inquiry conducted by committee Democrats into prewar Iraq intelligence. It alleges that Feith’s policy office “was predisposed in favor of finding evidence that supported the hypothesis that al-Qaeda had a collaborative relationship with the Iraqi regime” to support the case for war against Iraq.  Feith’s office sought to advance such a hypothesis, according to the report, by seeking changes in reports prepared by the U.S. intelligence community and by taking its views directly to senior Bush administration officials. According to the report, Feith’s office sought to recharacterize findings and to include previously omitted “raw” intelligence in reports prepared by the intelligence community, which was more skeptical of the alleged links between Iraq and al-Qaeda. In one example noted by Levin’s report, the office sought more than 30 changes to a 2002 CIA assessment, of which half were made “either as requested or with caveats.” The report also notes the differences made in three versions of a briefing Feith’s office provided separately in 2002 to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, to then-CIA Director George Tenet and senior intelligence officials and to senior staff from the vice president’s office and the National Security Council.  The report says that one slide included in the briefing to White House officials discussed an alleged 2001 meeting in Prague between Mohammed Atta, one of the hijackers involved in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, and an Iraqi intelligence officer. The slide was not included, though, in the briefing provided to senior intelligence officials, whose personnel had been skeptical that such a meeting ever occurred, the report says. In the runup to Operation Iraqi Freedom, senior White House officials, including President George W. Bush, made a number of statements alleging a long-standing relationship between former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime and al-Qaeda. In a report released this summer, though, the Sept. 11 commission determined that while there had been contacts between prewar Iraq and al-Qaeda, there was no sign of a developed relationship between the two.  “In order to present a public case that heightened the sense of threat from Iraq, administration officials reflected more closely the analysis of Undersecretary Feith’s policy office rather than the more cautious analysis of the IC [intelligence community],” Levin’s report says. Levin’s report came under fire yesterday from both the Pentagon and Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner (R-Va.), with both alleging that the report may be politically motivated. “The Levin report appears to depart from the bipartisan, consultative relationship that exists between the Department of Defense and the Senate Armed Services Committee,” a Pentagon statement said. Both the Pentagon and Warner noted that an inquiry into prewar intelligence on Iraq conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found that there was no evidence that intelligence analysts were pressured by the administration to change their assessments on either Iraq’s alleged WMD efforts or links to terrorism.  Warner also said in a statement that there was “no conclusive link” between prewar statements made by White House officials on Iraq’s alleged ties to al-Qaeda and the work of Feith’s office. “While certain policy-makers may have had access to the Feith analyses, they had equal access to comparable analyses from all entities in the U.S. intelligence community in formulating their views.  And competitive analyses and diversity of views in intelligence actually strengthen the policy-making process, as the 9/11 commission concluded,” he said. Back to top       Goss Promises to Overhaul CIA Operations Abroad New CIA Director Porter Goss pledged to agency employees that he would restructure the CIA Directorate of Operations, which conducts intelligence activities abroad, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Sept. 22). “I think we need to rebuild a true global capability,” with “more eyes and ears everywhere,” Goss said last month in a private address to CIA employees on the day he began work, according to a transcript obtained by the Post. Goss said he would allow officers to focus one “target” for extended periods and would stop “shuffling people around on artificial schedule.” He also said that he would encourage operatives and analysts to take greater risks, adding that “when it goes wrong,” he would provide his full support, the Post reported. “I believe this very wholeheartedly,” Goss said. “We need to take risks” (Dana Priest, Washington Post, Oct. 22). Back to top

Treaty Withdrawals by U.S., North Korea Possibly Undermined Arms Control, Researcher Says By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — By each pulling out of a major arms-control treaty in recent years, the United States and North Korea may have set precedents that “lowered the threshold” for future withdrawals, according to an essay in the 2004 edition of a respected international security almanac (see GSN, May 10). The U.S. withdrawal from the U.S.-Russian Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2002 shared a common feature with North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003, according to Christer Ahlstrom, writing in the recently released SIPRI Yearbook. Each country invoked a standard arms-control clause allowing for legal withdrawal when “extraordinary events” are cited. The withdrawals themselves were “unprecedented in the modern history of international arms control,” Ahlstrom wrote. Perhaps more significantly, the explanation each country provided for its action did not appear to measure up to the “extraordinary events” standard — potentially relaxing the standard for other countries to withdraw from arms-control treaties. That “would run counter to the interest of stability and predictability in international relationships,” wrote Ahlstrom, deputy director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which published the book, and a former Swedish nonproliferation official. A Requirement to Discourage Withdrawal Extraordinary events clauses in arms-control treaties traditionally have given parties a right to withdrawal from a pact after a specified period of time if it decides that “extraordinary events” related to the “subject matter of the treaty” have “jeopardized its supreme interests.” Treaties otherwise do not define an extraordinary event, leaving a justification open to subjective interpretation, he noted. Commentators, nevertheless, have “generally felt that the need to openly defend a unilateral withdrawal would serve as a factor that would influence states not to use it,” Ahlstrom wrote. Neither North Korea nor the United States, however, appeared to meet with even the basic standard of justification for withdrawal from the treaty as spelled out in the clause, according to Ahlstrom. “None of the arguments presented by the states concerned in support of the use of the clause would seem to be persuasive,” he wrote. North Korea North Korea announced it would withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty “after having violated its obligations under the NPT,” Ahlstrom wrote. It did so after the United States declared that North Korea had admitted to having a clandestine uranium enrichment program, he wrote. “Invoking the right to unilateral withdrawal in the face of one’s own violation of a treaty is difficult to reconcile with the [international legal] principle that ‘a breach of an obligation cannot produce legal results beneficial to the law-breaker,’” he wrote. While the North Korean government did not specify the extraordinary events invoked, he wrote, it alleged U.S. efforts to “stifle” North Korea and a “hostile” U.S. policy toward the country that used International Atomic Energy Agency inspections as tools to further its agenda. U.S. hostility might have been in response to North Korea’s suspected violation, Ahlstrom said. The United States In justifying the 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the Bush administration cited proliferation concerns. It said that since the treaty entered into force in 1972, “a number of state and nonstate entities have acquired or are actively seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction.” It said further, “It is clear, and has recently been demonstrated, that some entities are prepared to employ these weapons against the United States” and that some states were developing long-range ballistic missiles that could deliver such weapons. In light of those events, the administration said, the United States “must develop, test, and deploy antiballistic missile systems.” The U.S. missile defense system is expected to be activated this year (see GSN, Oct. 12). The United States did not make a particularly strong case, according to Ahlstrom. The justification gave “no information as to which states or nonstate actors have succeeded in acquiring WMD, let alone any assessment on how far those entities that are striving for such a capacity have progressed,” he wrote.  He continued, “The recent ‘demonstration’ of the use of such weapons against the United States is not described. Furthermore, as far as the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles is concerned, it can hardly be said to have transpired.” To invoke “an emerging threat” as basis for unilateral treaty withdrawal, he wrote, may set a precedent that future withdrawals are justified as “a preventive measure against an event that has not yet transpired. It is unclear whether such a use was envisaged when the clause was formulated.” Ahlstrom added that the threat justification provided by the United States did not fall under the subject matter of the treaty, which he said is limiting defenses against ballistic missiles. The implications of the two withdrawals for the future are unknown, he wrote. However, neither withdrawal produced any negative consequences for the withdrawing country and “this could set a future standard and may in a sense ‘lower the threshold’ for the invocation of this type of withdrawal clause in order to terminate legally binding relationships.” Back to top

North Korea Says No Talks Until U.S. Meets Demands; Powell Rejects Bilateral Negotiations With Pyongyang North Korea said today it would not consider returning to six-party talks aimed at resolving the standoff over its nuclear program until the United States agrees to three specific demands, Reuters reported (see GSN, Oct. 21). The United States must drop its “hostile policy,” join other countries involved in the negotiations in offering compensation for Pyongyang to freeze its nuclear efforts, and schedule discussions of South Korea’s past nuclear tests first in the six-party dialogues, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman told the official KCNA news agency (see GSN, Oct. 12). “The D.P.R.K. is approaching the six-party talks strictly in its interests,” said the spokesman. “In other words, it will attend the talks if they prove helpful to it.” North Korea regularly complains of the U.S. hostile policy. The United States is unlikely to offer aid now or allow talks on South Korea’s nuclear program to open the negotiations, Reuters reported (Martin Nesirky, Reuters/Yahoo!News, Oct. 22). The Bush administration remains committed to six-party talks that also involve South Korea, Russia, China and Japan, and has no plans to bargain directly with North Korea, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell told the Far Eastern Economic Review. “We will not change our policy. We will not get into a direct, bargain basement negotiation with the North Koreans because the other nations [involved in six-party talks] have as great a responsibility and equity as we do,” said Powell. Powell said that there is no evidence that North Korea has produced more than the one or two nuclear devices intelligence analysts have estimated the communist nation possesses (see GSN, Oct. 4). “The assumption was that the Agreed Framework had capped the North Koreans at one or two — it didn’t grow. And we never were sure, and we’re not — no one’s ever seen these weapons. But the best intelligence estimate is that they probably have one or two,” he said (State Department release, Oct. 21). Under the 1994 agreement, North Korea pledged to freeze its nuclear program in return for energy aid from the United States.  U.S. officials in 2002 charged that North Korea was operating a secret nuclear program; the deal collapsed and North Korea pulled out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Meanwhile, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher yesterday confirmed a report of recent U.S. contact with North Korean officials. “As you know, we do have contact with the North Koreans from time to time in New York, and we did have contact recently. I think it was Monday,” he said. “It was basically one of the regular working-level — routine working-level contacts that we have. The principal topic was questions of the monitoring of food assistance, which has been an ongoing issue for us that we wanted to raise again with the North Korean officials,” he added. Asked whether the nuclear issue was raised, Boucher replied, “I don’t know. I just don’t know at this point” (State Department briefing, Oct. 21). Back to top       Iranian, European Officials Expected to Meet Again Next Week for Further Nuclear Talks Iranian officials said yesterday they need time to consider the proposal put forth by France, Germany and the United Kingdom for Tehran to end its uranium enrichment activities, the Financial Times reported (see GSN, Oct. 21). The European powers would have to put their proposal in writing before it could be formally considered, said Hossein Mousavian, foreign policy chief of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Any decisions would have to be made by a “high-level” meeting of Iranian officials, he said. Iranian and European representatives agreed to meet again at the same level next week, according to EU officials, while a higher-level meeting involving foreign ministers is unlikely to occur before the Nov. 2 U.S. presidential election (Gareth Smyth, Financial Times, Oct. 21). U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said yesterday that Washington remained skeptical of a successful resolution to the standoff via the European proposal. “The important thing about the meeting is … are [the Iranians] going to comply with the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of [Governors]? Are they going to carry out their obligations, or not?” “I don’t know if it’ll come today. I don’t know if it’ll come tomorrow. Unfortunately, history would lead us to think the answer is going to be no,” he added (State Department briefing, Oct. 21). Some experts said a negotiated settlement would depend heavily on U.S. support, Agence France-Presse reported, and that the Iranians would probably wait for the results of U.S. elections to respond to the offer. “I think if [Democratic presidential candidate Senator John] Kerry wins, Iran would strike a compromise that would essentially delay the issue until early next year,” said Gary Samore of the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies. “I don’t get a sense that Iran is ready to agree to the suspension. I could see the Iranians restoring the suspension for only a brief period of time,” he added. Others, however, thought Iran was likely to strike a deal with the Europeans. “I can’t believe Iran would turn down” the European package, said David Albright, a former IAEA inspector and president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington. “If Iran turns this down, reasonable people would have to [conclude] the country wants nuclear weapons,” Albright said. Albright added that he was concerned about offering Iran a light-water reactor, said to be part of the European package, because the technology still produces material that could be weaponized. The larger difficulty, Albright said, is that “Iran wants assurances from the United States that Washington is not going to overthrow the Tehran regime.” A negotiated settlement “can’t move forward without the United States buying into it,” Albright added (Michael Adler, Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Oct. 22). Some experts said Israel has not ruled out military action to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, the Los Angeles Times reported. Pre-emptive strikes have always been an Israeli military option, according to the Times. The most prominent example is the June 1981 air raid attack on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. “The comparison to 1981 is of the utmost relevance because the decision-making is based on the same factors,” said army reserve Col. Danny Shoham, a former military intelligence officer who is now a researcher at Bar-Ilan University. “Those are:  What is the reliability of the intelligence picture? What would be the response of the opponent? What is the point of no return in terms of nuclear development, and what would be the international response?” Other experts, however, noted that there remained significant differences between the two scenarios, namely, that Iran’s nuclear sites are scattered throughout the country and often hidden or heavily fortified. “It would be a complicated operation. In order to undermine or disrupt the Iranian nuclear program, you would have to strike at least three or four sites,” said Ephraim Kam, the deputy head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. “Otherwise the damage would be too limited, and it would not postpone the program by more than a year or two, and this could in the end be worse than doing nothing,” he added (Laura King, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 22). Back to top       U.S. May Reconsider Sanctions on Indian Scientists The United States might lift sanctions imposed last month against two Indian scientists for allegedly aiding Iranian nuclear efforts, a senior U.S. official said yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 14). India has called on the United States to lift the sanctions imposed against Y.S.R. Prasad and C. Surendar, saying the two scientists had been unfairly charged with wrongdoing. The U.S. State Department has released no details about the alleged aid for Iran’s nuclear program except to say it occurred during the first half of last year, Reuters reported. The senior U.S. official said yesterday, though, that the United States might reconsider the sanctions, according to Reuters. “The Indians are being given a chance now to clarify, rebut, give us any information and we promise we’ll consider it,” the official said. The United States is also considering imposing sanction on as many as three additional Indian entities for allegedly aiding Iran’s nuclear efforts, Reuters reported (Carol Giacomo, Reuters, Oct. 21). Back to top       Russian Defense Minister Denies Submarine Lease Russian Defense Ministry Sergei Ivanov today denied recent Russian news reports that India planned to lease a Russian Akula-class nuclear submarine for 10 years, according to the Associated Press (see GSN, Oct. 22). Ivanov said that he discussed military purchases during a visit to India in January, “but there was no talk of leasing any submarines” (Associated Press, Oct. 22). Back to top

Judge Won’t Allow Hatfill to Question Scientists A federal judge yesterday ruled that a scientist identified by the Justice Department as a “person of interest” in the 2001 anthrax attacks cannot question scientists consulted in the case by federal investigators, USA Today reported (see GSN, Oct. 8). U.S. District Judge Reggie Walton told lawyers representing Steven Hatfill that releasing the depositions of experts consulted by the FBI would risk giving the anthrax killer insight into the investigation. “I hope Dr. Hatfill didn’t do this. I don’t know if he did.  I don’t think anybody knows,” the judge said. “There are some very unique things the government is doing at this time. If ... this were to be known to the perpetrator, it could have an adverse impact on the investigation.” Hatfill, a former scientist for the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick in Maryland, filed a federal lawsuit last year alleging that U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft and the FBI wrongly linked him to the attacks to create the appearance that the investigation was moving forward. Justice Department attorneys have given Walton secret briefings on the investigation’s progress over the past year to justify at least three requests for delay to keep Hatfill from acquiring depositions and other evidence, according to USA Today. Walton yesterday told investigators he likely will allow the lawsuit to move forward if the case is not solved by April 22 of next year (Toni Locy, USA Today, Oct. 22). Back to top

U.S. to Aid Destruction of Albanian Chemical Weapons By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The United States is set to aid the destruction of Cold War-era stockpiles of chemical weapons in Albania, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) announced yesterday (see GSN, April 26). The project, set to begin in 2005 and expected to last about two years, will involve the destruction of 16 tons of chemical weapons agent at a cost of about $20 million, according to a Lugar press release. It did not say how much funding the United States would provide for the effort. The senator’s office said that information on the type and location of the stockpile was being withheld to “ensure operational security or prevent revealing to potential proliferators or terrorists information that could endanger the stockpile.” Swiss officials, who have also been involved in efforts to dispose of Albanian chemical weapons, have previously described the stockpile as consisting of mustard agent located at a site about 50 kilometers from the Albanian capital of Tirana. The United States recently installed security fencing and monitoring equipment at the stockpile site. Security concerns persist, according to a Lugar spokesman, who said yesterday in a written reply to Global Security Newswire that “theft and black market sale was certainly a possibility for these materials.” Albania last year declared its small chemical weapons stockpile to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which oversees the Chemical Weapons Convention. In May 2003, the United States and Albania reached a cooperation agreement establishing the foundation for U.S. assistance to the chemical weapons destruction project. Washington is next set to deliver to the Albanian government a draft agreement defining the scope of the project, according to the Lugar release. Lugar’s office referred questions on details of the project to the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which did not comment. U.S. aid to the disposal project will be provided through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which seeks to secure and dispose of former Soviet weapons of mass destruction. The Albanian project marks the first time that CTR funds would be spent outside of the former Soviet Union, according to the Lugar release. U.S. lawmakers approved last year a measure to allow the president to spend up to $50 million in CTR funds on projects located outside of the former Soviet Union. “Russia will continue to be a major focus but emerging risks must also be addressed in the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere.  Nunn-Lugar has developed a unique capability to meet a variety of proliferation threats and I am excited that it will address this unique threat present in Albania,” Lugar said in a statement. Lugar, along with former Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), was one of the original architects of the CTR program. [EDITOR’S NOTE: Sam Nunn is chief executive officer, and Richard Lugar serves on the board, of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. NTI is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by the National Journal Group.] Back to top       Depot Investigating Possible Worker Sarin Exposure Officials at the Umatilla Chemical Depot in Oregon are investigating whether two depot workers were exposed to sarin last week inside a storage facility, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Oct. 19). The two unidentified guards were checking a filter on Oct. 15 when they detected a metallic taste in their mouths, depot officials yesterday told the Pendleton East Oregonian. One worker noticed the smell of rotten eggs while the other suffered a runny nose, according to AP. “We’re investigating for possible exposure to chemical agent,” said Army spokesman Jim Hackett. A runny nose indicates possible nerve agent exposure, though the egg smell is not an indicator, he said. A blood test Saturday indicated some type of exposure, Hackett said, but a follow-up test Monday came back negative. The depot is awaiting the results of a urinalysis, which Hackett said could take up to a week. The workers’ clothing tested negative for contamination, Hackett said, and the two were not given an antidote for chemical agent exposure (Associated Press/Corvallis Gazette Times, Oct. 21). Back to top       Madagascar Joins Chemical Weapons Convention Madagascar on Wednesday formally joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, according to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (see GSN, Oct. 6). Madagascar submitted its instrument of ratification to the United Nations, and the treaty’s provisions will enter into force for the country on Nov. 19.  To date, 167 countries have joined the treaty (OPCW release, Oct. 22) Back to top       Japan Conducts WMD Counterterrorism Exercise Japan today conducted a drill aimed at thwarting chemical weapons smuggling ahead of next week’s scheduled Proliferation Security Initiative exercise to be held off the coast of Tokyo, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Sept. 22). Dozens of officers from the Tokyo Metropolitan Police nuclear, biological and chemical weapons unit and the Japanese customs service participated in today’s counterterrorism exercise, which involved disposing of a container of mock toxic liquid discovered at a customs inspection site, said Foreign Ministry official Michiru Nishida. Japan is scheduled Tuesday to host a 15-nation maritime exercise under the U.S.-sponsored Proliferation Security Initiative. Participants are expected to practice intercepting and boarding ships suspected of engaging in WMD trafficking, according to AP (Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Oct. 22).       Back to top

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